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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
n 18 December 2008, the EU opened a new chapter in its accession 
negotiations with Turkey on Chapter 10 on Information Society and Media. 
In its common position of 18 December 2008, benchmarks were established 
as regards the alignment of primary legislation with the EU acquis, remedies and 
authorisations, the administrative capacity and independence of the telecoms 
regulator, the reform of legislation on audiovisual policy and the launch of an 
extensive public consultation with stakeholders. Against this background, the 
Turkish government has undertaken a number of initiatives that promise to bridge 
the gap with the EU acquis. These include the enactment of a new law on electronic 
communications, No. 5809; a redefinition of the institutional framework that led to 
the creation of a new integrated regulator (ITCA); and important steps towards a 
more dynamic and effective spectrum policy, which include the award of long-
awaited 3G licenses and upcoming WiMax and MVNO (mobile virtual network 
operator) licenses.  
More in detail, in the telecoms field the latest progress report published by the 
European Commission in November 2008 acknowledged that Turkey is progressing 
in its gradual alignment with the EU acquis. However, outstanding concerns remain 
on several issues such as universal service, licensing, and the need to promote 
competition in the fixed sector, especially in the ISP market. In addition, there is a 
need to reduce communications taxes imposed on operators, which have proven 
detrimental to market entry, penetration and usage intensity, especially in the mobile 
sector. Finally, the relative independence of the sectoral regulator was found to be 
detrimental for Turkey’s growth in this field.  
Compared to the telecoms sector, the area of audiovisual services is certainly the one 
where the most significant discrepancies still exist between the EU acquis and the 
Turkish framework. This is particularly important since, with over 14 million 
television-owning households, the Turkish broadcasting market is one of the largest 
in Europe. The yardstick for assessing the situation in Turkey is the EU Television 
without Frontiers (TVWF) directive. Major divergences are found in many areas, 
including definitions, jurisdiction, freedom of reception, promotion of European and 
independent works, advertising and tele-shopping, protection of minors, restrictions 
on the share of foreign capital in radio and television companies, funding of the 
O
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public service broadcaster, independence of the regulatory authority (RTÜK) and the 
targets set for digital switchover (2014 v. 2012). 
In November 2008, the new Turkish law on electronic communications was finally 
passed. One of the main purposes of Law No. 5809 is to align the Turkish regulatory 
framework with the EU acquis. However, this objective was only partially achieved. 
The new law can be significantly improved: provisions on universal service, 
spectrum planning, tariff regulation and general provisions on the competencies of 
the NRA (national regulatory authority) give the impression that the NRA could act 
as market regulator, planner and supervisor, taking over also the responsibilities of 
the NCA in scrutinising operators’ conduct ex post. Provisions on tariff regulation are 
often not linked to the performance of a market analysis, and some articles suggest 
that SMP notification will not be needed in order for the NRA to apply a plethora of 
rather intrusive remedies. Finally, legal certainty is hampered by other provisions, 
including provisions on the revocation of spectrum.  
Moreover, the law itself seems to introduce an element of complexity into the system, 
and thus fails to provide the long-awaited (and strongly requested at EU level) 
streamlining and simplification of the regulatory framework. This is due to the very 
long set of transitional measures (‘Final Provisions’), and – more generally – to the 
choice made by the Turkish legislature to enact a law that amends previous 
legislation, rather than a brand new law. In this respect, developing and enacting a 
consolidated text would have been far more preferable. 
Looking forward: Regulatory alternatives and policy scenarios 
This report addresses a number of issues that are likely to come under the spotlight 
in the negotiations of Chapter 10 in the months to come. These include universal 
service, licensing and authorisations, spectrum policy, number portability, mobile 
termination, MVNO licensing, taxation of e-communications services and available 
options to open up the fixed-line sector to competition. For each of those issues, we 
identify a number of regulatory options and provide an analysis of the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the option at hand. Table 1 below contains a 
summary of all the options considered for each of the issues analysed. 
Options were combined into four different scenarios, in order to identify the 
combination likely to bring the highest net benefits for Turkish citizens. Each 
scenario was then subject to a cost-benefit analysis. Costs are expressed in terms of, 
i.a. opportunity costs, inefficiencies in policy formulation and implementation, low-
quality business environment and administrative costs. Benefits are expressed in 
terms of reduced price, increased competition, innovation and growth, availability of 
products and services and choice for consumers, regulatory certainty, more efficient 
governance, etc. 
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Table ES1. Regulatory options 
Option  Description Costs Benefits 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
1.1.0 No policy change ☻ ☻ 
1.1.1. More transparency in the allocation of the USF ☻☻ ☻☻ 
1.1.2. More transparency and transfer of USF to the Telecom authority ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.1.3. Alignment with the acquis through a new USO regulation ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
LICENSING AND AUTHORISATIONS 
1.2.0. Maintain the wording of Law No. 5809 ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.2.1. Full alignment with the EU acquis ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
1.2.2. General authorisations for all services  ☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
1.2.3. A hybrid system ☻☻☻ ☻ 
SPECTRUM POLICY 
1.3.0. No policy change ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
1.3.1 Introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific bands ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.3.2. Clustering of digital dividend in line with COM(2007)700 ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
NUMBER PORTABILITY 
1.4.0 Implementing current plans ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
1.4.1. Reduction of switching time to less than 5 days ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
TERMINATION RATES 
1.5.0. No policy change ☻☻☻ ☻ 
1.5.1. ‘Glide path’  ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.5.2. ‘Glide path’ towards ‘single efficient MTR’ ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.5.3. ‘Glide path’ + no internal non-discrimination obligation ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
MVNOS 
1.6.0. No action on MVNOs ☻ ☻ 
1.6.1. Authorisation of MVNOs ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
1.6.2 Mandated entry of MVNOs ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
PROMOTING COMPETITION IN THE FIXED-LINE AND BROADBAND SECTOR 
1.7.0 No policy change ☻☻☻☻  
1.7.1 Investment ladder ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.7.2 Regulatory holidays ☻☻ ☻ 
1.7.3 Functional separation ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
TAXATION 
1.8.0. No policy change ☻☻☻☻  
1.8.1. Elimination of Treasure Share and SCT ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
AUDIOVISUAL POLICY 
2.1.0. No policy change ☻☻  
2.1.1. Alignment with the EU AVMS Directive ☻☻ ☻☻ 
2.1.2. Alignment with the AVMS Directive + spectrum reform ☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
2.1.3. Alignment with AVMS Directive + spectrum + improved governance ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
NRA INDEPENDENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY 
3.1.0. No policy change ☻☻ ☻ 
3.1.1. Better delineation of competences in broadcasting, spectrum, licensing ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
3.1.2. Cooperation with NCA, reduced state ownership, transparency, RIA ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
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1. NO POLICY CHANGE 
Under this scenario, Turkey would not introduce additional policy measures 
compared to laws and regulations that are currently being adopted (such as the 
licensing of 3G). In this situation, alignment with the acquis will of course remain 
insufficient, and one of the most important consequences for Turkey would be that 
negotiations on Chapter 10 would fail.  
Overall, there are very little benefits that would accrue to Turkish citizens from 
preserving the current situation in the e-communications and media sectors. Without 
new legislation, Turkey would virtually remain outside of the EU; in addition, absent 
the streamlining of licensing and authorisations, very little competition would 
emerge in the fixed-line and broadband sector, due to difficulties in entering the local 
calls market. Moreover, rather rigid spectrum policy and the absence of a pro-
competitive spectrum plan for the digital dividend will leave Turkish citizens with a 
rather limited possibility of entering the digital age from the front door. This 
situation would be worsened by the rigidities in the current audiovisual policy 
framework and consequently by the limited access to (foreign) premium content 
featured by the current framework. Recent changes in legislation to enable wholesale 
broadband access would not be sufficiently enforced due to limited capacity and 
independence of the NRA, both in the e-communications and (most notably) in the 
media sectors. 
2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2008 NPAA 
The most important measures announced in the NPAA are related to:  
i) Implementation of the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) and access to 
emergency services (the so-called 112 emergence number) within 2 years; 
ii) Adoption and implementation of the Authorisation Directive in line with Law 
No. 5809; 
iii) Opening up the market to MVNOs in 2009 through general authorisations; 
iv) Amendment of Law No. 3984 within 2 years to align it with the AVMS Directive 
as regards broadcasting principles, legal framework for digital broadcasting and 
its licensing, the transmission/re-transmission rights and the frequency 
allotment – i.e. licensing, authorisation and bidding – procedures; and 
v) Improvement in the administrative capacity of the NRA. 
3. ‘FULL ALIGNMENT’ WITH THE ACQUIS 
This scenario includes currently proposed rules and policies at EU level and would 
require, compared to scenario 2, the following measures: 
i) New rules are introduced to clarify the assignment of rights of way; 
ii) Full alignment with the EU acquis on authorisation and licensing, through the 
removal of ambiguous provisions contained in Art. 9 of Law No. 5809; 
iii) Introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific spectrum bands; 
iv) Reduction of the porting time to one working day; 
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v) Glide path to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile termination rates and gradual 
convergence towards the ‘single efficient MTR’; 
vi) Licensing of new operators for local calls and implementation of ‘investment 
ladder’ model; and 
vii) The independence and effectiveness of the NRA are strengthened in order to 
ensure the effective implementation of already available remedies, especially in 
wholesale fixed-line and broadband access. 
4. ‘ALIGNMENT’ PLUS PROACTIVE POLICY MEASURES 
In addition to scenario 3, in this case Turkey would: 
i) Adopt a spectrum plan based on the clustering of the UHF band proposed in the 
recent communication on the digital dividend; 
ii) Implement current plans on mobile portability; 
iii) Adopt a glide path to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile termination rates and 
refrain from adopting the internal non-discrimination obligation on one SMP 
player proposed in the analysis of market 16; 
iv) Adopt the AVMS Directive, align with EU spectrum reform objectives and 
improve governance of spectrum by reorganising competences; and 
v) Strengthen NRA-NCA cooperation, plan a reduction of state ownership of 
incumbents, increase transparency and adopt RIA. 
 
Comparison of scenarios assessed 
The table below summarises our scorecard analysis of the four scenarios, 
where each option has been scored from 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
Table ES2. Summary scorecard analysis of the four scenarios 
 
The preferred scenario for Turkey is thus Scenario 4, in which the current debate on 
future EU rules (including rules on termination and portability) is not fully mirrored 
by the Turkish framework, and more time is left for operators to close the gap with 
the EU27 in sectors that have been affected by delays (e.g. in 3G services). Our 
conclusion is that Turkey may profit significantly from a set of targeted reforms, 
aimed at solving existing problems that have been highlighted, i.a., by the European 
Commission and also by the recent ECTA Scorecard 2008. These include:  
vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
• The streamlining of primary legislation – possibly through a consolidated text, which 
clarifies the currently confusing framework created by the enactment of a law (No. 
5809) that overlaps and co-exists with previous laws and by-laws.  
• A more proactive approach towards the liberalisation of the fixed-line and broadband 
sectors, possibly by implementing the investment ladder model (due to a lack of 
alternative infrastructures) and, in the medium-term, by addressing the problems 
of limited access to the local loops, concentration of all infrastructures in the hands 
of the same player, spectrum liberalisation and the optimal choice of the band 
used for WiMAX.  
• Efforts to bring the regulatory framework in line with the EU framework, especially in 
the areas of Universal Service, spectrum policy and mobile termination rates. 
• A clear and reliable plan to drastically reduce taxation in the area of mobile and internet 
services, thus boosting usage (also in terms of MoU) and penetration. 
• Striving for ‘better regulation’, by prioritising the clear delineation of roles and 
responsibilities between the various authorities active in the field, from ITCA to 
RTÜK, the Competition Authority, the Ministry of Transport, etc.; and also by 
providing for systematic use of impact assessment and public consultation.   
Finally, we also explore the potential timing and sequencing issues that can lead 
Turkey towards the implementation of a welfare-enhancing policy strategy in the e-
communications and media sectors. The graph below illustrates the proposed stages 
of reform. 
Figure ES1. Proposed timing of steps 
Jan 09 Jun 09 Jan 2010 Jun 2010 Jan 2011 Jun 2011 Jan 2012
• General authorisation
• Alignment of USO 
regulation
• NRA independence
• Spectrum policy
• Glide path + elimination 
of internal non‐
discrimination obligation;
• Reduction of SCT to 15%;
• Policy statement on the 
regulatory model
• Alignment with the AVMS 
Dicrective
• Implementation of 
“investment ladder”
• Authorisation of MVNOs;
• Elimination of SCT and 
and Treasury Share
• Clustering and use of UHF 
to bridge the digi. Divide
• Reduction of state 
ownership of incumbent 
players
• Adoption of mandatory 
RIA for all decisions
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 18 December 2008, the EU decided to open two new chapters in its 
accession negotiations with Turkey, namely Chapter 4 on the Free Movement 
of Capital and Chapter 10 on Information Society and Media. In this report, 
we focus on Chapter 10 and on the available options for Turkey in negotiating 
its provisions. In doing this, we follow the Impact Assessment methodology 
as developed in the EU and contained in the 2005 IA guidelines. In addition, 
we tailor this methodology to the specific features of the task to be 
accomplished, i.e. the appraisal of regulatory and strategic options available 
to the Turkish government from a cost-benefit perspective.  
From many viewpoints, the Turkish e-communications sector is vibrant and 
fast-moving. With a population of 70 million of whom a majority are 
youngsters, Turkey has an enormous potential, which however can be 
unleashed only within a regulatory environment that is conducive to 
investment and competition. Against this background, some features of the 
Turkish regulatory framework have been often considered to represent an 
obstacle to the development of the sector. In earlier studies, Burnham (2006), 
Akdemir et al. (2007) and Atiyas and Renda (2007) have observed that 
modernising the Turkish telecommunications sector could boost lower prices, 
better choice of services, innovation and growth. For example, Akdemir et al. 
(2007) estimate that the potential contribution from Turkey’s alignment with 
the EU acquis and implementation of a UK-like or Finland-like telecoms policy 
could be an increase in Turkish GDP of 0.428% yearly.  
As regards regulatory reform, an important factor for Turkey is represented 
by the prospect of joining the European Union. Against this background, the 
European Commission has issued rather satisfactory statements on the state 
of alignment of Turkey with the EU acquis in the field of telecommunications 
services, although progress is still expected in a number of areas. By contrast, 
as highlighted by the European Commission in its 2006 Progress Report, 
Turkey was found not to be aligned with EU standards on e-commerce; 
likewise, concerns were expressed as regards the alignment of Turkish 
legislation with the EU acquis on audiovisual services and European 
standards, where progress “on most of the related priorities of the Accession 
Partnership is lagging behind considerably”. Also in the latest progress report 
on EU-Turkey accession negotiations, the European Commission reported 
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that “Turkey has made some progress in the area of electronic 
communications, in particular regarding the secondary legislation”; however, 
the Commission also noted that “the country is only partially aligned with the 
EU framework”, and in particular that “Turkey’s level of alignment with the 
audiovisual acquis remains limited”.  
In its common position of 18 December 2008, the following benchmarks have 
been set for Chapter 101: 
1. Alignment of primary legislation with the acquis. Turkey must complete 
the legislative alignment with the acquis on electronic communications, 
and with the acquis on information society services2. 
2. Remedies (secondary legislation) and authorisations. Turkey should 
secure the implementation of competitive safeguard measures against 
operators with significant market power following market analyses, and 
the general authorisation regime in line with the acquis. 
3. Administrative capacity. Turkey must ensure sufficient administrative 
capacity to enforce the acquis in the field of electronic communications, as 
well as the transparency, predictability and independence of the 
telecommunications regulator. 
4. Audiovisual policy. Turkey should adopt legislation aimed at transposing 
the acquis in the field of audiovisual policy, including measures to ensure 
that the national legal framework complies with the principle of freedom 
of reception and retransmission of television broadcasts. 
5. Public consultation. Turkey should complete a public consultation with the 
relevant stakeholders as regards the impact of the measures adopted in 
view of enhancing the transparency of the audiovisual regulatory process 
and the independence of the competent regulatory body. 
These five benchmarks appear rather challenging and open to different 
interpretations. In many cases, there are several different options available to 
the Turkish government in reaching the benchmark. This is true especially for 
some of the benchmarks: for example, what constitutes “effective 
implementation” of competitive safeguards is open to interpretation, as are 
the concept of “sufficient” administrative capacity and independence of the 
regulator.  
In the next sections, we briefly summarise the basic features of Turkey’s 
information society and media sectors and the areas in which alignment with 
the EU framework is still missing. Section 3 will explore the options available 
                                                 
1  These benchmarks are intended as complements to the provisions already set in the 
Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, which contain some provisions on both 
e-communications and audiovisual services. These, however, mostly overlap with the ones 
illustrated here in the text.  
2 As will be clarified in the next sections, in November 2008 Turkey finally passed its new 
Law on electronic communications (Law No. 5809), which will be analysed in detail In 
Section 2.5 below.  
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to the Turkish government in meeting the benchmarks, whereas Section 4 will 
combine those options into scenarios and discusses the timing of preferred 
measures. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks and comments on the 
need for monitoring and evaluation of the chosen policy options.  
1.1 Methodological issues: a brief concept note 
An impact assessment (IA) exercise implies standardised steps, such as 
problem definition, identification and assessment of alternative options, 
selection of the preferred option. For the purposes of this report, however, we 
have added some steps to reflect the complex nature of the exercise to be 
undertaken, which encompasses a number of different policy options. 
Accordingly, our methodology is articulated along the following steps: 
• Problem definition. In this phase, the status quo is analysed. Normally, the 
specific aim is identifying market failures or regulatory gaps that could be 
filled by government intervention. In our case, the problem is already 
specified – Turkey needs to align with the EU framework along the 
benchmarks set in the Council common position in reopening Chapter 10. 
In addition, since our aim is to assess the most efficient and effective way to 
comply with the benchmarks set, it is useful to describe the current market 
developments, so to fully describe the status quo and establish a 
counterfactual for any assumed future legislative or regulatory change.  
• Definition of alternative regulatory options. For the purposes of this IA report, 
regulatory alternatives are mostly related to the benchmarks set by the 
European Commission. Looking at the benchmarks, different sets of 
alternatives can be found in the enactment of new legislation/amendment 
of existing legislation; but also in different options to implement and 
enforce existing legislation; and in the provision of new capacity and a 
more independent status to the sectoral regulator. Accordingly, various 
sets of alternative options are likely to be found in such a complex process, 
and each of them has to be analysed in isolation.  
• Assessment of the pros and cons of each alternative option. This phase involves 
an assessment of the expected risks and opportunities of each option 
identified in the main areas covered by the negotiation table. Where 
possible, the impact in the short to medium-term is quantified. For all 
issues covered, we develop a SWOT analysis, i.e. a detailed analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 
• Building and assessing “bundles of options”. Once each of the major pending 
issues in EU-Turkey Chapter 10 negotiations has been analysed in isolation, 
we proceed to an analysis of available combinations of options, which we 
term “scenarios”. Since they provide a comprehensive picture of the 
selected options, scenarios account also for possible interrelations between 
different regulatory options, and as such represent the most effective and 
meaningful way to assess the expected impact of Chapter 10 negotiations. 
Each option will be assessed by accounting for potential benefits 
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(investment, competition, end users, harmonisation with EU acquis, 
macroeconomic benefits such as growth and jobs); and costs 
(switching/harmonisation costs, costs for end users, industry costs, 
administrative burdens, etc.). For policy scenarios, we diversify options in 
terms of degree of alignment (“full”, “partial”, “none”); and timing of 
alignment (e.g. “big bang” v. “gradual”).     
• Identification of the preferred policy option. After the pros and cons of policy 
scenarios have been compared, an indication of the preferred alternative 
becomes possible. In most IAs, it is hard to identify one precise set of 
options that clearly dwarf all others in terms of costs and benefits. 
Moreover, the IA final outcome is only to be intended as a support to the 
government choice, not as a replacement for the political decision to be 
taken by policymakers. Section 4 of this report contains an identification of 
the suggested set of regulatory initiatives to be undertaken in Turkey, with 
an indication of the timing.  
• Monitoring and evaluation. Once a set of options has been highlighted as 
preferable, it is useful to pinpoint which indicators and other tools or 
actions could be considered useful for monitoring the performance of the 
regulatory option and evaluating on an interim or ex post basis the 
achievement of the desired results. We do this in section 5 of this IA report.  
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2. PROBLEM DEFINITION (“ZERO OPTION”): TURKEY’S MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT AND ALIGNMENT WITH THE EU ACQUIS 
We define the problem at hand in two different ways: the current state of play 
in the regulation of e-communications in Turkey (regardless of the EU acquis); 
and the lack of alignment with the EU acquis, which triggers regulatory 
intervention.  
The telecommunications sector is a significant part of Turkey’s ICT market, 
which accounts for 77% in a market that reached a total value of $23.5 billion 
in 20073. The telecommunications market has grown by 26% over the last four 
years, and the share of electronic communications as a percentage of GDP was 
3.19% in 2007. This ratio was higher than the EU25 average in 2006 (2.51%). 
Turkey is a net importer of ICT products and average spending per person on 
ICT is around $40 compared to $500 in the EU.4 
 
Table 1 - Breakdown of the Turkish ICT Market (billion USD) 
  2005 2006 2007 
     
Telecommunications 14.3 15.4 18 
IT  4.4 5.5 5.5 
Total ICT  18.7 20.9 23.5 
     
      (Source: TUSIBAD) 
 
In an executive opinion survey conducted by the World Economic Forum, 
Turkey was ranked 40 out of 127 countries in 2007 in terms of “the use of 
information and communication technologies by the government” and 
“improved efficiency of government services facilitating interaction with 
businesses and individuals”. Turkey scored 4.6 on a scale of 1-7 and is placed 
in the top 2nd quartile of the countries surveyed, ahead of Greece, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, Belgium and even Japan, but 
behind Mexico, India and Brazil. Also, Turkey ranks 43rd in the 2008 E-
Readiness rankings published by the Economist Intelligence Unit5. 
As the 2008 Progress Report indicates, Turkey has made some progress in the 
area of electronic communications and information technologies. As of June 
2008, there are nearly 18 million subscribers to fixed lines, which lead to a 
penetration rate of approximately 25%. Fixed-line penetration has however 
been slowly decreasing since 2000, as in the EU27 on average. Revenues from 
fixed voice continue to decline in the EU in contrast with the rapid increase in 
                                                 
3 Source: Turkish Informatics Industry Association (TUBISAD). 
4 ICT Market Survey 2007.  
5 See http://www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=ibm_ereadiness.  
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the mobile and broadband market. Nonetheless, the Turkish fixed-line 
incumbent is one of the most profitable firms of its kind in the world6.  
The total number of mobile subscribers in Turkey has reached 63.6 million 
corresponding to a penetration ratio of 90% in 2008, up from 60% in 2005. The 
convergence with the EU average is fastest in the mobile market (EU average 
mobile penetration was 111.8% in 2007). The number of internet subscribers 
has also increased with the majority using broadband (ADSL) subscription.    
In terms of revenue the size of the telecommunications market in Turkey is 
large in absolute terms but small as percentage of GDP. According to latest 
figures in 2008, the total revenues in this sector amounted to 10.8 billion Euros 
(see Table 2 below) of which 6.1 billion Euros of revenue was generated by the 
mobile sector, 3.7 billion by fixed voice sector and only 722 million Euros and 
289 million Euros by internet services and data communications respectively. 
As can be seen from Table 2 below, the cable television sector is still fairly 
underdeveloped. Among the candidate countries, Turkey is a dominant 
country with its large population, hence the market size. When the absolute 
amount of the revenues in each sub-sector is corrected for population size, 
and expressed as revenue per capita, Turkey’s telecommunications market 
still exhibits a large potential for growth.    
 
Table 2 - Telecommunications Market (2007)-in million Euros, Turkey v. Croatia 
 Turkey Croatia  Turkey Croatia 
 Revenue  Revenue per capita 
Cable television 39.4 14.6  0.54 3.29 
Data communications 288.8 47.7  3.98 10.73 
Internet services 722.5 121.5  9.96 27.35 
Fixed voice 3714.5 691.2  51.23 155.58 
Mobile 6104.9 866.4  84.18 195 
TOTAL 10870.1 1741.4    
Total/GDP 3.19 4.87    
 Source: Cullen International , 2008. 
 
Main (fixed) telephone lines (per 100 inhabitants) have decreased from 26.9 in 
2002 to 24.1 in 2007 representing a reduction rate of 2%. Several EU member 
states have experienced a similar trend in the fixed line telephony market 
although at varying degrees (with the exceptions of Malta, Romania, Slovenia 
and Spain). In contrast with recent trends in fixed line services, mobile sector 
has grown dramatically in the last decade. Mobile cellular subscribers per 100 
inhabitants have reached 82.8 in 2007 and in 2008 90% penetration ratio has 
been achieved (ITU). There has also been strong growth in the last three years 
                                                 
6 See, i.a. D: Neylan, Alternative Telecoms Critical of Türk Telecom, Sunday’s Szaman, 4 January 
2009, at http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=163147.  
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in both internet subscriptions and users where internet users (per 100 
inhabitants) have increased from 14.2 in 2005 to 28.2 percent in 2007.      
 
Table 3 - Basic telecommunications indicators for Turkey 
 
Main 
telephone 
lines (fixed 
lines) per 100 
inhabitant 
Mobile 
cellular 
telephone 
subscribers 
per 100 
inhabitants 
Personal 
computers 
per 100 
inhabitants 
Internet 
subscribers 
(total 
broadband) 
per 100 
inhabitants 
Internet 
subscribers 
(total) per 
100 
inhabitants 
Internet 
users per 
100 
inhabitants 
       
2002 26.9 33.2 4.3 0   
2003 26.5 39.1 4.7 0.3 1.7 6.1 
2004 26.5 48.1 5.1 0.8 2.1 8.4 
2005 25.9 59.6  2.2 3.1 14.2 
2007 24.3 82.8 5.56 6.08 6.26 28.2 
Source: ITU  
 
2.1 Fixed telephony market 
The number of fixed lines in 2007 was 18.2 million and almost 100 percent 
delivered by PSTN technology and 99 percent of the lines serve residential 
purposes. Turkey is still in the process of converting its fixed lines from 
analogue to digital, where the digitalization rate was 99% in 2007. Turkey has 
no party lines anymore which were seen as a potential barrier to any intensive 
use of the telephone service and an obstacle to local loop unbundling. The 
development of competition in fixed lines telephony market has been 
determined by the liberalization process in Turkey. Turkey liberalized first its 
national networks and then its local networks. Currently (2007) there are 32 
operators using CS/CPS calls licensed under Type 2 licenses providing long 
distance services but local call services are provided by the incumbent, Turk 
Telekomunikasyon A.S. (hereinafter, “Türk Telekom”). Among long distance 
service providers, none provide Cable TV services.  
There is almost no competition in the fixed telephony sector in terms of the 
numbers allocated by NRA, where in the case of Turkey no numbers has ever 
been allocated. Türk Telekom currently has 81% market share in terms of 
retail revenue, 91% in minutes of telephone traffic. At the national call level, 
the incumbent holds monopoly position with 92% market share (in minutes) 
and 78% in international calls.  
2.2 Mobile market 
The penetration rate in the mobile sector has increased rapidly over the last 
couple of years, but in comparison to other EU candidate countries like 
Croatia (113.4% in 2007), Turkey still lags behind. The majority (79.9%) of 
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mobile subscribers use prepaid services in preference to post-paid services. In 
Turkey there are three licensed network operators: Turkcell Communications 
Services (since 1998), Vodafone Communications Services (1998) and Avea 
Communications Services (since 2001). After years of announcements and 
failed attempts, Turkey finally auctioned 3G licenses at the end of 2008, and 
the service should become operational in mid-2009.  
 
Table 4 - Market Share of Mobile Operators 
 
 as % of subscribers as % of revenues 
Turkcell 57 65 
Vodafone 27 21 
Avea 16 14 
 
 
One interesting feature of the Turkish mobile market is the high churn rate of 
subscribers, despite the absence of 3G services and Mobile Virtual Network 
Operators. Figure 1 below shows that the monthly churn rate in Turkey  is 
higher than in many other EU member states, and close to that of the UK.  
 
  Source: Cullen International , 2008. 
 
2.3 Internet and Broadband Market 
Turkey has often had broadband penetration rates (6.3%) comparable to those 
of Romania and Bulgaria that joined the EU in 2007. However, as shown in 
Figure 2 below, in the past few years the number of Internet users  
Turkey has a total number of 77 ISPs: however, the incumbent still holds a 
quasi-monopoly position in the market by accounting for 85% of revenues 
Figure 1 – Monthly churn rate in 2008, selected countries 
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and 94% of connections, where xDSL is the main access technology. Turk 
Telecom, the incumbent, does not provide DSL services at the retail level but 
only provide services for resale, including to its own ISP subsidiary, TTNet. 
TTNet had approximately 5 million subscribers as of July 2008 and the 
alternative operators have approximately 250,000 subscribers which have 
been acquired by resale method. The operators plan to migrate most of their 
subscribers from resale to bitstream over the next months. In addition to this, 
the LLU process has been already initiated in January 2008 with a few 
hundred subscribers (Cullen International, 2008). Currently, there is no 
broadband wireless access (BWA) spectrum licensing in Turkey, and although 
there is a general authorisation for provision of Internet services, there are no 
WiFi providers in the case of WLAN. 
 
Figure 2 – total broadband subscribers by country, millions, June 2008 
Total  broadband subscribers, by country, millions, June 2008
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Source: OECD 
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Figure 3 – Broadband penetration in OECD countries, by technology, June 2008 
 
 
Figure 4 – Estimated internet users per 100 capita, 2000-2007 
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Figure 5 – Average and fastest broadband speed in OECD countries 
 
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 from the OECD Broadband Portal give a visual 
comparison of Turkey’s position vis-à-vis other countries in terms of 
broadband access, penetration and pricing. As can be seen in Figure 2, the 
number of total broadband subscribers in Turkey is larger than in Poland, a 
country of comparable size and a member of the EU. However, Turkey has 
the second lowest broadband penetration rate among the OECD countries 
(Figure 3) and the number of Internet users has been close to that of new EU 
member states Bulgaria and Romania until 2007, when the two latter countries 
have exhibited a remarkable increase. In terms of average monthly 
subscription prices (2007 at USD PPP) Turkey’s tariffs are more competitive 
than in several OECD countries including Austria, Canada, US, Portugal and 
Czech Republic. On the other hand, Turkey’s monthly price per advertised 
Mbit/s is the highest in the OECD (Figure 7 below). Finally, Turkey currently 
has the lowest broadband speed in OECD countries (Figure 5). 
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Figure 6 – OECD Broadband penetration and GDP per capita, June 2008 
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Figure 7 – Broadband average monthly subscription price, October 2007, USD PPP 
Broadband average monthly subscription price, Oct. 2007, USD PPP
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 Source: OECD 
 
2.4 The current alignment of the regulatory framework with the 
EU acquis 
2.4.1 Telecommunications 
In the telecommunications field, the Turkish regulatory framework is 
composed by different pieces of legislation, mostly based on Law No. 4502 of 
2000, which amended the previous Telecom and Telegraph law (No. 406) and 
the Wireless Law (Law No. 2183, originally dated April 1983). Law N. 4502 
envisaged that the monopoly rights of the state owned incumbent, TTAŞ, 
would be terminated on December 31, 2003. However, the termination of 
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monopoly rights did not mean full liberalization, as new entry was indeed 
hampered by a restrictive licensing regime.  
Law N. 4502 also established the Telecommunications Authority (TA) as an 
independent administrative agency with power to design and implement 
secondary legislation. In particular, the TA was authorized to issue 
regulations for the telecommunications industry, determine operators which 
are responsible to provide interconnection and roaming services, regulate 
interconnection tariffs, set Reference Interconnection Offers, monitor 
compliance and impose fines in case of non-compliance, issue technical 
standards, test the equipment to check compliance with such standards.  
Initially, the authority to issue licenses remained with the Ministry of 
Transport.  The TA started functioning in August 2000. Later, partly as a 
result of pressures from the IMF, licensing authority was also transferred to 
the TA through Law no. 4673 (May 2001). This law also introduced new rules 
on the ownership of TT. 
As reported several times by the European Commission, the original 
framework laid out in Law No. 4502 was inspired mostly by the 1998 
regulatory framework in the European Union (EU) and was therefore broadly 
in line with the ONP provisions.  As such, it did not contain the “competition 
law” based logic of the new EU regulatory framework that was launched in 
2003. However, over the years the secondary legislation put out by the TA has 
been increasingly modelled after the 2003 package and is based on the 
concept of SMP. Nevertheless, the framework law, as laid out by Law No. 
4502, has put significant constraints on how closely the TA can emulate the 
2003 framework and significant divergences exist, especially in the area of 
authorizations, as discussed below.   
As regards the implementation of existing legislation, a lot has been done by 
the Telecommunication Authority through issuance of secondary legislation. 
The initial approach was reportedly cautious (see, e.g., Atiyas and Renda, 
2007), and this resulted in a lack of liberalization, especially in the fixed-line 
sector. Things went differently in the mobile sector, where three strong 
players currently operate, but delays in issuing 3G (with the tender eventually 
issued on November 28, 2008) and other wireless broadband wireless licenses 
may prove problematic for the future of Turkey’s information society.  
More in detail, in the latest progress report published in November 2008, the 
European Commission acknowledged that Turkey is progressing in its 
gradual alignment with the EU acquis, thanks to the introduction of 
regulations that relate to:  
• The revision of significant market power operators (SMP) and price cap 
regulations;  
• publication of standard reference interconnection offers (RIO) for SMP 
operators; 
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• number portability (operational since 9 November 2008 for the mobile 
sector, whereas fixed-line number portability will be operational from 9 
May 2009);  
• the management and allocation of spectrum, including the preparation of 
important new licenses for mobile virtual operator services, broadband 
wireless access services (WiMAX), and 3G; 
• the gradual reduction of mobile termination rates. 
The European Commission has acknowledged the progress achieved on the 
issues of number portability – possible from 10 November 2008 in the mobile 
market after a central database became operational in the 
Telecommunications Authority – and LLU, following the revision on Turk 
Telekom’s reference unbundling offer last year. 
However, besides problems in the abovementioned areas, outstanding 
concerns remain in the telecoms area, including: 
• The delays in approving the new electronic communications law: the 
Turkish President vetoed four articles on the administrative and financial 
conditions for the regulatory authority and the draft is back in Parliament 
for discussion. The new Law (Law No. 5809) finally came into force on 
November 10, 2008, but still presents important discrepancies with the EU 
framework, and must be implemented through as many as 49 new pieces 
of secondary legislation (see infra, Section 2.5).  
• The difficult implementation of universal service obligations - the scope 
and implementation of USO are still incompatible with the relevant acquis7. 
• The need to strengthen and simplify the licensing regime. As will be 
explained below, the new Law No. 5809 will make important steps towards 
the simplification of the licensing regime, and a licensing clause will come 
into force six months after the publication of Law No 5809 (hence, on May 
10, 2009). However, also in this respect the new law could have been 
drafted in a less ambiguous way. 
• The need to advance in imposing accounting separation and cost 
accounting, in particular on the fixed-line incumbent. 
• The need to promote competition in the fixed sector, and especially in the 
ISP market, where more than 95% of the broadband internet access services 
are provided by the incumbent’s internet operator. In particular, the need 
to secure equitable and transparent conditions for fixed wholesale 
broadband access. In addition, liberalisation of local telephony is still 
pending and undermines competition in the fixed and broadband markets. 
• The need to reduce communications taxes imposed on operators, which 
have proven detrimental to market entry, penetration and usage intensity, 
especially in the mobile sector. 
                                                 
7  http://www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/10/sorular%20ve%20cevaplar_files/SC10_Cevaplar.pdf.  
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• The effective independence of regulatory body from Government (which 
remains an important shareholder in several operators). The regulatory 
body, now called ITCA, is considered to be well staffed with 137 employees 
dealing with regulatory issues and self financed with a considerable 
operational budget; however, it has exhibited a lack of full independence in 
the past years - notably in the authorisation process - and a lack of 
transparency in the decision making process. 
2.4.2 Turkey in the ECTA scorecard 2008  
Further evidence of the relative position of Turkey compared to the EU27 is 
provided by the results of the ECTA Scorecard 2008, released on 29 January 
20098. The ECTA scorecard is based on the responses of ECTA members and 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The scope of the survey indicator 
includes a number of areas regarding the institutional and legislative 
environment as well as the effectiveness of the regulatory authorities in 
implementing and enforcing the regulations.  
More specifically, the assessment of each country depends on the following 
criteria.  
i. Institutional environment: The setting in which authorities and market 
players operate, e.g. the legal framework, the independence, 
enforcement powers and resources of the NRA, and the procedures for 
settling disputes and appeals; 
ii. Regulatory environment: The existence and efficiency of regulatory 
enablers for the evolution of the sector, including rights of way, 
numbering and frequency allotment procedures; 
iii. Efficiency of regulator: The assessment of the regulator’s efficiency and 
transparency, covering the effectiveness of its market analyses, dispute 
resolution and enforcement procedures; 
iv. Application of regulations: Ability of regulatory to ensure a forward-
looking and technologically neutral environment in which operational 
and pricing conditions are met; 
v. Regulatory and market outcomes: Development of voice, mobile, business 
and broadband services, and the degree of competition in wholesale 
and retail markets. 
2.4.2.1 Main findings of the ECTA Scorecard 2008 
The findings of the assessments show that Turkey lags significantly behind 
the EU member states, especially in domains such as the regulatory 
environment and the application of regulations. Uncertainties and deficiencies 
resulting from rights of way and frequency allotment procedures will need to 
be addressed. According to the ECTA report, the Turkish authorities need to 
                                                 
8 See http://www.ectaportal.com/en/basic651.html.  
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ensure that adequate mechanisms are in place to prevent incumbents to use 
their positional advantage to gain artificial benefits with the use of non-price 
strategies. A number of market definitions are not forward-looking, while 
technological neutrality is violated in several cases.  
There are also important issues that lower the country’s scores in the 
remaining areas. For example, the development of the market conditions is 
delayed due to the unavailability of a number of services. Although the 
institutional environment compares well with others, the insufficient 
enforcement powers granted to the regulator coupled with the government’s 
shareholding in the sector can lead to potential problems. Moreover, the 
regulator’s transparency needs to be improved by making its decisions and 
detailed annual accounts available to public. Figure 8 below reports the 
summary results of the ECTA scorecard, showing that Turkey occupies the 
last position. 
Figure 8 – ECTA Scorecard 2008 – summary results 
 
A number of upcoming developments will likely improve the country’s score 
within the next year. The regulatory environment scores will be automatically 
enhanced provided that number portability becomes fully operational by May 
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2009. The requirement of accounting separation and cost-based pricing for 
operators with SMP will do the same for the score relating to the application 
of regulations. 
More in detail, the ECTA scorecard found the following: 
• Institutional dimension. Turkey was found to have a relatively 
inadequate institutional environment, with significant challenges 
remaining in the regulator’s independence and powers. Despite these 
weaknesses, the country compares with some EU member states, 
including Belgium, Germany and Poland. The key challenges ahead are:  
o The insufficient enforcement powers of the NRA, particularly when 
addressing SMP operators. The NRA has not been able to impose 
periodic penalty payments, which is highlighted as a 
particularly effective mechanism for encouraging compliance. 
Moreover, the authority has no power to oblige an operator with 
SMP to separate its assets in that market from its operations in 
other markets. Another (probably less significant) problem is 
that the authority lacks the power to suspend the launching of 
services pending compliance, although it has power to reject 
offers made by SMP operators in an ex-post fashion. 
o The remaining significant government stakes in industry operators. 
The government has significant stakes and an effective veto 
power in the incumbent operator (Türk Telekom), which is also 
a SMP in all fixed market segments. Other government positions 
include indirect ownership of two other players, Avea, TTNet, 
as well as full ownership of Turksat, which offers satellite TV 
and broadband services. 
o The role of government in approving and guiding NRA 
decisions. The regulator needs government approval in a number of 
cases, including “the right of use of scarce resources”, all 
expropriation decisions, and interventions that could cause 
interruption of electronic communications. The Ministry of 
Transport also has the power to provide direction on policies 
regarding the development of communication industry, 
infrastructure and services. Put together, the government’s 
stakes in the industry and its power on the decisions of the 
authority are seen as a potential threat to the regulator’s 
independence. 
• Administrative/regulatory capacity. Despite the deficiencies identified 
above, the Turkish authority scores well in terms of its resources. Much 
like most member states, the authority is well-staffed, with 625 
employees, 279 of which specialize in regulatory issues. Moreover, the 
regulator obtains full marks on its dispute resolution capacity, mostly 
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because the responsibilities are collected under a single roof.9 Similarly, 
the appeal procedure is, by and large, in line with the EU standards. 
However, as evidenced by the country’s low rank, these aspects are not a 
good indicator of its effectiveness.  
• Regulatory environment. The results of the survey show that Turkey has 
remained significantly behind other EU member states. The problems 
highlighted in this section show that market entry, network roll-out and 
the introduction of new services are difficult, due to legal and economic 
uncertainties, inexistence of a legal framework and the slow-paced 
regulatory developments. The country’s rank is likely to improve once 
number portability is adopted by the spring of 2009. The key challenges 
for going forward are as follows: 
o Uncertainties arising from rights of way procedures 
o Technologically dependent in frequency allocation 
o Inexistence of spectrum trading mechanism 
o Little progress in digital switch-over 
Moreover, no common procedure for the resolution of disputes exists, 
which is an additional source of uncertainty. Also, certain state entities 
(BOTAŞ, TCDD, and General Directorate of Highways) auction the rights 
to the highest bidder, which may restrict access to licensed operators only. 
Major problems regarding facility usage/sharing fees also exist; however, 
the 2008 reference bundling offer (RUO) is expected to address these by 
stating terms, conditions and fees applicable.  
• Spectrum policy. There are major problems regarding the technological 
neutrality condition. In particular, the 2.6 GHz is planned as an addition 
to 3G, 900/1800 MHz is reserved only for 2G services. Until the 
finalization of the Broadband Wireless Access services regulation, it is 
also not certain if the 3.5 GHz band will be available for mobile 
broadband services. Also, Turkey is the only surveyed country – along 
with Ireland – which has no frequency exchange mechanism (envisaged 
or in place). Furthermore, the country has made little progress in the 
digital switch-over (planned to take place in 2014), including how to 
allocate the digital dividend (see below, section 3.1.3).  
• Number portability. Partly explaining the country’s low rank in this 
section, number portability has only been recently introduced in the 
country (mobile numbers: 9 November 2008; geographic and non-
geographic numbers, i.e. fixed and VoIP services: expected by 9 May 
2009). The country’s score in this aspect is expected to increase as 
portability becomes a reality over the coming months.  
                                                 
9 See next section for concerns on resolution of disputes on rights of way.  
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Below, de describe more in-depth the main problems faced by Turkey in the 
domains of NRA efficiency, remedies application and enforcement, and 
market conditions.  
2.4.2.2 Efficiency of the Turkish regulator 
Turkish regulatory authority (TA) scores rather low in the efficiency 
indicators, mostly due to the weak transparency of the regulatory process and 
its weak enforcement record. Comparative results show that the apparent 
weaknesses of the dispute settlement body are also mirrored elsewhere, 
implying that most member states face challenges in this respect. The 
country’s score is likely to improve alongside with its enforcement record.  
The key challenges ahead are:  
• Lack of transparency on regulator’s decisions and operations10. The 
timescale allowed for the consultations is quite short, ranging between 
two to four weeks. Moreover, the operational costs of TA are only partly 
transparent; although annual reports are published, no information is 
provided on costs. 
• Delayed revision of market analyses. The regulator’s market analysis 
procedures are in line with the EU standards, with the regulatory having 
completed analyses of 16 markets. One source of weakness is the revision 
process,11 which is already in place for markets 15 and 16 and is expected 
to be completed for all the segments by the end of 2009. In this aspect, the 
regulator’s performance is comparable to the Italian and Spanish 
regulators.  
• Enforcement record. The questionnaire results also reveal that 
enforcement record of the regulator is very weak, since no breach 
notifications or enforcement actions were prompted. This is, once again, 
unparalleled since infringement procedures were instigated in all member 
states. There is some question, also highlighted in the report itself (p. 24), 
as to what extent the measures developed under this subcategory point to 
the underlying efficiency of regulator.  
• Dispute settlement. The problems regarding the efficiency of the dispute 
settlement body, housed within the regulatory authority, is comparable 
with the findings in member states. The timeframe for obtaining decisions 
is long (between two and a half months and one year), but all member 
states are above “the legally mandatory timeframe of four months”, (p. 
62). Similarly, most member states score low in terms of transparency of 
decisions, (only six countries publish any decisions).  
                                                 
10 As the TA now finally has a legal obligation to make its decisions public, its score is likely 
to improve in this dimension.  
11 The questionnaire addressed only revisions up until 31 August 2008 (Question 43); 
therefore the recent revisions initiated by the TA are not considered.  
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2.4.2.3 Application of regulations 
The low score of the Turkish regulatory authority (TA) in market conditions 
can partly be explained by the overall low performance of other countries. In 
most cases, the country’s score is no worse than some less developed 
members, such as Czech Republic and Poland, as well as more developed 
ones, such as Finland, Germany and Sweden. The imminent application of 
account separation methodologies should improve the country’s score within 
a year. Notwithstanding these arguments, the authorities need to work hard 
on ensuring that adequate mechanisms are in place to prevent incumbents to 
use their positional advantage to gain artificial benefits with the use of non-
price strategies.  
The key challenges ahead are the following: 
• Operators with SMP can use position to own advantage via non-price 
strategies. There are no effective guidelines on the application of the non-
discrimination obligation. For example, the incumbent Türk Telekom is 
not required to provide wholesale offers prior to launch related retail 
offers. In the wholesale call termination market, locally generated calls 
cannot be terminated locally, effectively preventing subscribers to take 
advantage of cheap long-distance telephony alternatives. Also, no 
information restrictions are imposed on SMP operators to prevent them 
from using the legacy information to win back customers. 
• Market definitions not forward looking not technology-neutral. In 
terms of technological neutrality and forward-looking approaches, 
Turkey scores very low, mirroring the performance of Czech Republic, 
Greece, Poland, Spain and Sweden. Several problems are highlighted. TA 
has so far refused to oblige the incumbents on Partial Private Circuit 
(PPC) agreements, which restricts neutrality in leased line terminating 
segment (Market 13 or Market 6 in new definition. The exclusion of fibre 
lines (including FTTC/FTTH) from market definitions is also seen as 
violation of the forward-looking approach. Some deficiencies exhibited by 
the Turkish authorities are paralleled in the majority of other countries. 
For example, no remedies are in place to facilitate competition in 
downstream markets with a SMP operator; however, only Netherlands 
has scored full points on this issue. Also, the IP interconnection issue has 
not been examined at all by the regulator, but the same holds in 12 other 
countries. 
• Other operational conditions. A qualified statement on the country’s 
score holds for the operational conditions as well. There are some severe 
problems, such as the lack of processes in place to synchronize number 
portability with other measures, such as local loop unbundling, wholesale 
naked bitstream and wholesale line rental (WLR). These put into question 
whether the equivalence of outputs and (non-discriminatory) migration 
between wholesale products will be achieved in the near future. On the 
other hand, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Poland and Sweden have 
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also low scores in this area. For example, only eight countries have some 
form of migration/synchronization processes in place to ensure that 
entrants have adequate safeguards on the quality of access and can 
migrate between different wholesale accesses.  
Imminent changes in Turkey, if they materialize, should have a positive 
impact on the country’s score in pricing conditions. The requirement of account 
separation and cost-based pricing for operators with SMP, which is currently 
set by law, will become applicable in 2009. This is likely to increase Turkey’s 
score in this area in the upcoming years, as the first separated accounts 
expected to be published within a year. It should be noted that Turkey scores 
better than some member states, including Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Slovenia, and Sweden, where the methodologies applicable to account 
separation are found to be insufficient.  
2.4.2.4 Market conditions 
Turkey’s low performance in regulatory and market outcomes puts into 
question the effectiveness of regulatory measures introduced over the last five 
years. However, it should be noted that all new member states, such as Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, have also scored relatively low in 
this area, pointing to issues relating to the late implementation of the 
regulatory framework.  
The key challenges for going forward are as follows: 
• Limited extent of local loop unbundling (LLU) 
• No mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) 
• Unavailability of wholesale leased line terminating services 
The pricing figures provided by the regulator were compared to the figures 
summarized in the 14th Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package - 2008, which was published by the European Commission 
on 24 March 200912.  
• In narrowband voice services, the reference rates determined by TA would 
put the country above the EU averages and close to average rates in 
Poland.13 A number of services are also virtually inexistent, including the 
capacity-based interconnectivity offer, alternative providers (other than the 
incumbent) that offer telephone services, wholesale line rental (WLR), etc. 
The extent of local loop unbundling (LLU) is extremely meagre, with only 
75 fixed lines on the basis of LLU. While these point to deficiencies, a 
number of providers provide voice-over-broadband (VoB) services for 
                                                 
12 See 14th Implementation Report, Staff Working Document, Vol. 2, Fig. 88 and ff., at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/implementation_enforcem
ent/annualreports/14threport/annex2.pdf.  
13 Local rates were not provided by the regulator. Also, the report has judged the Turkish 
market to be among the most expensive countries based on a general figure of 4 cents/min, 
although no detail is given on how this figure is reached.  
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long-distance services. Moreover, the value of services provided to 
residential and business customers is relatively high, with the retail price 
basket falling among the lowest-third of the distribution, leading to a high 
score.  
• The mobile market, which is more competitive, scores slightly better than 
other markets In particular, the rates for fixed to mobile termination 
charges (5 cent/min) are among the lowest in the survey. Partly attesting to 
the enhanced competitive environment in the market, there is one mobile 
service provider (reseller) that is operational in the country. On other 
measures, the country’s mobile market fares worse than other countries 
included in the survey. In particular, the market is relatively concentrated, 
with one company accounting for 65% of revenues and 56% subscribers. 
Moreover, the price of the basket for average users for mobile retail 
services is relatively high (see Figure 11 below). Moreover, there are no 
MVNOs authorized in the country.  
• In business services, the country has no PPC, as pointed out above, which 
does not allow business users access to a variety of wholesale cost-saving 
opportunities. Due to unavailability of wholesale services, the pricing of 
leased line terminating segment are quite high when compared with EU 
member states (see Figures below).  
• Lastly, in broadband services, the country fares quite badly, mostly due to 
various obstacles remaining for the entry of new competitors in the market. 
The big problems include the low number of unbundled loops, the 
unavailability of fibre optic lines and the wholesale naked bitstream access. 
A comparison reveals, however, that the setup and recurrent tariffs for 
shared access are relatively low.  
Figure 9 – interconnection charges for terminating calls on incumbent’s fixed network as of 
1 October 2008, single transit (EU average: 0.86 €cents) 
 
Turkey: 0.94 €‐cents 
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Figure 10 – interconnection charges for terminating calls on incumbent’s fixed network as 
of 1 October 2008, double transit (EU average: 1.13 €cents) 
 
 
 
Figure 11 – OECD basket for PSTN, 2008 
 
Turkey: 30.49 €
Turkey: 1.49 €‐cents 
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Figure 12 – OECD Business composite Basket, 2008 
 
Turkey: €38.12 (incl. VAT) 
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Figure 13 – OECD medium usage basket, pre & post paid, 2008 
 
Turkey: €40.75 (incl. VAT)
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Figure 14 – Price for 2Mb/s, 2km circuits, per month 
 
 
Figure 15 – Price for 34Mb/s, 2km circuits 
 
 
2.4.3 Audiovisual services 
The area of audiovisual services is certainly the one where the most 
significant discrepancies still exist between the EU acquis and the Turkish 
framework. These services were initially regulated by Law n. 2954 regulating 
the principles and procedures regarding the duties, authorities and 
Turkey: €10,939/yr (incl. VAT)
Turkey: €54,510/yr (incl. VAT) 
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responsibilities of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)14. 
Later, Law n. 3984 of 20 April 1994 on the Establishment of Radio and 
Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts entered into force, and provided 
a more comprehensive set of rules on the provision of broadcast services in 
Turkey15.  
This law envisaged the establishment Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Radio and 
Television Supreme Council - RTÜK) as the regulatory authority for 
broadcasting. One of the key regulatory problems in broadcasting continues 
to be the allocation of broadcast frequencies, which could not be realised for 
years. All radio and television broadcasters must obtain a broadcast licence 
and a broadcasting permit. However, due to the frequency allocation 
deadlock currently, all terrestrial radio and television broadcasts are carried 
out without any licence or official allocation of frequencies. In mid-2005, the 
government announced that it no longer had interest in pursuing with 
analogue frequency allocations and the switchover to digital broadcasting 
would be the next step. 18 commercial broadcasters and the public-service 
broadcaster TRT set up a consortium (Anten A.Ş) in April 2007 to carry out 
the initial planning for the switchover. The targeted date for the digital 
switchover is 2014.  
With over 14 million television-owning households, the Turkish broadcasting 
market is one of the largest in Europe. The number of players now sharing the 
already small advertising expenditure has driven more outlets into 
dependency on non-media revenue sources. This increases the challenges to 
media independence. TRT’s main sources of income are revenue obtained 
from a tax levied on all electricity bills, allocations from the general budget, 
advertising revenue, and income from the sales tax collected from television 
and radio receivers16. 
At the end of 2008, in its yearly report, the Commission found “some 
progress” achieved by Turkey in this area, after the Grand National Assembly 
amended Law n. 3984, following up on an earlier amendment approved in 
                                                 
14 An amendment regulating radio and television broadcasts in Turkey was made in the 
Constitution and was adopted by a referendum on 6 November 1982. In line with Article 
133 of the Constitution, radio stations and television networks could only be established by 
the state and their management would be as public corporate bodies. Furthermore, the 
principle of impartiality would be preserved in the management and supervision of the 
institution, establishment of the administrative bodies and in all radio and television 
broadcasts. 
15  http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=b41eac9a-bc39-4213-91f3-
0d39931c1f1d  
16  Despite a 25% ceiling for foreign ownership, Turkish broadcasting media market attracted 
growing interest from international investors due to the signs of a possible market 
liberalisation following the crisis. In September 2005, the Canadian group Canwest 
acquired two national and two local radios; in July 2006, Rupert Murdoch's News 
Corporation acquired TGRT, a national TV channel. Both groups entered the market with 
their Turkish partners to overcome the foreign ownership limits stated in the law. 
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2002 to further allow broadcasts in languages other than Turkish17. In 
addition, RTÜK recently promoted self-regulation by broadcasters and 
enhanced its administrative capacity to fulfil its monitoring duties. Since 
August 2008, RTÜK decisions are also accessible to the public (in Turkish).  
However, Turkey’s level of alignment with the EC acquis on audiovisual 
policy remains limited to provisions concerning advertising and the 
protection of minors. The amended Law n. 3984 on the establishment of radio 
and television broadcasts still poses problems from several viewpoints, 
including non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, definitions, 
jurisdiction, freedom of reception and retransmission, major events, 
promotion of European and independent works and restrictions on the share 
of foreign capital and television enterprises. As regards the administration of 
the broadcasting sector, RTÜK has not reallocated frequencies or reviewed 
temporary licences. RTÜK established a regular dialogue with the 
broadcasters and enhanced the transparency of its decisions. However, 
further measures are needed in order to strengthen the functionality of the 
regulator. 
The yardstick for assessing the situation in Turkey is certainly the EU’s 
“Television without Frontiers” (TVWF) directive. Major discrepancies are 
found in the following areas:  
• Definitions;  
• Jurisdiction;  
• Freedom of reception;  
                                                 
17  A 2002 amendment to article 4 of the Law no. 3984 on the Establishment of Radio and 
Television Enterprises and their Broadcasts, both public and private radio and television 
had already been permitted to conduct broadcasting in different languages and dialects 
used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. The detailed rules regarding such broadcasts 
were laid down by a “Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts In Different 
Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives” issued 
by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) on 25 January 2004. As a result of 
this regulation, the objective of which was harmonization with EU legislation, radio and 
television enterprises which obtained permission from RTUK were given the right to 
conduct broadcasting in such languages and dialects, provided that certain time limits 
were not exceeded. These limits were 60 minutes per day and five hours per week for 
radios and 45 minutes per day and four hours per week for television corporations. 
According to these regulations, TRT has been broadcasting in Zaza, Bosnian, Arabic, 
Circassian and Kurmanji languages on TRT Radio1 and TRT3 since 2004. After TRT began 
broadcasting in other languages and dialects, Gün TV and Söz TV which conduct 
broadcasting from Diyarbakır, and Medya FM Radio from Şanlıurfa have been permitted 
by RTUK, upon their application, to conduct broadcasting in Kurdish. However, currently 
only Gün TV continues such broadcasting. This latest amendment grants TRT the 
opportunity to extend the period of broadcasts which are made in the mentioned 
languages and dialects, and furthermore to dedicate a channel for these broadcasts. It has 
been announced that when the necessary preparations are completed, a TRT channel is to 
be dedicated to broadcasts in different languages and dialects such as Kurdish and Farsi 
which are being spoken in some regions of Turkey. This channel is to be accessible not only 
in Turkey but also in other foreign countries and especially in the Middle East. 
EU-TURKEY ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS: IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON CHAPTER 10 | 29 
 
 
• Promotion of European and independent works;  
• Advertising and tele-shopping;  
• Protection of minors;  
• Restrictions on the share of foreign capital in radio and television 
companies; 
• Adequate funding of the public service broadcaster.  
• Independence of the regulatory authority (RTÜK).  
• Digital switchover (2014 v. 2012). 
2.5 Law n. 5809: full alignment of primary legislation? 
As already mentioned, in November 2008 the new Turkish Law on electronic 
communications was finally passed. One of the main purposes of Law No. 
5809 is to align the Turkish regulatory framework with the EU acquis. 
However, as will be explained in this section, this objective was only partially 
achieved.  
As a preliminary remark, Law no. 5809 improves upon previous laws like 
Wireless Law No. 2813 and Telegraph and Telephone Law No. 406. Its key 
features are: 
• The creation of the new Information Technologies and Communication Authority 
(ITCA), which replaces the previous Telecommunications Authority. 
Article 6(ç) of the Law improves the transparency of the NRA decisions by 
mandating that every Board decision that concerns the operators and 
consumers is made “publicly available with its rationale and processes”. 
• A broader definition of “Electronic Communication” services, which now 
includes “the transmission, exchange and receiving of all kinds of signals, 
symbols, sounds, images and data which could be converted into electrical 
signals, by means of cable, radio, optic, electric, magnetic, electromagnetic, 
electrochemical, electromechanical and other types of transmission 
systems”. This means that the Law covers also mobile communications, 
satellite telecommunication, internet, data transmission over landlines, 
cable platform and infrastructure operation.  
• A new, simpler authorisation regime for electronic communication service 
providers: The previous legislation contained a number of different 
authorisation types (such as concession agreements, telecom licence and 
general authorizations, see Section 3.1.2 below); the new Law only 
envisages two types of authorisation by the ITCA: (i) notification; or (ii) 
usage right. More in detail, companies wishing to offer electronic 
communication services and/or set up and operate networks or 
infrastructures for such services have notify the ITCA before they start their 
activities. The ITCA will then set out the principles of such a notification. 
On the other hand, the Law requires that operators obtain a usage right 
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whenever an electronic communication service needs the ITCA to allocate a 
specific resource, such as a number, frequency or satellite position18.  
• New provisions on operators' obligations, tariffs about telecommunication 
services, access and interconnection, right of way, spectrum management, 
consumer rights and market surveillance.  
Due to the ambitious and almost ground-breaking nature of Law No. 5809, 
it’s no surprise that the foreseen implementation period is quite long. For 
example, as regards the new authorization regime, the new provisions will 
enter into force only from 10 May 2009 (6 months after the publication of the 
Law No. 5809)19. During the next months, as many as 49 new regulations on 
electronic communication are supposed to be enacted by the ITCA. 
2.5.1 Problems raised by specific provisions in Law No. 5809 
Looking at the new Law No. 5809, there is no doubt that the Turkish 
regulatory framework would become more in line with the EU acquis, once 
the law is fully in place. However, a number of issues remain obscure or still 
divergent from the EU regulatory framework. These include the following: 
• The provisions on tariffs (Articles 13-14) appear to contrast with Article 17 
of the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC). In particular,  there is no 
clear definition of whether tariffs subject to regulatory control include 
wholesale and also retail tariffs. Moreover, while the justification and 
proportionality of obligations imposed are essential prerequisites under the 
EC Universal Service Directive, these principles are completely absent in 
the New Law.  
• Even though Article 6(ç) (Duties and Powers of the NRA) mandates the 
publication of all Board decisions, so far the decisions adopted by the Board 
after the entry into force of the Law have not been published on the ITCA website. 
It must thus be ascertained what is meant by “publicly available” – this 
could be interpreted as publicly accessible (under request), or published on 
the ITCA website.   
• The provisions on the Authorization Regime are aimed at simplifying the 
regulatory framework, but still leave some obscure issues, and are to be 
implemented through a rather long and patchy transition process. More in 
detail: 
o The definition of compliance with the conditions of the 
Authorization Regime is ambiguous. In particular, the law states 
                                                 
18  Hence, a usage right is not needed for new entrants in the fixed-line market, if such entrant 
will rely on an incumbent player’s infrastructure. But a usage right will be needed for 
landlines since it is possible for it to lease the infrastructure (i.e. the landlines) from another 
service provider which has such a usage right. However, a GSM operator will need a usage 
right because it needs a special three-digit number in order to operate GSM services. 
19 Operators which were previously awarded authorisations (such as telecom licence or 
general permit) shall be deemed to have duly acquired the necessary usage right or to have 
made the necessary notification in line with the Law. 
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at Article 9(9) that “[t]he NRA might reject authorization 
applications based on the reasons related to national security, 
public order, public health and other public interests…”; and at 
Article 9(11) that “[t]he NRA might abort the operations of the 
companies based on the reasons related to public security, 
public health and other public interests, upon the review of the 
Ministry”. These provisions are unclear and may leave excessive 
discretion to the ITCA and the Ministry in granting 
authorization for the provision of e-communications services. 
o The law states (Provisional Article 2) that “Authorization and 
concession agreements signed with the Authority before the 
enforcement of this Law shall continue to be valid as per their 
current provisions until their termination due to their 
expiration, annulment, cancellation of the agreement or in case 
of a termination for any other reason whatsoever”. This means 
in particular that concession agreements – such as those 
currently in the hands of the fixed-line incumbent and the three 
GSM (and now also 3G) operators will not be affected by this 
law. Important consequences may emerge in terms of entry in 
the fixed-line sector, and for what concerns regulatory certainty, 
as concessions will have the old law as a legal background 
(including definitions), whereas the others will have the new 
law as basis.  
• The powers attributed to the new NRA are ambiguously defined. In particular, 
the provisions contained at Article 6 on the “Competencies of the 
Authority” appear rather obscure, and may ultimately conflict with some 
provisions of the EU framework directive. These provisions include: 
o Article 6(a), where the NRA is attributed powers to “create and 
protect competition”, as well as “to arrange regulations 
pertaining to the elimination of practices which are obstructive, 
disruptive or limitative for competition”. These competencies 
may appear as inclusive of the competencies of the national 
competition authority (NCA), also since they include the power 
to “impose obligations on operators with significant market 
power in the relevant markets and on other operators when 
required”. More clarity on the relative competencies and powers 
of the NRA and the NCA may help legal certainty.  
o This impression is confirmed by the wording of Article 6(b), 
where the NRA is given the power to “supervise the breaches of 
competition in electronic communications sector which are 
against this Law and against regulations within the scope of this 
Law, to impose sanctions and to take the opinion of Competition 
Authority on the issues regarding the breach of competition in 
electronic communications sector, if specified by the legislation”. 
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o Article 6(d) empowers the NRA, in line with the Framework 
Directive, to “operate the dispute resolution procedure between 
the operators when necessary”. However, the Framework 
Directive specifies that the NRA should exercise its power to 
pursue the objectives laid down at Article 8, whereas the new 
Turkish Law does not clarify the mandate of the NRA when 
resolving disputes. Also, according to Law No. 5809 the NRA 
may “take necessary measures that are binding until reversed by 
the related parties, in case of no settlement is ensured between 
them”. This provision should be clarified along the lines of the 
Framework Directive, which at article 20(2) specifies that 
Member States may resort to other dispute resolution 
mechanisms (including mediation) when this is possible. In 
addition, the new Law could have specified that binding 
decisions adopted by the NRA in this context must be made 
publicly available.  
o Article 6(j) empowers the ITCA to “determine general criteria 
and implementation procedures and principles regarding tariffs 
to be imposed on the users and other operators within the scope 
of access, contract terms, technical matters and other issues 
related to its areas of office”, and “to approve the tariffs and to 
make regulations regarding the supervision of tariffs”. This 
provision appears very broad, and seems to cover both 
wholesale and retail tariffs, independently of the results of 
market analyses and of the corresponding remedies adopted by 
the NRA. Such a general provision may lead the NRA to adopt 
price regulation in a rather uncontrolled way.  
o Article 6(s) confers to the ITCA the power “to audit and/or to 
have third parties to audit the conformity of operators to the 
legislation” and “in case of inconsistencies to perform the 
actions suggested by the legislation and to impose sanctions”20. 
Again, this provision appears very broad and, in addition, does 
not require the NRA to motivate the imposition of sanctions, nor 
to inform the target operator in due time. 
o Article 6(t) seems to extend the power of the NRA to the 
scrutiny of commercial interconnection agreements between 
operators, regardless of whether NRA intervention is justified 
by the specific criteria set in the EU framework. This, again, 
confirms the impression that the ITCA could take over the 
responsibility of protecting competition also on an ex post basis, 
overlapping with the powers of the competition authority. But 
this overlap is not explicitly mentioned, and the relative roles of 
the NRA and NCA are not clarified.   
                                                 
20 Emphasis added.  
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• Article 33 (Carrier Selection and Carrier Pre-Selection) does not require 
that the ITCA performs a market analysis before imposing CS or CPS as 
remedies. The Article prescribes that “[t]he Authority may impose 
obligation on operators to perform carrier selection and pre-selection”. To 
the contrary, Article 19 of the EU Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) 
clearly limits this remedy to operators notified as having SMP, which 
requires a prior market analysis. Again, this is probably also what the 
Turkish legislator meant, but the text does not provide the sufficient legal 
certainty.  
• Article 36(4) on frequency planning specifies that the ITCA “may make any 
kind of amendments including abatement, in a manner not to result in 
infirmity as regards State security and intelligence”, and excludes any kind 
of responsibility “for the regulations made regarding such amendments”. 
This is in stark contrast with the provisions contained at Article 8 of the 
Authorisation Directive, which prescribes that “[p]rovided that all national 
conditions attached to the right to use the radio frequencies concerned have 
been satisfied in the case of a common selection procedure, Member States 
shall not impose any further conditions, additional criteria or procedures 
which would restrict, alter or delay the correct implementation of the 
common assignment of such radio frequencies.” Again, this provision fails 
to provide legal certainly on the limit of NRA powers as regards 
abatement.  
• The same impression is confirmed by Article 40(2), which specifies that the 
ITCA “is entitled to perform spectrum management including spectrum 
planning and frequency allocation, registration and pricing as well as 
spectrum trading including the revocation of allocated frequency and 
resale thereof and to exercise the regulations necessitated by spectrum 
monitoring and inspection for the effective and efficient use of 
frequencies”21.  
2.5.2 General comments 
As noted above, the new Law no. 5809 can be significantly improved, 
especially as regards the current ambiguities in the definition of the limits to 
the NRA power to regulate the market. Provisions on universal service, 
spectrum planning, tariff regulation and general provisions on the 
competencies of the NRA give the impression that the NRA could act as 
market regulator, planner and supervisor, taking over also the responsibilities 
of the NCA in scrutinizing operators’ conduct ex post. Provisions on tariff 
regulation are sometimes not linked to the performance of a market analysis, 
and some articles suggest that SMP notification will not be needed in order 
for the NRA to apply a plethora of rather intrusive remedies. Finally, legal 
certainty is hampered by other provisions, including provisions on the 
revocation of spectrum.  
                                                 
21 Emphasis added.  
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Moreover, the Law itself seems to introduce an element of complexity into the 
system, and thus fails to provide the long-awaited (and strongly requested at 
EU level) streamlining and simplification of the regulatory framework. In 
particular: 
• The very long set of transitional measures (“Final Provisions”) suggests 
that a complex implementation process is to be expected, and may leave 
the market in a state of very limited regulatory certainty. 
• The choice made by the Turkish legislator to enact a law that amends 
previous legislation in many respects, without replacing them, may create 
confusion in the market. Developing an enacting a consolidated text 
would have been way more preferable in this respect, as it would have 
provided a sound legal basis for all acts and secondary legislation 
adopted by the NRA and other public authorities in this sector22. 
2.6 The 2008 NPAA plan  
The 2008 national programme (NPAA) for Turkey was published on 31 
December 2008 in the Official Gazette. In addition to outlining the proposed 
principles to achieve alignment with EU’s political and economic criteria, the 
programme also provides timetables and other operational details associated 
with the intended legal and structural changes for the chapters under 
negotiation. In the area of information society and communications (chapter 
10), the NPAA addresses a number of issues that were highlighted in the 
February 2008 Accession Partnership Agreement and the December 2008 
meeting of the Accession Conference at ministerial level, which officially 
opened the chapter 10 negotiations.23,24  
The programme sets out a number of legislative arrangements addressing 
(i) short-term priorities for the completion and adoption of key 
“starting conditions” (Priority 10.1);  
                                                 
22 For example, in the case of Croatia the adoption of a consolidated text has significantly 
accelerated the accession negotiations. The text was adopted in June 2008. 
23 The (revised) Accession Partnership Agreement (2008/157/EC), published on 26 February 
2008, indicates a number of priority areas proposed by the Commission and adopted by the 
Council for Turkey’s eventual membership. The chapter 10 requirements were the need to 
(i) adopt an electronic communications law and continue alignment with audiovisual 
policy to achieve alignment with the acquis and (ii) complete the adoption of key “starting 
conditions” for EU’s 2002 regulatory framework.  
24 Held on 19 December 2008, the Sixth meeting of the Accession Conference at ministerial 
level with Turkey outlined the more detailed “closing benchmarks” for chapter 10 
negotiations. The key requirements were (i) to achieve and continue alignment with the 
electronic communications and audiovisual acquis; (ii) to safeguard measures against 
operators with significant market power; (iii) to reinforce the powers, transparency and 
operational independence of the telecommunication operator; and (iv) to create a public 
consultation framework for audiovisual regulatory process. For more details, see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/104925.p
df. 
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(ii) mid-term priorities for continuing alignment in audiovisual 
policies, especially regarding the Television without Frontiers 
Directive (Priority 10.2);  
(iii) mid- to long-term priorities for continuing adoption and 
implementation of electronic communication acquis and 
preparing the markets for competition (Priority 10.3); and 
(iv) Long-term priority for ensuring the independence and 
administrative capacity of regulatory authority (Priority 10.4).   
 
With the information provided in the 2008 NPAA, the key legislative and 
structural changes are as follows:  
1. Short-term (1 year): Electronic communications – Authorization of 
mobile and wireless broadband services, mobile virtual network 
operators (MVNOs) and digital terrestrial television (DTT) services; 
2. Mid-term (2 years): Audiovisual policy – Broadcasting principles, 
legal framework for digital broadcasting, the transmission/re-
transmission rights, and frequency allotment procedures.  
3. Mid-term (2 years): Audiovisual policy – Creation of a forum to 
complement work of RTÜK as well as other entities under RTÜK 
for the enhancement of transparency and protection of minors; and, 
4. Mid-term (2 years): Universal service – enhanced access to 112 
emergency number 
In the following sections, we will proved a more detailed examination of the 
chapter 10 measures mentioned by the 2008 NPAA.   
2.6.1 Completion of starting conditions – short-term priorities 
The adoption and implementation of the Authorization directive has been 
identified as one of the key areas of further work in the screening part of the 
chapter 10 negotiations. In particular, in its responses to the EU’s questions on 
the legislation’s compliance with the EU’s 2002 framework, the government 
has admitted that the “current authorization regime needs to be improved.”25 
As illustrated in Table 5 below, most of the short-term priorities focus on the 
implementation of the Authorization Directive (2002/20/EC) into Turkish 
law. According to the programme, the procedures and principles of the 
general authorization regime for the electronic communication sector will be 
determined by the end of 2009.  
In addition, the government also shows its willingness to open the market to 
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), mobile and wireless broadband 
services and digital terrestrial television (DTT) services other than video 
                                                 
25 From page 2 of Turkish government’s response to EU’s questions on Screening chapter 10 – 
INFORMATION SOCIETY AND MEDIA Bilateral meeting EC-Turkey, 13 July 2006, 
Brussels.  
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broadcasting (DVB-T). According to the 2009 business plan of the Information 
Technologies and Communications Authority (BTK), draft regulation on the 
authorization of Broadband Wireless Access Services and MVNOs (Law no. 
5793) have been prepared and have gone through the consultations.26 For this 
reason, it is highly likely that the authorization regimes in these particular 
areas will be enacted in line with the programme.  
It is also worth noting that some of the other “starting conditions” mentioned 
elsewhere are not considered in the programme. For example, the short-term 
priorities make no mention of the rights of way issues and the lack of carrier 
selection and pre-selection for local calls, which have been recently 
highlighted by Olivier Pascal (DG Information Society and Media).27 These 
issues are covered by Law No.5809, although implementing secondary 
legislation would be needed for these issues to be effectively addressed in 
Turkey. 
2.6.2 Audiovisual policies – mid-term priorities 
As shown in Table 6, the audiovisual policies considered in the 2008 NPAA 
focus, to a large extent, on the Television without frontiers Directives 
(89/552/EEC and its amendment, 2007/65/EC). Almost all the addressed 
issues relate to changes that will be made in the current law on the 
Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio Stations and Television Channels 
(Law no. 3984). Adopted in 1994, this law defines the functions, authorities 
and responsibilities of the Supreme Council of Radio and Television (RTÜK). 
The key anticipated changes are the measures on the broadcasting principles, 
legal framework for digital broadcasting and its licensing, the 
transmission/re-transmission rights and the frequency allotment – i.e. 
licensing, authorization and bidding – procedures. 
In addition to the proposed legislative changes outlined in Table 6, the 2008 
NPAA also puts forth a number of corporate restructuring measures. Perhaps 
the most important change is the creation of a Radio and Television Public 
Advisory Forum to complement the work of RTÜK.  With participation of radio 
and television broadcasters, the forum will act as a consultative body for the 
regulatory process and the decisions of RTÜK. According to the details 
provided in the NPAA, the forum will be created in 2009 (Table 10.2.2). A 
number of entities for tracking the alignment with EU acquis, protection of 
minors, etc. are also put forth as structural enhancements. 
The operational costs of the legislative and corporate changes foreseen under 
this priority are estimated to be € 8,220,000. Over 85% of the costs will arise 
from the new equipment and hardware for the new entities mentioned above.  
                                                 
26 For the 2009 business plan of BTK, see 
http://www.tk.gov.tr/Yayin/Is_Planlari/2009_is_plani.pdf.  
27 See Mr. Pascal’s presentation on 17 June 2008 at 
http://www.tbv.org.tr/UserFiles/File/telekom/op.pdf.  
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2.6.3 Continuing alignment with electronic communication acquis and 
preparing the markets for competition – mid- to long-term 
priorities 
Despite its ambitious title, the legal measures presented in this priority are not 
many. Both measures relate to the implementation of the Universal Service 
Directive (2002/22/EC). As depicted in Table 5, the first set of measures 
essentially enhances the widespread use of information technologies within 
the country. Ostensibly, this would increase the demand for such services in 
the country, creating the necessary framework for a deeper market, i.e. use of 
a wider array of services. The second set of measures harmonizes access to 
emergency services (the so-called 112 emergence number) with the EU acquis. 
Despite these modest aims, the total costs arising from the necessary 
arrangements under this priority are significant, estimated to be € 5,995,000.  
2.6.4 Independence and administrative capacities of regulatory 
authority – Long-term priorities 
The issue of independence and the administrative capacity of the regulatory 
authority has been singled out as a “closing benchmarks” in the December 
2008 Accession Conference.28 The single legislative measure set forth under 
the relevant priority area gives little detail on how this broad requirement will 
be satisfied. The 2008 NPAA also states that structural changes are foreseen 
by 2012 to enhance RTÜK’s administrative capacity. Once again, no details are 
provided on these changes; expect for the statement that the amendments and 
measures will give rise to no costs. 
                                                 
28 See footnote 2 on details on the closing benchmarks put forth at the meeting. 
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Table 5 (Translated from Table 10.1.1 in NPAA 2008) 
No EU 
legislation 
Proposed Turkish 
legislation 
Scope Responsible 
agency 
Intended 
adoption 
date 
1 2002/20/EC Regulatory 
amendment to change 
title and content of 
regulation regarding 
authorization from 
“Broadband fixed 
wireless access 
service” to 
“Broadband wireless 
access service” 
Constitution of 
evaluation and 
strategic approach to 
authorization for 
wireless broadband 
access to voice and 
data services; 
determination of 
procedures and 
principles for the 
provision of these 
services 
Information 
technologies and 
communications 
authority (BTK) 
2009 
 2002/19/EC 
and 
2002/20/EC 
Regulation for 
authorization of 
Mobile virtual 
network operators 
(MVNOs) 
MVNO services; the 
ability to provide 
mobile services by 
using the 
infrastructure of 
existing mobile 
operators  
BTK 2009 
3 2002/20/EC Regulation for the 
authorization of 
electronic 
communications 
sector 
Determination of 
procedures and 
principles for 
authorization 
BTK 2009 
4 2002/20/EC Regulation to amend 
authorization 
principles and 
procedures for third 
generation (IMT-
2000/UMTS) service 
and infrastructure 
Determination of 
procedures and 
principles to facilitate 
the development and 
widespread use of 
mobile broadband 
applications 
BTK 2009 
5 2002/20/EC Authorization of 
Terrestrial Digital 
Platform Service 
Operators 
Determination of 
procedures and 
principles for the use 
of infrastructure, 
market definition, and 
authorization type for 
digital terrestrial 
platform services 
other than video 
broadcasting (DVB-T) 
BTK and Radio 
television supreme 
council (RTÜK) 
2009 
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Table 6 – initiative in the audiovisual services sector29 
No EU 
legislation 
Proposed Turkish 
legislation 
Scope Responsible 
agency 
Intended 
adoption 
date 
1 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Law amending the 
current law on the 
Establishment and 
Broadcasting of Radio 
Stations and 
Television Channels 
(Law no. 3984) 
Definitions, the 
power to adjudicate, 
news in brief rights, 
incentives provided 
for independent 
works of art, scope 
(IPTV, video-on-
demand, etc.), 
broadcasting 
principles, European 
works of art, legal 
framework for digital 
broadcasting and its 
licensing, 
transmission and re-
transmission rights, 
regulation of 
advertisement 
windows  
Radio television 
supreme council 
(RTÜK) 
2009-2010 
2 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Regulation on 
principles and 
procedures for 
television and radio 
broadcasting 
Amendments in line 
with the changes in 
law no. 3984 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
3 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Amendment of the 
administrative and 
fiscal conditions for 
private radio and 
television corporations  
Amendments in line 
with the changes in 
law no. 3984 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
4 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Amendment to the 
regulations on 
frequency allotment to 
radio and television 
corporations, bidding 
procedures, licensing 
and authorization  
Amendments in line 
with the changes in 
law no. 3984 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
5 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Smart signs regulation Amendments in line 
with the changes in 
law no. 3984 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
6 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Licensing and 
authorization of 
satellite broadcasts 
Amendments in line 
with the changes in 
law no. 3984 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
7 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Amendment of radio 
and television 
supreme council cable 
broadcasting licensing 
and authorization 
regulation 
Amendments in line 
with the changes in 
law no. 3984 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
                                                 
29 Translated from Table 10.2.1 in NPAA 2008. 
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8 Article 12 of 
EC Treaty 
Law amending the 
current law on the 
Establishment and 
Broadcasting of Radio 
Stations and 
Television Channels 
(Law no. 3984) 
Enhancement of 
conditions restricting 
activities of foreign 
private and corporate 
entities 
RTÜK 2010 (after 
adoption of 
law no 3984) 
9 Article 12 of 
EC Treaty 
Law amending the 
current law on the 
Establishment and 
Broadcasting of Radio 
Stations and 
Television Channels 
(Law no. 3984) 
Removal of 
restrictions on foreign 
capital 
RTÜK 2 years before 
full 
membership 
 
 
Table 7 – (Translated from Table 10.3.1 in NPAA 2008) 
No EU 
legislation 
Proposed Turkish 
legislation 
Scope Responsible 
agency 
Intended 
adoption 
date 
1 2002/22/EC Cabinet decision in 
accordance with 
article 5 of the Law 
on Provision of 
Universal Services 
and Amendments 
(Law no. 5369) 
Enhancement of 
computer literacy 
and prevalence of 
information 
technologies; 
inclusion  of digital 
broadcasting 
services to the scope 
of universal services 
in line with EU 
acquis 
Transportation 
ministry 
To be 
considered 
in the 
perspective 
of full 
membership 
2 2002/22/EC 
and 
2003/558/E
C (recomm.) 
Law on provision of 
emergency services 
Enabling the use of 
the emergency 
number 112 not 
only in medical 
emergencies but 
also for security, 
fire and natural 
disaster 
emergencies.  
Interior ministry 2009-2010 
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Table 8 – (Translated from Table 10.4.1 in NPAA 2008) 
No EU 
legislation 
Proposed Turkish 
legislation 
Scope Responsible 
agency 
Intended 
adoption 
date 
1 89/552/EEC 
and 
2007/65/EC 
Law amending the 
current law on the 
Establishment and 
Broadcasting of 
Radio Stations and 
Television Channels 
(Law no. 3984) 
Frequency 
allotment and 
licensing in 
accordance with 
frequency planning 
for the effective use 
of scarce resources 
for public benefit  
RTÜK 2011 
 
2.7 Caveat: the current review of the EU acquis 
The previous sections have described the current state of the Turkish regulatory 
framework for electronic communications with the current EU acquis. However, 
the latter is currently being reviewed, after a first proposal was presented by the 
European Commission in November 2007. The co-decision procedure has then 
led the Parliament to introduce a number of amendments to the Commission 
proposal in its plenary vote on 24 September 200830. The Commission adopted 
the amended legislative proposals on 6 November 2008. However, the Council 
then voted common positions on the telecom package on 16 February 2009, on 
the basis of the first political agreement found on 27 November 200831. On 17 
February 2009, the Commission adopted a Communication on the Council 
common positions on the telecom package, which expressed concern on the 
Council vote32. The proposed new Telecoms Package is now in second reading 
in the plenary of the European Parliament (expected for April 2009), while 
informal “trialogue meetings” between Parliament, Commission and Council 
are ongoing. 
The proposed new framework contains a number of new provisions, which 
may be relevant for the reforms taking place in Turkey. These include the 
introduction of principles of technology and service neutrality in spectrum 
management; the reduction of the porting time to one working day; the creation 
of a pan-European regulatory authority (initially termed the EECMA, then 
BERT, then GERT); the introduction of functional separation in the set of 
                                                 
30 See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/next/ep/index_en.htm.  
31  http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/next/council/index_en.htm.  
32 In the Communication adopted on 17 February 2009, COM(2009)78 final, the Commission 
noted that “the Council’s position departs substantially from those of the Commission and 
the European Parliament, notably as regards the internal market mechanisms, in particular 
for ensuring consistent regulatory remedies, the additional remedy of functional separation, 
spectrum policy, and the establishment of a regulatory body. As regards the regulatory body, 
the Commission has particular concerns that the Council’s position raises institutional 
questions that constitute a substantial barrier to a satisfactory settlement”. 
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remedies available to the NRAs vis-à-vis SMP operators; etc. In addition, the 
Commission adopted in November 2007 a Communication on the digital 
dividend, which proposes the creation of three sub-bands in the UHF portion of 
spectrum, dedicated to different clusters of technologies. This proposal is 
however still heavily debated.  
Finally, over the past few months a set of new soft-law documents have been 
adopted by the Commission, and are still subject to debate and consultation. 
These include, most notably:  
• The Draft Recommendation on Regulated Access to Next Generation Access 
Networks33, which proposes, i.a., to include a risk premium on access charges 
to NGANs.   
• The Draft Recommendation on the regulatory treatment of fixed and mobile 
termination rates in the EU34, which paves the way for a convergence 
between mobile and fixed termination rates in the future.   
• The new regulation on roaming, which i.a. would introduce a new Euro-SMS 
Tariff from 1 July 2009 (maximum 11 €cents+VAT for sending an SMS from 
abroad), set wholesale caps for data roaming (€1 per megabyte for wholesale 
data roaming fees) and further reduce the Eurotariff for voice calls (as 
regards  making calls, from 43 cents on 1 July 2009, to 40 cents, 37 cents and 
34 cents for each of the following years; for receiving a call, from 19 cents on 
1 July 2009 to 16 cents, 13 cents and 10 cents for each of the following years).  
In the next sections, where relevant, we will take the current proposals into 
account in analysing the regulatory alternatives available to the Turkish 
government in reforming the regulatory framework for e-communications in 
line with the developments of the EU acquis.   
2.8 Turkey’s IT sector: challenges ahead 
Although the present report deals mostly with the telecommunications and 
audiovisual service sectors, it is worth recalling that these sectors cannot be 
seen in full isolation from the IT sector, especially as the telecoms market enters 
the transition towards NGNs, which promise a full convergence between 
telecoms and IT. This is even truer since, in Turkey, the IT sector appears 
underdeveloped compared to the telecoms sector, and this may become a 
problem in the NGN era. As already recalled, despite the boom observed in e-
communications in the past few years, the share of ICT in GDP remains around 
2.5% compared to 8-10% in the EU, and most of this is telecommunications, 
whereas the IT sector is particularly weak. As a matter of fact: 
• ICT imports widely exceed exports35. 
                                                 
33 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/public_consult/nga/index_en.htm.  
34 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/public_consult/termination_rates/index_en.htm.  
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• Average spending per person on ICT is around $40 compared to $500 in 
Western Europe and $1,200 in the US. 
• Turkey’s IT equipment manufacturing capability is modest;  
• Software is largely imported. 
• Local manufacturing activity is limited to assembly. 
• Turkey’s share of ICT specialist occupations in the total economy is the 
lowest in OECD countries36. 
• The current share of software in total market is 15%, which is far below 
worldwide averages.  
In addition, problems have emerged lately also as regards the application and 
content layers of the Internet architecture. In particular, the value of end-to-end 
all-IP platforms to Turkish end-users is undermined by the persistence of 
episodes of censorship, such as the one that involved YouTube in 200737. The 
likelihood that problems related to freedom of expression spread from linear to 
non-linear audiovisual services has been expressed also recently by the 
European Commission in its progress report on Chapter 10 and broadly 
endorsed also by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 12 March 2009 on 
the EU-Turkey’s 2008 progress report. 
To conclude, if Turkey wants to achieve a vibrant information society, the 
weaknesses in the hardware and software sectors and the blocking of content 
and applications must be carefully assessed, especially as the Turkish 
Information Society Strategy for 2006-2010 is about to expire, and some of the 
ambitious goals set for 2010 appear unattainable (e.g. 70% of businesses having 
broadband access).    
                                                                                                                                               
35 See the Report on Turkey’s information and communication technology, http://www.turkey-
now.org/db/Docs/Sector%20Reports/Sector%20Reports%202008/INFORMATION%20AN
D%20COMMUNICATION%20TECHNOLOGIES.pdf.  
36 See OECD Information Technology Outlook 2008, Figure 1.18. 
37 See, i.a., YouTube Banned in Turkey after Video Insults, The Times Online, March 7, 2007, at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1483840.ece.  
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3. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 
In this section, we identify available regulatory alternatives in all the areas 
highlighted as “pending” in the previous section. Each available regulatory 
option is then assessed based on expected benefits and costs. As anticipated in 
one of the previous sections, our template for the analysis is as follows.  
Benefits include: 
• Investment (foreign and domestic);  
• Competition;  
• Benefits to end users;  
• Bridging the digital divide; 
• Harmonisation with EU acquis; 
• Macroeconomic benefits (e.g., growth and jobs, productivity).  
• Other benefits. 
 
On the other hand, costs include: 
• costs to industry players; 
• costs to end users; 
• switching/harmonisation costs; 
• employment costs; 
• administrative burdens; 
• other costs. 
 
3.1 Area 1 – Adapting primary and secondary legislation in the 
telecoms field 
As stated by the European Commission, Turkey must complete the legislative 
alignment with the acquis on electronic communications, and with the acquis on 
audiovisual services. This implies changes both in primary and secondary 
legislation. 
As far as primary legislation is concerned, our analysis of the status quo 
highlighted that the main “fronts” for the Turkish government are related to the 
approval of the new e-communications law, and in particular in the following 
areas: 
1.1. USO legislation – the implementation and management of USO are still 
incompatible with the relevant acquis. 
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1.2. Introduce principles of service and technology neutrality in spectrum 
allocation and management, in line with the Commission’s proposed 
review of the 2002 framework. 
1.3. Introduce stringent time limits for number portability in the fixed-line 
and/or mobile sector, in line with the new (and uncontested) provision in 
the proposed review of the 2002 EU framework, according to which users 
should be able to switch provider within one working day38. 
1.4. Reduction of communications taxes imposed on operators, which have 
proven detrimental to market entry, penetration and usage intensity, 
especially in the mobile sector; 
1.5. Introduce regulation of wholesale and retail roaming tariffs, in line with 
the 2007 and 2008 EU regulations on roaming, covering both voice and 
data roaming.  
As far as secondary legislation is concerned, we analyse the following areas: 
1.6. Equitable and transparent conditions for fixed wholesale fixed-line and 
broadband access.  
1.7. Action on mobile termination rates. 
1.8. Action on spectrum to secure the availability of frequencies for new 
applications, such as 3G and WiMAX. 
1.9. Action on spectrum to open the market to mobile virtual network 
operators (MVNOs) and digital terrestrial television (DTT) services other 
than video broadcasting (DVB-T). 
3.1.1 Universal service 
Universal service legislation in Turkey has long been considered inadequate for 
a modern telecoms regulatory framework. This was due in particular to the 
exclusive attribution of universal service obligations (USO) to Türk Telekom, to 
the fact that the Ministry had competence for operating the universal service 
fund (USF); as well as to the lack of transparency rules as to how the universal 
service fund is spent39. In addition, the set of services included in the universal 
service did not include basic internet service.  
In 2005, Law n. 5369 and the subsequent Universal Service Ordinance n. 26 of 29 
June 2006 have partly improved the situation. After the enactment of this Law, 
and also as part of the privatised concession in 2005, Türk Telekom is now 
obliged to provide a set of ‘minimum services’ (i.e. emergency services, 
directory services and payphones) for free to the entire population. The set of 
                                                 
38 As already recalled, in Turkey mobile number portability is already operational since 9 
November 2008, but fixed-line portability will be possible only from 9 May 2009.  
39 Stakeholders have stated that a recent update of the Ministry’s personal computer stock was 
financed by the USF. See Frontier Economics (2007).  
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services included in universal service now features also “Basic internet 
services”40. Also the new Law No. 5809 mentions that “[u]niversal service 
means electronic communications services including internet access and other 
services to be determined within the scope of this Law”41. 
Interestingly, the fixed-line incumbent has to provide basic fixed line voice 
service to at least 18.9 million subscribers – a feature that has been heavily 
criticized, as it links the population of users to be connected to the number of 
users at 2005. On top of this, no additional geographic universal service 
obligation has been set, which means that since then, the incumbent Türk 
Telekom has connected new customers only if those were deemed 
commercially viable. This is reflected in the recent stagnation in fixed line 
penetration rates, as shown in Table 9 below. 
Table 9 – Number of fixed line subscribers (million), Turkey, 2002-Feb 2008 
 
Source: Tözer and Ünver (2008). 
 
The reported number of subscribers leads to a rather low fixed-line penetration 
in Turkey (approximately 25%), along the lines of other countries such as the 
Czech Republic or Romania. Two representatives of the Telecommunications 
Authority recently wrote that “[t]he penetration level is stabilized around 25-26 
% but if we take into account the fact that average household size is 4.5 then it is 
not wrong to say that effective penetration rate is near 95 percent throughout 
the country”; and that due to fixed-mobile substitution, the number of 
subscribers is also likely to fall below 18 million in the future42. 
This last statement appears puzzling, though. As a matter of fact, reducing the 
number of connected customers also means depriving a growing number of 
households of basic (dial-up) internet service, especially since 3G telephony has 
not yet started in Turkey, and is unlikely to cover rural areas any time soon. At 
the same time, even the most optimistic forecasts on WiMAX deployment in 
Turkey would not dare to imagine full coverage of rural areas in the near 
future, also due to the current choice of frequency bands for WiMAX (around 
3.5GHz), which would require a very costly investment to cover Turkey’s large 
territory43. And even voices on the possibility to use the universal service fund 
                                                 
40 Quote law. 
41 See Additional Article 3 of the Law No. 5809.  
42 Tözer and Ünver (2008). 
43 It was estimated that WiMAX deployment in the 3.5GHz band, besides exhibiting poor 
building penetration potential, would be four times more costly than deployment in the 700 
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for WiMAX deployment in rural areas are hard to believe, if the frequency to be 
used is 3.5 GHz.  
Finally, the current management of the universal service fund (USF) creates 
concerns, in particular since control over the USF is allocated to the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications44. In this respect, since the enactment of the 
Directive COM(96)608, the EU has constantly stated that USFs, where existing, 
must be administered by an independent body, which should be responsible for 
collecting contributions from liable operators and service providers; overseeing 
the transfer of sums due; and/or administrating out-payments to universal 
service providers. Moreover, besides some initiatives that have been 
undertaken to increase the coverage of telecom services45, there is no clear 
policy on what the fund can be used for. This is due to the fact that the funding 
methodology of universal service is not explicitly stated in the law, and indeed 
Law n. 4502 (art. 9) implicitly allows “cross-subsidisation” by Türk Telekom as 
the solution – this is confirmed by the fact that besides some financial assistance 
for the digital switchover, Türk Telekom has not received funds from the USF.  
Accordingly, Türk Telekom had the possibility of pricing long distance calls 
above cost to provide short distance calls below cost. However, in the past few 
years increased competition in long-distance due to the award of authorizations 
has led Türk Telekom to cut prices in this previous “cash cow”. This, in turn, 
can explain why monthly rental fees and local call prices have been increasing46 
and the total number of subscribers has been falling; and why new discounted 
local call packages have been introduced by the incumbent, which carry 
restrictions on usage47. 
Needless to say, the use of cross-subsidies instead of a transparently, efficiently 
designed and independently managed USF is considered to be undesirable in 
many respects in the literature. For example, Clarke and Wallsten (2001) discuss 
                                                                                                                                               
MHz band. However, no plans exist in Turkey for the reallocation of that portion of the 
digital dividend to BWA services such as WiMAX. See below, Section ... 
44 Contributions to the USF are as follows: 2% of the authorisation fees collected by the 
Telecommunications Authority; 1% of net sales revenues of all operators, except for GSM 
operators; 10% of payments by GSM operators to the Treasury; 20% of administrative fines 
collected by the Telecommunications Authority; 20% of what remains in the budget of the 
Telecommunications Authority budget after all expenditures are deducted. These can be 
increased by up to 20% by the Council of Ministers. See Cullen International (2008), 
Enlargement Countries Monitoring Report – September 30, 2008, at 91.  
45 The Ministry of Transport and Communication, which is in charge of the universal service 
policy, has completed a universal service project by awarding a tender to TurkSat whereby 
all schools in Turkey are provided with a broadband access (approximately 40,000). The 
Ministry of Transport and Communication is initiating several universal service projects, 
including an up-coming tender to connect the remaining rural areas (approximately 1,000 
villages) which have so far been not covered by basic telephony services. 
46 See Tözer and Ünver (2008). 
47  E.g. the “HesaphHatt” package. See Alternative telecom firms critical of Türk Telekom, praise 
liberalization, Sunday’s Zaman, 4 January 2009.   
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cross-subsidies and conclude that: (i) they are inherently inefficient, since “by 
separating price from cost they distort consumption and investment decisions”; 
(ii) they are typically not transparent, as they make it “difficult to determine 
who receives subsidies and who funds them”; (iii) they do nothing to 
encourage service to high-cost regions or to the poor since the existence of 
monopoly profits from one group does not induce the firm to provide service to 
another group48; (iv) they are most often badly designed to meet expansion 
goals in the first place, and have therefore been “largely ineffective”. 
In summary, in Turkey universal service appears to be still a matter of only one 
company, the incumbent operator, and is entirely relying on cross-subsidisation 
between different services provided by that company. This equates to stating 
that universal service policy in Turkey has been privatized and kept static 
alongside with the privatization of the incumbent, and the USF is used for 
marginal add-ons such as connecting a limited number of schools. This also 
means that money contributed by all operators to the USF does not really 
contribute to territorial coverage of minimum telecommunication services, but 
to something else.  
This situation, needless to say, can create enormous problems in the 
organization of competition in the fixed-line sector, due to the impossibility to 
link prices to underlying costs. It would be virtually impossible to introduce 
any competition in local fixed-line calls until this is fixed.  
For such reason, it is very important that Turkey progresses in the reform of its 
universal service policy. This can be achieved by: (i) increasing the transparency 
of the allocation of the USF (in the short-term); (ii) transferring the USF to the 
telecom authority, in line with an established orientation at EU level; (iii) 
abolish the USF altogether and fund universal service through other means 
(cost-sharing, public funds, etc.); (iv) completely align with the EU acquis on 
universal service in e-communications – which includes abandoning cross-
subsidies, opening USO to other operators and introducing cost-based 
calculations of USO obligations for funding purposes. Below, we perform a 
SWOT analysis of these options.  
 
                                                 
48 Quoting Brook and Smith (2000). 
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Option 1.1.0. – No policy change 
STRENGTHS 
• Government keeps control of USF 
WEAKNESSES 
• Relies on a single operator 
• Fails to achieve the goal of universal service (does 
not provide incentives to connect more subscribers) 
• Lack of transparency on allocation of USF 
• Cross-subsidization distorts competition 
• Unfit to align Turkey with the “information society 
for all” goals set in the i2010 strategy 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Use of USF to subsidise 
broadband deployment and 
penetration (without full 
liberalization nor competition-
oriented policies) 
THREATS 
• Can be an obstacle to the achievement of Turkey’s 
“broadband for all” goals 
• Hampers full liberalization of the fixed-line sector 
 
 
Option 1.1.1. – More transparency in the allocation of the USF 
STRENGTHS 
• Government keeps control of USF 
• Industry players effectively know 
what they are contributing to 
• Possibility to monitor the way in 
which USF is spent and 
compliance with the law 
WEAKNESSES 
• Does not solve the problems of “zero option” 
• Relies on a single operator 
• Fails to achieve the goal of universal service (does 
not provide incentives to connect more subscribers) 
• Cross-subsidization may distort competition 
• Unfit to align Turkey with the “information society 
for all” goals set in the i2010 strategy 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Use of USF to subsidise 
broadband deployment and 
penetration (without full 
liberalization nor competition-
oriented policies) 
THREATS 
• Can be an obstacle to the achievement of Turkey’s 
“broadband for all” goals 
• Hampers full liberalization of the fixed-line sector 
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Option 1.1.2. More transparency and transfer of USF to the Telecom authority 
STRENGTHS 
• Industry players effectively know 
what they are contributing to 
• Possibility to monitor the way in 
which USF is spent and 
compliance with the law 
WEAKNESSES 
• Still does not solve the main problems in previous 
options 
• Relies on a single operator as USO provider 
• Fails to achieve the goal of universal service (does 
not provide incentives to connect more subscribers) 
• Persisting cross-subsidization may distort 
competition 
• Unfit to align Turkey with the “information society 
for all” goals set in the i2010 strategy 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Transparency on where 
communication taxes are 
allocated 
• The NRA could have the 
mandate to spend USF money for 
“broadband for all” goals 
THREATS 
• The USF would not be used for its main purpose – 
bringing minimum services to all Turkish citizens 
• Absence of cost-based calculations of the burden of 
USO obligations 
• No possibility to reach a level-playing-field in the 
local calls market 
 
 
Option 1.1.3. Alignment with the acquis through a new USO regulation 
STRENGTHS 
• Compatible with competition in 
the provision of local calls 
• Transparency and independence 
in the allocation of the USF fund 
• Cost-based measures of USO 
burdens 
• Technological neutrality 
WEAKNESSES 
• Government cannot control the USF anymore. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Other licensed operators could 
provide service to high-cost areas 
• Competition is not distorted 
neither in long-distance, nor in 
local calls due to end of cross-
subsidies 
THREATS 
• Need for a strong and independent regulator to deal 
with USO calculations filed by the incumbent 
• Need for sound public procurement framework and 
practice to effectively select USO providers in 
different areas/services 
 
As a result, option 1.1.3 – full alignment with the acquis – appears to be far more 
desirable than any alternative. This option, however, requires substantial 
changes to be implemented in a relatively short timeframe, including; (i) 
abolishing cross-subsidies as a means to finance USO; (ii) transferring the 
management of the USF to the NRA; (iii) designing cost-based models to enable 
the NRA to identify areas and services for which universal service funding is 
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required, based on a cost-benefit analysis; (iv) opening up to all telecom 
operators access to competitive selection of USO providers.  
3.1.2 Authorisations and licensing 
Before Law No. 5809 was passed, there were four different types of 
authorisations available to the operators in Turkey:  
• Authorisation agreement – issued to operators where state ownership is more 
than 50%; 
• Concession agreement – issued, following a tender, to a limited number of 
companies providing telecommunications services or operating 
telecommunications networks on a national level;  
• Type 1 licence – issued, following a tender procedure, to a limited number of 
companies providing telecommunications services or networks at a local 
level;  
• Type 2 licence – issued to companies providing telecommunications services 
or networks, where the number of providers is not limited. This category 
includes long distance telephony services (A, B and C-types), cable 
television, satellite, public phones, intelligent networks and value added 
services49.  
 
                                                 
49 Individual licences under each of the four types of authorisations are limited to narrowly 
defined services or activities that are set out in 14 annexes to the Ordinance on 
Authorisations. Each annex defines specific authorisation conditions for a specific service. 
One-off licence fees for long distance telephony services under Type 2 licence are the 
following: A-type (CPS services) - TRY 571,446 (€286,000); B-type (CS services) - TRY 253,976 
(€127,000); and C-type (services provided through a 10-digit number assigned by the TA) - 
TRY 126,988 (€64,000). See Cullen International (2008), cit. The annual fee is 0.5% of net sales, 
plus a further annual administrative fee of 0.35% of net sales. 
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Table 10 – Type of license/authorisation and number of operators, as of February 2008 
Authorisation agreement: No. 
Satellite and cable TV services 1 
Maritime communication and course 1 
Concession agreement:  
GSM services 3 
Various telecommunication services 1 
Type 2 telecommunications license  
Satellite Communications 33 
Satellite Platform 4 
GMPCS Mobile Telephony 8 
Data Transmission over Terrestrial Lines 27 
Long Distance Telephone Services 45 
PMR/PAMR Service License 68 
Infrastructure Operation Services 15 
Cable platform services 5 
General authorisation  
Wired and wireless Internet services 162 
 
At present, Türk Telekom (which signed an authorisation agreement with the 
Telecommunications Authority), Turkcell, Vodafone and Avea are providing 
services under concession agreements. These agreements will not be affected by 
the new Law No. 5809, as specified at Provisional Article 2 of that same Law. 
Until the end of 2008, all other operators were providing services either under a 
type 2 licence or a general authorisation (internet service providers should 
obtain general authorisations to provide services). In principle, a telecoms 
licence could be either a type 1 licence or a type 2 licence. If provision of a 
service required allocation of scarce resources (like frequency or numbering) or 
only a limited number of operators will provide such service, a concession 
agreement should be signed with, or a type 1 licence obtained from, the 
Telecommunications Authority. There were no major differences between the 
type 2 licence and the general authorisation. General authorisations were 
granted by the Telecommunications Authority after an application and a review 
process, which was nearly as cumbersome as the procedure applicable to type 2 
licences. A general authorisation regime applied only to ISPs and operators 
providing value-added SMS-based services over mobile networks. The one-off 
fee for this type of services was set at TRY 2,730 (€1,365).  
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The provision of domestic long-distance and international telecommunications 
networks and services was liberalised from January 1, 2004, and the 
liberalisation of local services was formally introduced in July 2005. In practice, 
the licensing framework for local services was only adopted in August 2007. In 
August 2007, the Telecommunications Authority had introduced a licence for 
Fixed Telecommunications Services which covered the provision of voice 
telephony, data, payphones and value added services at the local level over the 
fixed network. This was seen as an important measure that would enable new 
entrants to enter the market for local voice telephony services (including of both 
carrier selection codes and the assignment of E.164 numbers). However, on 
January 23, 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Council of State issued an injunction 
against the decision on the grounds that a single licence was used to enable the 
provision of more than one telecommunications service (i.e., voice and Internet).  
So far, no licences for the provision of local telephone services have been issued 
and Türk Telekom remains the only provider.  Between August 12 and 28, 2008 
the NRA ran a consultation on a draft amendment to the authorization 
ordinance that introduces a new annex for the authorization of fixed telephone 
services50.  
As observed in Section 2.5 above, entry into force of Law No. 5809 has finally 
laid the legal basis for the simplification of the authorization and licensing 
regime in Turkey, bringing it more in line with the EU 2002 framework. In the 
new regime, the provision of electronic communications networks or services 
may only be subject to a general authorization: the undertaking concerned is 
required to submit a notification, but it must not obtain an explicit decision or 
any other administrative act by the national regulatory authority (NRA) before 
exercising the rights stemming from the authorisation. The general 
authorisation gives undertakings the right to provide electronic 
communications networks and services and to negotiate interconnection with 
other providers in the European Community. When such undertakings provide 
electronic communications networks or services to the public, the general 
authorisation makes them eligible to be designated to provide certain universal 
service functions. A clear distinction is made between the conditions applicable 
under the general authorisation and those linked to the rights to use radio 
frequencies and numbers. 
However, the definition of compliance with the conditions of the Authorization 
Regime is still ambiguous. In particular, the law states at Article 9(9) that “[t]he 
NRA might reject authorization applications based on the reasons related to 
national security, public order, public health and other public interests…”; and 
                                                 
50 The Telecommunications Authority should issue a special annex to the Authorisation 
Regulation to grant licences for a particular type of service. These annexes define the scope of 
the service and, in doing so, they are generally adopting the narrowest possible definition. 
An operator cannot obtain an authorisation from the Telecommunications Authority that is 
not included in these annexes. 
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at Article 9(11) that “[t]he NRA might abort the operations of the companies 
based on the reasons related to public security, public health and other public 
interests, upon the review of the Ministry”. These provisions are unclear and 
may leave excessive discretion to the ITCA and the Ministry in granting 
authorization for the provision of e-communications services. 
The simplification in the authorization and licensing process appears like an 
essential step towards the encouragement of entry in the Turkish e-
communications and media sectors, and should be achieved rapidly with the 
enactment of secondary legislation. Although it is practically impossible to 
quantify the impact of such simplification in terms of costs and benefits, we can 
certainly assume that such a simplification, besides aligning the Turkish 
regulatory framework, will bring about two major benefits: (i) the removal of 
restrictions to entry of new service providers; and (ii) a reduction of 
administrative burdens. In the EU, the transition towards a general 
authorizations regime has been hailed as a major step towards the creation of a 
more competitive business environment in the e-communications sector, and 
the same is likely to happen in Turkey, although other restrictions to entry of 
new providers would have to be lifted in order to unleash the full potential of 
entry in the Turkish e-communications sector, and in particular in the fixed-line 
local calls.  
Besides the provisions introduced by the Law no. 5809, Turkey also has other 
options. In particular: (i) the provisions contained in article 9(9) and 9(11) can be 
modified to ensure that the NRA powers to reject the authorization or abort 
operations are not made too broad; (ii) the general authorization regime could 
be extended also to spectrum, as was suggested during the ongoing review of 
the 2002 framework51; (iii) a hybrid system could be introduced , in which more 
than one type of authorization exists. This would be in line with the choice 
made in other legal systems, such as Japan and Korea, where authorizations are 
differentiated between facility owners and non-infrastructured service 
providers52. Although multi-tier regimes have performed quite well to date, the 
obvious limit to this alternative would be that the Turkish system would still 
significantly diverge from the EU one, as well as with the Internal Market 
objective, and this could become a reason to slow down Chapter 10 negotiations 
further.  
                                                 
51 This would make it easier to achieve technology and service neutrality, as well as to enable 
spectrum trading in the medium-term. However, this proposal has faced significant 
resistance in the EU debate, and is currently unlikely to be endorsed in the final text. This is 
mostly due to the risks of increased interference in spectrum usage; and to issues raised by 
the broadcasting sector, especially as regards the need to protect providers of services of 
general interest. 
52 For example, Japan has Type I carriers and (general and special) Type II carriers. This two-tier 
system apparently worked well; Hong Kong has a three-tiered licensing regime, etc. 
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Accordingly, for the purposes of our impact assessment exercise, we can 
identify four main options: (i) status quo (i.e., maintain the wording of Law n. 
5809); (ii) full alignment with the current EU acquis; (iii) introduction of general 
authorizations also for spectrum; and (iv) adoption of a multi-tier authorization 
system. Below we provide a SWOT analysis of these options.  
 
Option 1.2.0. – Maintain the working of Law No. 5809 
STRENGTHS 
• Simplifies the regulatory 
environment 
• Facilitates entry 
WEAKNESSES 
• Provisions at Article 9 appear hardly in line with EU 
acquis, as they may provide too broad powers to the 
ITCA 
• Does not facilitate flexibility in spectrum usage 
• At EU level, this system has encouraged too much 
entry in some cases, with no distinction between 
infrastructure owners and non-owners 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Encourages entry, especially in 
the fixed-line and fixed 
broadband sectors. 
THREATS 
• Broad NRA powers can hinder regulatory certainty 
• Requires other policy measures to effectively 
contribute to a better business environment in 
Turkey 
 
Option 1.2.1. – Full alignment with the EU acquis 
STRENGTHS 
• In line with EU acquis 
• Simplifies the regulatory 
environment 
• Facilitates entry 
WEAKNESSES 
• Does not facilitate flexibility in spectrum usage 
• At EU level, this system has encouraged too much 
entry in some cases, with no distinction between 
infrastructure owners and non-owners 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Encourages entry (more than 
option 1.2.0), especially in the 
fixed-line and fixed broadband 
sectors. 
THREATS 
• Requires other policy measures to effectively 
contribute to a better business environment in 
Turkey 
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Option 1.2.2. – General authorisations for all services  
STRENGTHS 
• Simplifies the regulatory 
environment 
• Facilitates entry 
• Conducive to spectrum 
liberalisation and trading 
WEAKNESSES 
• At EU level, this system has encouraged too much 
entry in some cases, with no distinction between 
infrastructure owners and non-owners 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can contribute to a more 
competitive environment in 
many relevant markets 
• Can help Turkey’s 
competitiveness through trading 
and flexibility in spectrum usage 
THREATS 
• Requires other policy measures to effectively 
contribute to a better business environment in 
Turkey 
• Can harm broadcasters and IPR protection 
• Can lead to more interference in spectrum usage 
 
Option 1.2.3. – A hybrid system 
STRENGTHS 
• Can partly simplify the 
regulatory environment 
• Can facilitates entry of 
infrastructure owners 
WEAKNESSES 
• Not in line with EU acquis 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Could be a transitional measure 
• Can contribute to sustainable 
competition in many relevant 
markets 
THREATS 
• Can be difficult to administer and lead to regulatory 
uncertainty in some cases 
 
We believe that the best option for Turkey over a short-term period would be 
1.2.1. – fully align the Turkish acquis with the EU regulatory framework by 
moving to a general authorisation regime and maintaining exemptions for 
numbering, rights of way and spectrum. This option would still allow Turkey 
to move towards general authorisation for spectrum usage once all other 
relevant legislation on spectrum flexibility and trading is in place, and together 
with other EU member states, if the current proposals will be endorsed by EU 
institutions during the current review.  
3.1.3 Spectrum policy 
Spectrum policy is key for competitiveness both in the EU and in Turkey. At EU 
level, recent estimates show that spectrum-dependent services contribute €250 
billion to the EU economy, i.e. 2.2% of the EU GDP. Several studies have shown 
that spectrum is currently used very inefficiently in Europe, and that a more 
flexible and market-based approach to spectrum management would 
significantly boost EU competitiveness. Accordingly, the European Commission 
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has undertaken a number of initiatives to foster the introduction of more 
modern spectrum usage and management in the EU27, and since 2005 has 
strongly advocated for a more market-based approach to spectrum. Lately, the 
Commission has proposed important changes in spectrum management, 
ranging from a significant reshuffling of current band allocation (especially in 
the February 2007 Communication on flexibility in spectrum management), to 
the adoption of technology and service neutrality as mandatory principles in all 
member states from 2015 (in the November 2007 proposed review of the 2002 
framework); to the creation of three sub-clusters of technologies and services in 
the UHF band after the digital switchover (in the November 2007 
Communication on the Digital Dividend). Some of these proposals have met the 
resistance of the Parliament, and most importantly of the Council, and have 
been partly rolled back. However, it remains clear that more flexibility in 
spectrum usage and management, as well as opening up the UHF band to 
broadband wireless technologies, are key steps towards a more competitive EU 
in this sector in the future.  
Moreover, the European Commission rightly noted that new services such as 
Mobile TV, or new technologies such as WiMAX need at least a pan-European 
scale and adequate certainty on the availability of spectrum to reach a “business 
case”. Accordingly, it seeks to identify bands to be devoted to specific pan-
European services, also in line with the work carried out under the WAPECS 
project in the past few years. In Europe, spectrum trading and liberalization is 
expected to generate benefits of as much as €900 billion yearly, whereas trading 
without liberalization would yield much lower welfare gains, at around 900 
million yearly. A recent study by Mott McDonald et al. (2006) estimated the net 
present value of the harmonisation of collective uses of spectrum in the EU in a 
range between €463 billion and €898 billion; this means a yearly contribution to 
GDP of up to 0.17%. Current proposals include the endorsement of principles of 
technology and service neutrality, and the identification of certain bands for 
spectrum trading/liberalisation, as well as bands for unlicensed uses of 
spectrum. Recently, the Commission adopted a “Communication on 
Strengthening the Internal Market for Mobile TV“, where it endorses the DVB-
H standard for mobile broadcasting and calls upon Member States to make 
spectrum available for mobile broadcasting as quickly as possible, including in 
the UHF band (470-862 MHz) as it becomes available . The Commission also 
called for more bandwidth in the 900Mhz and 1800Mhz bands to be allocated to 
3G and internet phone services, which could cut network costs by up to 40%.   
In Turkey, spectrum policy has progressed very slowly over the past few years, 
especially as regards market-based approaches, unlicensed spectrum and the 
issuance of 3G licenses. A national table of frequency allocations is published on 
the NRA’s web site. The NRA is a member of CEPT and is actively participating 
in the Electronic Communications Committee of the CEPT in the field of 
spectrum management. Members of the ECC are harmonizing and aligning 
their spectrum strategies and methods to manage the spectrum more effectively 
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and efficiently. As part of this initiative, the NRA has submitted their national 
table of frequency allocations to the Frequency Information System of the 
European Radiocommunications Office (ERO), the permanent office supporting 
ECC.  
The main current issues at hand in the reform of Turkey’s spectrum policy are 
the following: 
• 3G licenses: after significant delay, 3G licenses have finally been awarded in 
December 200853. Turkcell submitted the winning bid of €358 million for the 
highest frequency 3G licence on offer in Turkey (“A” band, 40Mhz block), 
whereas Vodafone has submitted the winning bid of €250 million for the 
second highest frequency on offer (“B”, 35Mhz block) and Turkey's Avea, 
owned by fixed-line operator Turk Telekom, won the bid for the third 
highest frequency with a bid of €214 million (“C”, 30 MHz). The fourth 
licence was cancelled due to a lack of bids. 3G network services are now 
expected to start in the summer of 2009. With this, Turkey will align with 
EU member states as regards the availability of mobile broadband services.  
• WiMAX licenses: the next step announced by the government is the 
auctioning of WiMAX licenses, probably in the 3.5GHz band. As observed 
above, this is likely to represent an important step forward in Turkey, and 
occurs with little or no delay compared to EU member states. However, the 
choice of the band is likely to lead to WiMAX deployment only in very 
densely populated areas, whereas bridging the digital divide with WiMAX 
will remain almost impossible to achieve. 
• Digital dividend: as often evoked by the European Commission, digital 
switchover represents a one-time opportunity for EU and non-EU countries, 
especially when it comes to encouraging the development of alternative 
ways to provide content to consumers (e.g. mobile TV), and most 
importantly bridging the digital divide through wireless broadband (e.g. 
LTE, WiMAX) as affordable cost. Such a one-time opportunity can be reaped 
only if sufficient flexibility is introduced in spectrum allocation, and in 
particular if UHF licenses are reallocated through a number of potentially 
competing uses, possibly along with the “clustered” structure proposed by 
the European Commission in November 2007, and later endorsed by the 
European Parliament. Absent refarming in the UHF band, all these benefits 
would not be reached.  
In terms of available regulatory options, then, Turkey seems to have solved 
most of the previous pending problems (in particular, the award of 3G licenses), 
                                                 
53 An auction for 4 UMTS licenses had been launched in May 2007, but was later cancelled. On 
June 16, 2007 the TA had announced an auction for 4 IMT-2000/UMTS licenses to be held on 
September 7, 2007: only one player participated in this tender (mostly due to disputes as 
regards number portability) and won one license on a bid of €311 million, whereas the rest of 
the licenses were not sold. The license awarded was then withdrawn.  
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whereas new initiatives should mostly focus on introducing neutrality 
principles and proactively pursuing the efficient allocation of the digital 
dividend. Accordingly, the main policy alternatives at hand are: (i) no policy 
change; (ii) introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific bands; 
and (iii) clustering of the digital dividend in line with the Commission 2007 
Communication.  
 
Option 1.3.0. – No policy change 
STRENGTHS 
• 3G and WiMAX licensing 
underway 
• Command and control ensures 
regulatory certainty and stability 
WEAKNESSES 
• Inefficiency of command and control 
• Allocation of spectrum is too rigid 
• Current frequencies selected for WiMAX are not 
suited to bridging the digital divide 
• No proactive policy on the digital dividend 
• Digital switchover difficult and delayed compared to 
EU member states (2014) 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• None 
THREATS 
• Very difficult to bridge the digital divide with BWA 
technologies 
 
Option 1.3.1. Introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific bands 
STRENGTHS 
• 3G and WiMAX licensing 
underway 
• Neutrality favours efficiency, if 
interference is kept under control 
WEAKNESSES 
• Long license duration can hamper flexibility 
• Digital switchover difficult and delayed compared to 
EU member states (2014) 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• With proactive refarming, more 
efficient spectrum allocation can 
be achieved in some bands 
THREATS 
• Does not guarantee spectrum reallocation, 
particularly in the UHF band 
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Option 1.3.2. Clustering of digital dividend in line with COM(2007)700 
STRENGTHS 
• Frees up resources for welfare-
enhancing uses of spectrum, in 
particular BWA 
• “Clustered neutrality” reduces 
the risk of interference, at the 
same time promoting more 
efficient use of spectrum 
WEAKNESSES 
• Requires proactive refarming of spectrum 
 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• An essential condition towards 
quick uptake of mobile 
broadband throughout Turkey 
• Allows for competition between 
4G technologies, i.e. mobile 
WiMAX, LTE, etc. 
 
THREATS 
• Current taxation may hamper the development of 
new BWA services 
• Current allocation of WiMAX licenses may lead to 
underutilisation of WiMAX in the700MHz band 
 
In conclusion, we think that the best opportunity for Turkey would be 
represented by option 1.3.2. The mere introduction of service and technology 
neutrality in spectrum management would not guarantee that Turkey takes 
advantage of its one-time opportunity. On the other hand, Turkey would align 
itself to other big European economies if it laid the bases for a more efficient use 
of the UHF band within a reasonably short timeframe, and possibly by 2014.  
3.1.4 Number portability 
Number portability has been heavily debate in Turkey over the past few years. 
This facility allows customers who wish to switch operator to keep the numbers 
originally assigned to them, avoiding the costs of switching to new numbers. 
Number portability applies to both fixed and mobile lines, although in the 
literature and in the international debate the focus is often placed only on the 
latter.  
Mobile number portability has become possible only very recently in Turkey, 
and fixed number portability will be available only from May 9, 2009. Until 
now, customers wishing to switch mobile operators could only keep their 
mobile phone number exclusive of the prefix. Prefixes remained assigned to 
individual operators, due to the wording of the concession agreements of two o 
mobile operators, which granted them a 25-year ownership of particular 
numbering blocks54. After setting up the necessary database, in November 2008 
mobile number portability was finally launched in Turkey, with the ambitious 
goal of ensuring that transactions to switch operator would be completed in less 
                                                 
54 It is worth recalling that concession agreements are not affected by Law no. 5809, which 
introduced a general authorisation regime. See supra, Section 2.5.1. 
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than six days. At the same time, the new proposed regulatory framework in 
Europe is even more ambitious, as it proposes to reduce the time needed to 
switch to a new operator to only one working day55. 
The impact of number portability on competition is widely recognized in the 
economic literature, although the extent to which introducing portability 
contributes to customer churn is still heavily debated. For example, in the UK 
within 63 months from service launch, only 5% of customers had used mobile 
number portability; in Portugal, after 27 months from launch of mobile number 
portability, only 0.28% of customers had used this option. On the other hand, in 
Hong Kong, within 60 months from service launch, 85% of customers had 
switched mobile operator. And in Finland, after only 8 months, 16% of 
customers had switched.  
In 2008, the Commission reported that “a total of almost 19 million subscribers 
have ported their numbers as of October 2007 (compared to 15 million at 
October 2006 and 7 million in 2005): 21% more”. And the number of ported 
mobile numbers had increased over the past year by 7.1 million. As of October 
2007, 46 million (8.31%) subscribers had ported their number. In Italy alone, 
over 14 million customers have ported their numbers. This amounts to 15.96% 
of total mobile numbers. Finland has the highest percentage of ported numbers 
(68.18%) followed by Denmark (42.06%) and then Spain (27.3%). Overall, 
however, performance remains very patchy, with negligible porting in a 
number of Member States, and the potential impact on competition is clearly 
not being exploited fully. Subsequently, in 2009 the Commission published its 
14th Report on the implementation of the regulatory framework, and reported 
that mobile ported numbers have increased by 14 million between October 2007 
and October 2008, such that “almost 60.7 million subscribers have ported their 
number since the introduction of this possibility”, and the “percentage of 
ported numbers in the EU over the total mobile subscribers since the 
introduction of mobile number portability is now 10.3%”56. Today, Finland 
continues to have the highest percentage of ported numbers over the total of 
mobile subscribers (68.7%) followed by Denmark (39.97%) and then Spain 
(35.45%). 
                                                 
55 The current amendment of Article 30(4) of Directive 2002/22/EC reads as follows: “Porting of 
numbers and their subsequent activation shall be executed within the shortest possible delay, 
no later than one working day from the initial request by the subscriber. National regulatory 
authorities shall be able to impose appropriate sanctions on providers, including an 
obligation to compensate subscribers, in cases of delay in porting or abuse of porting by them 
or on their behalf. National regulatory authorities may extend the one day period and 
prescribe take appropriate measures where necessary to ensure that subscribers are not 
switched against their will. National regulatory authorities may impose appropriate 
sanctions on providers, including an obligation to compensate customers, in case of delay in 
porting or abuse of porting by them or on their behalf “. 
56 See 14th Implementation Report, Staff Working Document, Vol. 2, Fig. 16a, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/implementation_enforcemen
t/annualreports/14threport/annex2.pdf. 
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Figure 16 – Cumulative mobile ported numbers as a percentage of total mobile numbers, 
October 2008 
 
Source: European Commission, 14th Implementation report 
 
Figure 17 – Mobile numbers ported between 2007 and 2008 and wholesale price of mobile 
number portability, October 2008 
 
Source: European Commission, 14th Implementation report 
 
More in detail, the effectiveness of portability seems heavily dependent on 
whether switching can be achieved in a very short timeframe: in Hong Kong, 
numbers are ported normally within 48 hours; in France, since the new system 
shortening the delay of two months to ten days has been implemented, the 
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number of portings has increased significantly; In Spain a five day period for 
porting a number appears to benefit the overall usage of this facility. Likewise, 
the UK regulator Ofcom decided to reduce the maximum porting time for 
mobile numbers to two working days as of April 2008, and plans to further 
reduce this time to just two hours in 2009. In contrast, lengthy and often 
cumbersome porting procedures in Poland (14-30 days) and Slovakia (up to 20 
days) appear to undermine the full potential benefit for end-users. In Italy for 
certain periods in 2007 mobile number portability took up to 45 days, and is 
now set at 15 days (see figure 18 below). 
 
Figure 18 – Time taken in number of days for mobile number portability, October 2008 
 
Source: European Commission, 14th Implementation report 
 
A good benchmark for Turkey is Spain, where number portability is achieved in 
5 working days. There, fixed number portability has worked very well since 
March 2000, leading to over four million ported fixed numbers in 2008 (approx. 
20% of total lines). At the same time, mobile number portability has been 
effectively implemented alongside with extensive MVNO entry, leading to 35% 
of mobile numbers being ported in just a few years.  
Several authors have attempted to provide a cost-benefit analysis of introducing 
mobile number portability. As regards benefits, a commonly-used approach to 
analysing the likely costs and benefits of MNP divides the measure’s potential 
benefits into three types57: 
                                                 
57 Several cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) are available in published form, notably Oftel (1997) for 
the UK, NERA/Smith (1998) for Hong Kong, and Ovum (2000) for Ireland. 
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• Type 1 benefits obtained directly by customers who switch,  
• Type 2 benefits obtained by all mobile telephony customers (e.g. efficiency 
gains and price reductions due to strengthening of competition) and  
• Type 3 benefits obtained by those making calls to ported numbers. 
On the other hand, number portability also entail significant costs, including 
costs of network investments, process changes and operating expenses incurred 
to make mobile numbers portable. Lyons (2006) finds that significant net 
benefits of number portability can be expected only in countries where porting 
occurs within 5 working days or less. For these countries, in the short run a fall 
in average prices of 6.58% and an increase in the churn rate of 13.6% can be 
expected; in the long run, prices can fall by 12% and churn increase by 34.7%. 
Against this background, Turkey seems to face two main regulatory 
alternatives in the short term: (i) status quo (implement current plans on number 
portability); or (ii) further reduce the time needed for switching operator. In the 
longer term, Turkey could consider implementing cross-platform portability, 
including fixed-mobile number portability (FMNP) as in the US, Canada, UK, 
Ireland. This option is however viable only if there is sufficient fixed-mobile 
convergence/substitution, and competitive pressure is exerted by MVNOs and 
other platforms such as cable. 
 
Option 1.4.0. – Implementing current plans 
STRENGTHS 
• Current plans can foster 
competition especially in fixed-
line 
WEAKNESSES 
• Unlikely to lead to significant increased churn and 
reduced retail prices in mobile 
• No cost-benefit analysis has been provided to date 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• If coupled with new entry in local 
calls, can lead to more vibrant 
competition in the fixed-line 
sector 
• Can be coupled with MVNO 
licenses in the mobile sector 
THREATS 
• Not sure if costs have been fully taken into account 
• If switching time is not reduced, effects in the mobile 
sector are uncertain 
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Option 1.4.1. – Reduction of switching time to less than 5 days 
STRENGTHS 
• Can foster competition in fixed 
and mobile 
• Short run fall in average prices of 
6.58% and increase in churn rate 
of 13.6%  
• Long run price decrease of 12% 
and churn increase of 34.7%. 
WEAKNESSES 
• May be too costly for operators at this stage of 
market development. 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can be coupled with MVNO 
licenses and liberalization of 
cable 
THREATS 
• Absent liberalization in competing platforms (fixed-
line, cable, etc.), the overall effect can be less evident 
than expected.  
 
As a result, we consider that a further reduction in switching time below 5 days 
could in principle ensure that Turkey fully benefits from fixed and mobile 
number portability. However, as number portability has just been introduced in 
Turkey, we suggest that: (i) the costs and benefits of the current regime are 
monitored and assessed overtime; and (ii) a careful impact assessment is carried 
out in the medium-term before the porting time is further reduced. Option 1.4.0 
will then be retained as the preferred one in cost-benefit terms for the short 
term. As shown in our SWOT analysis, the effectiveness of this option heavily 
depends on complementary policy measures aimed at facilitating entry in 
wireline and wireless sectors, most notably entry DSL and cable operators. 
3.1.5 Mobile Termination  
Another area in which alignment with the EU is needed is that of termination 
rates. In particular, after April 2008, mobile termination rates have been 
drastically reduced in Turkey, whereas fixed termination rates have been only 
slightly reduced (10%).  
As regards mobile termination rates, Turkey is (on average) below the EU 
average, as shown in Figure 19 below.  
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Figure 19- Mobile termination rates – January 2008 
 
Source: elaborated from ERG(08)17 
 
However, as shown in the Figure, there are differences in the termination rates 
according to the operators, despite the fact that all of them have been notified 
with SMP.  The NRA has so far kept the asymmetry level between Turkcell and 
the other two operators Vodafone and Avea, a feature of the Turkish market 
that has been operational for 7 years now, and currently stands at 18%. Figure 
20 below shows the new levels of termination rates compared to the previous 
ones.  
 
Figure 20 – Old v. new termination rates (as of May 1, 2009) 
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In the EU27, symmetric rates are already in place in seven Member States58. As 
reported by the ERG in 2008, in a further twelve Member States a glide path has 
been set to achieve symmetry over the next few years59. In each of Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK, by exception, one SMP player is permitted a higher 
rate than the others (by 10-20%) at the end of the glide-path on the basis of 
objective justification. In addition, in other 6 MS the announced national policy 
is in favour of symmetry; in some of these cases, explicit pre-conditions for 
asymmetry have been laid down60. Also in Belgium and the Netherlands the 
situation appears to be moving in the direction of symmetry61. 
In Turkey, there is no specific announcement or policy statement in favour of 
symmetry for mobile termination rates. This is not in line with the current 
orientation at EU level, where the Commission indicated in different comments 
that “termination rates should normally be symmetric and that asymmetry, 
acceptable in number of cases, requires an adequate justification.”62 The 
Commission also recognises that, in certain exceptional cases, an asymmetry 
might be justified by objective cost differences which are outside the control of 
the operators concerned, such as different network topologies due to the use of 
specific frequency bands63. But this is certainly not the case in Turkey, where 
differences in costs and network usage appear negligible64. Even in the case of 
different market shares between SMP operators in market 16, the European 
Commission clarified that “the fact that an MNO entered the market later and 
has therefore a smaller market share can only justify higher termination rates 
for a limited transitory period”65. 
Accordingly, in Turkey there seems to be no basis for maintaining the 
asymmetry of termination rates in the future. A glide path should thus be 
established to reduce and eventually eliminate differences between MTRs. This 
would indeed eliminate the distortionary effect of asymmetric termination 
rates, which is commonly acknowledged in the economic literature66. The 
                                                 
58 Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden.  
59 Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, UK.  
60 Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Norway, Romania.  
61 As reported by the ERG, in Belgium BIPT made a Decision to achieve symmetry by the end of 
a glide path. However, this principle was overturned on appeal to the national courts. In 
Netherlands, OPTA plans to make a decision on its next Market Analysis by mid 2010. 
62 Case BE/2006/0433, Case FR/2006/0461, Case FR/2007/0596, Case LV/2006/0464, Case 
LV/2007/0574 
63 Case IT/2007/0659  
64 The operator that has the highest termination rate, Avea, uses both 1800 Mhz band channels 
and some 900 Mhz band channels, which helps decreasing unit cost.  
65 Case BE/2006/0433, Case FR/2006/0461. 
66  See i.a., Peitz, M. “Asymmetric regulation of access and price discrimination in 
telecommunications”, International University in Germany, School of Business 
Administration, Working Paper 28/2005, January 2005; and Valletti, T. “Asymmetric 
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European Commission has clearly endorsed this view in the recent explanatory 
note to the consultation on termination rates67. 
In the consultation on termination rates, the Commission also clarifies the need 
to move to “single efficient” termination rates. In this respect, in Turkey the 
NRA has recently analysed market 16 and found all three operators to hold 
SMP. However, the NRA proposed to impose an internal non-discrimination 
obligation only to the operator that holds the largest share of subscribers. This is 
one of the NRA approaches that the Commission has challenged over the past 
few years, as it typically aims at solving a competitive problem in a given 
relevant wholesale market (former market 16) with a remedy that falls on a 
retail market. In addition, it fails to comply with the requirement that remedies 
be proportionate, as it unnecessarily overlaps with the cost-orientation of 
termination rates already imposed on all SMP players. Suffice it, in this respect, 
to consult the letter sent by the Commission to the Belgian regulator BIPT in the 
case BE/2007/066568. 
Against this background, Turkey has a number of (incremental) regulatory 
alternatives; (i) no policy change, which means maintaining the current 
(asymmetric) termination rates; (ii) establishing a glide path to eliminate the 
asymmetry of termination rates in a reasonable timeframe; (iii) establishing a 
glide path and an overall reduction of MTRs (towards “single efficient MTRs”) 
in line with the Commission’s recent Recommendation on termination; (iv) 
glide path + removal of the proposed obligation not to engage in internal price 
discrimination for the largest of the three SMP operators.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
regulation of mobile termination rates”, Imperial College London and University of Rome, 
December, 2006. 
67 See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/ 
termination_rates/explanatory.pdf (section 4.2.) 
68 Available at http://www.bipt.be/GetDocument.aspx?forObjectID=2495&lang=en  
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Option 1.5.0. – No policy change 
STRENGTHS 
• None 
WEAKNESSES 
• Competition is distorted due to enduring 
asymmetric termination rates 
• Not in line with the Commission’s recent 
recommendation on termination 
• The proposed internal non-discrimination obligation 
on one SMP operator can distort mobile business 
models and lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
• Internal non-discrimination obligation is not in line 
with the Commission approach 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• None 
THREATS 
• Enduring asymmetry can hamper 2G and 3G success 
on the market 
• The proposed internal non-discrimination obligation 
on one SMP operator can distort mobile business 
models and lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
• Overlap of obligations in former market 16 can 
jeopardise availability of resources for investment in 
the deployment of 3G and other BWA technologies 
in the future. 
 
Option 1.5.1. – “glide path”  
STRENGTHS 
• Removes a source of distortions 
in the mobile market 
 
WEAKNESSES 
• Still not fully in line with the Commission objective 
to proceed towards a “single efficient” MTR 
• The proposed internal non-discrimination obligation 
on one SMP operator can distort mobile business 
models and lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
• Internal non-discrimination obligation is not in line 
with the Commission approach 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can lead to reduced prices and a 
more levelled playing field  
• Can prevent inefficient entry 
• Operators can still exploit the 
waterbed effect to conceive their 
business strategy 
THREATS 
• The proposed internal non-discrimination obligation 
on one SMP operator can distort mobile business 
models and lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
• Overlap of obligations in former market 16 can 
jeopardise availability of resources for investment in 
the deployment of 3G and other BWA technologies 
in the future. 
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Option 1.5.2. – “glide path” towards “single efficient MTR” 
STRENGTHS 
• Removes a source of distortions 
in the mobile market 
• In line with the Commission 
recommendation on termination 
WEAKNESSES 
• Strict cost-orientation of MTRs can prevent firms 
from exploiting the waterbed effect 
• The proposed internal non-discrimination obligation 
on one SMP operator can distort mobile business 
models and lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
• Internal non-discrimination obligation is not in line 
with the Commission approach 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can lead to reduced prices and a 
more levelled playing field  
• Can prevent inefficient entry 
THREATS 
• The proposed internal non-discrimination obligation 
on one SMP operator can distort mobile business 
models and lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
• Overlap of obligations in former market 16 can 
jeopardise availability of resources for investment in 
the deployment of 3G and other BWA technologies 
in the future. 
• Cost orientation of MTRs must be implemented 
carefully, as it can lead to higher domestic 
origination charges or reduced investment due to the 
waterbed effect. 
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Option 1.5.3. – “glide path” + no internal non-discrimination obligation 
STRENGTHS 
• Removes a source of distortions 
in the mobile market 
• In line with the Commission 
recommendation on termination 
• In line with Commission 
approach to internal non-
discrimination obligations 
WEAKNESSES 
• If the NRA aims at “single efficient MTR”: strict 
cost-orientation of MTRs can prevent firms from 
exploiting the waterbed effect 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can lead to reduced prices and a 
more levelled playing field  
• Can prevent inefficient entry 
• Allows for welfare-enhancing 
discrimination and more service 
differentiation (subject to ex post 
competition rules, of course) 
THREATS 
• If the NRA aims at “single efficient MTR”: cost 
orientation of MTRs must be implemented carefully, 
as it can lead to higher domestic origination charges 
or reduced investment due to the waterbed effect69. 
 
In summary, we consider that the preferred option for Turkey would be option 
1.5.3. As a matter of fact, on the one hand, it would be highly advisable to 
establish a glide path towards removing the asymmetry between current MTRs, 
as well as removing the internal non-discrimination obligation for only one of 
the SMP players; on the other hand, imposing a drastic reduction of MTRs 
towards a “single efficient termination rate” in a country where the termination 
rate is already half of the EU average and below the EU target for 2010, 3G is 
yet to start and penetration of 2G has not yet reached 100% would seem highly 
premature. In addition, a further reduction in MTRs may significantly reduce 
MNOs’ incentives to invest, due to limited resources available.  
In general the Commission recommendation, which promises a reduction of 
current MTRs up to 70%, has been heavily criticized. For example, Frontier 
economics has estimated in September 2008 that a reduction of MTRs to 2 €cent 
per minute (as compared to an average 9 €cent today in the EU) could lead to 
mobile penetration being 9% lower than otherwise. With option 1.5.4, Turkey 
would align to the EU approach on MTRs, but not on yet-to-be-approved 
principles such as those contained in the Recommendation.  
                                                 
69 The “waterbed effect” refers to the situation in which lower termination charges (e.g. due to 
regulation) leads to higher charges for other services, such as retail charges. See, i.a. Genakos 
and Valletti (2008), Testing the “Waterbed Effect” in Mobile Telephony, CEIS Working Paper No. 
110. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114856; and Muysert et al. (2006), The 
“Waterbed Effect” in Mobile Telephony, CRA Competition Policy Discussion paper, available at 
http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/RELATING_MATERIALS/Publications/Consultant_
publications/files/pub_4976.pdf.  
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3.1.6 MVNOs 
One of the features of the e-communications sector in Turkey (and in other EU 
countries) is the absence of regulatory provisions on the authorisation of 
MVNOs. The Turkish government has been preparing a regulation on MVNOs 
during 2008, and its enactment is apparently imminent.  
Against this background, the short-term plan to issue authorisations for entry of 
MVNOs does not seem to match Turkey’s most urgent priorities. As a matter of 
fact, entry of MVNOs would take place through voluntary commercial 
agreements between facilities-based mobile operators (MNOs) and MVNOs. On 
the other hand, if MVNO entry is made mandatory, the impact of such entry 
would depend on many different factors, including the following: 
• Business model – MVNOs can adopt different models, such as: (i) ‘full’ 
MVNO, which involves the MVNO providing its own network core 
including a mobile switching centre, which may connect directly to the 
MNO’s radio access controller; (ii) ‘intermediate’ MVNO, where the MVNO 
acquires a switched service, but provides its own home location register 
(HLR) or jointly owns it with the MNO; and (iii) ‘thin’ MVNO, where the 
MVNO acts as simple reseller by providing ‘bolt-on’ applications and 
content platforms. At least initially, it can be expected that MVNOs owuld 
adopt “thin” or “intermediate” models, but not “full MVNO” business 
models; 
• Regulated licensing terms – in case MVNOs are made mandatory, failure 
to set efficient interconnection agreements may end up stifling incentives to 
invest by facilities-based MNOs; this would stifle sustainable competition 
and innovation in the longer term, exactly as occurs with a badly-
implemented investment ladder model in the fixed line sector.  
• Availability of complementary provisions – the existence of an effective 
number portability system is essential for the successful entry of MVNOs 
(see Section 3.1.4 above)70. At the same time, MVNO would be much easier 
if a general authorisation regime were introduced in lieu of the current 
system of type 1-2 licensing and concession agreements.  
• Competition in the fixed-line sector – as we approach fixed-mobile 
convergence, MVNOs represent an appealing strategy for new entrants in 
the fixed-line sector, within a broader multiple-play strategy71. However, as 
no real competition currently exists in Turkey’s fixed-line broadband, this 
prospect cannot be said to currently exist.  
                                                 
70 A good benchmark for Turkey is Spain, where number portability is achieved in 5 working 
days. There, fixed number portability has worked very well since March 2000, leading to over 
four million ported fixed numbers in 2008 (approx. 20% of total lines). At the same time, 
mobile number portability has been effectively implemented alongside with extensive 
MVNO entry, leading to 35% of mobile numbers being ported in just a few years. 
71 See OECD (2007).  
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Overall, MVNO entry can have pros and cons, and most importantly 
opportunities and threats. On the one hand, MVNOs can contribute to 
enhancing consumer choice and service differentiation on the market, as 
MVNO can capture consumer demand for ‘niche’ services and can provide 
appealing content platforms. Likewise, increased competitive pressure exerted 
by MVNOs on MNOs can exert a “disciplining” effect on MNOs, leading to 
lower prices.  
On the other hand, however, entry of MVNO can hamper incentives to invest in 
infrastructure at a time when MNOs are looking for important investments that 
will lead Turkey to catch up with the rest of Europe in the mobile sector – the 
deployment of 3G networks. As 2G telephony approaches 100% penetration 
and 3G licenses have only recently been made available, entry of 2G could – if 
not carefully organized – end up undermining the sustainability of MNOs’ 
business models. For this reason, we consider that mandatory MVNO entry 
carries little prospects of enhancing consumer welfare in Turkey. To the 
contrary, a careful application of competition law can ensure that MNOs having 
SMP do not “refuse to deal”, by denying interconnection to potential entrants, 
which hold a general authorization. Even in this case, the application of 
competition rules on abuse of dominance would have to be very careful in 
order to avoid Type I errors (“false convictions”), which would inevitably 
create uncertainty in the marketplace.  
Below, we compare the following three regulatory alternatives: (i) no action on 
MVNOs; (ii) authorization to MVNO entry subject to commercial agreements 
between MNOs and MVNOs; and (iii) mandatory MVNO entry. 
  
Option 1.6.0. – No action on MVNOs 
STRENGTHS 
• Preserves the business model of 
existing MNOs in light of 
upcoming investments 
WEAKNESSES 
• Prevents MNOs and MVNOs from reaching win-win 
agreements to the benefit of end users 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Preserves regulatory stability and 
certainty 
THREATS 
• Might lead to anticompetitive behaviour by existing 
MNOs (e.g. collusive behaviour)  
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Option 1.6.1. – Authorisation of MVNOs  
STRENGTHS 
• Preserves the business model of 
existing MNOs in light of 
upcoming investments 
• Makes room for win-win 
agreements between MNOs and 
MVNOs, widening consumer 
choice and increasing welfare 
WEAKNESSES 
• None 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Preserves regulatory stability and 
certainty 
• Increases competitive safeguards 
in mobile markets 
• Might lead to price reductions 
and better matching of end user 
preferences 
THREATS 
• Crucially depends on complementary measures 
(portability, reform of authorisation regime) 
 
Option 1.6.2. – Mandatory entry of MVNOs  
STRENGTHS 
• Increases consumer choice and 
diversity of business models 
WEAKNESSES 
• Potentially disrupts existing business models by 
imposing market outcomes 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Might lead to price reductions 
and better matching of end user 
preferences 
THREATS 
• May reduce investment by MNOs 
• May delay consumer access to 3G services 
• May stifle infrastructure-based competition 
• Crucially depends on complementary measures 
(portability, reform of authorisation regime) 
 
Accordingly, we suggest that the best option for Turkey would be leaving 
MVNOs under the general authorisation regime, without mandating MVNO 
entry, and thus leaving to commercial agreements between MNOs and MVNOs 
to decide whether the latter will eventually enter the market (option 1.6.1). This 
provision must however be coupled with careful and effective antitrust ex post 
scrutiny of the conduct of dominant MNOs, if they deny access; and should 
necessarily be coupled with the issuing of general authorisations (option 1.2.1 
above) and with tighter cooperation between the NRA and the NCA (option 
3.1.2 below).  
3.1.7 Promoting competition in the fixed-line broadband sector 
One of the most important areas in which Turkey lags behind other EU 
countries is the liberalization of fixed-line telecommunications and the 
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development of infrastructure-based competition. To date, even service-based 
competition is slowly developing, due to the difficulties in entering the local 
calls market72; in addition, bitstream access is minimal and not a single local 
loop has been unbundled73. This also means that, absent policy changes, there 
are very little prospects of seeing players climbing the “rungs of the investment 
ladder” any time soon.  
Currently, the incumbent’s reference offer for the provision of access to its local 
loop has been agreed by the NRA, and co-location at the incumbent’s exchanges 
started officially in January 2007; however, no specific target date for opening 
up all of the incumbent’s approximately 1,000 exchanges has been set74, and the 
whole local access market seems very far from real liberalization. 
In the broadband market, the consequences of the current situation are fairly 
visible from the data: Turkey currently has relatively high prices for broadband 
access and the lowest speed in OECD countries, se shown in Section 2 above.  
Discussing available regulatory options in this domain is far from easy. This is 
mostly due to the fact that the lack of liberalization mostly depends on issues 
related to licensing and lack of implementation and enforcement of existing 
rules, rather than to the need to enact new regulation. Once the authorization 
process has been streamlined, it is likely that licenses for the provision of local 
calls services will finally be issued, with no possibility for courts to overturn 
NRA decisions anymore75. Also, the possibility to provide all services, 
including local calls, will create a more competitive environment compared to 
the current one, where the incumbent has an incentive to compete where it is 
exposed to competitive pressure (by reducing prices in long-distance calls) and 
raise prices in “safe” markets (such as local calls). Replicability of the incumbent 
offer, coupled with efficient, cost-based interconnection pricing, certainly 
                                                 
72 A major change impacting competition in the fixed line market came in March 2006, when 
Türk Telekom’s network was upgraded to allow for carrier preselection (CPS) and call by call 
selection (CS) to comply with regulatory requirements dating back to 2005. Since then seven 
CS agreements and eight CPS agreements have been signed. See Frontier economics (2007) 
and Cullen International (2008). 
73 The RUO has been available since November 2006 and a regulated reference offer for 
wholesale bitstream access since August 2007. 
74  Frontier Economics (2007). 
75  As reported by Cullen international (2008), in August 2007 the NRA had introduced a licence 
for Fixed Telecommunications Services which covered the provision of voice telephony, data, 
payphones and value added services at the local level over the fixed network. This was seen 
as an important measure that would enable new entrants to enter the market for local voice 
telephony services (including of both carrier selection codes and the assignment of E.164 
numbers). On January 23, 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Council of State issued an injunction 
against the decision on the grounds that a single licence was used to enable the provision of 
more than one telecommunications service (i.e. voice and Internet). So far, no licences for the 
provision of local telephone services have been issued and Türk Telekom remains the only 
provider. 
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reduces the risk of price squeeze in both the narrowband and broadband 
markets.  
Once these basic conditions have been met, there are still several options 
available to the NRA and the government on how to effectively liberalise the 
fixed-line and broadband sectors and promote the migration towards all-IP 
networks at least in densely populated areas. These include the adoption of a 
“ladder of investment” model; the award of “regulatory holidays” for players 
investing in high-speed networks; the adoption of a functional separation 
model, in which all broadband providers have access to a common next 
generation infrastructure on an “equivalence of access” condition; and several 
hybrid models76.  
The choice of the policy strategy to be adopted is very sensitive to the 
regulatory, geographic and demographic context of a country. Countries like 
the UK reportedly profited from functional separation, whereas countries 
where more than one platform is available (so-called “2.x” countries, to quote 
Eli Noam) may profit from regulatory holidays, as in the case of the US. Other 
countries, such as France, have successfully encouraged investment by effective 
LLU pricing, which led to several thousand local loops unbundled in a very 
short time during 2005 and 2006. In this respect, Turkey cannot count on any 
alternative infrastructure, as cable is very underdeveloped and no fibre 
investment has been undertaken to date. Prospects for mobile broadband to 
complement fixed are real, but not short-term, and WiMAX deployment is 
unlikely to lead to sufficient bridging of the digital divide.  
As a result, we consider that the investment ladder model remains the most 
feasible at this stage, and that functional separation may become an option in 
the future, after entry has been stimulated through resale, bitstream and LLU 
pricing. However, it is important to underline that the investment ladder model 
is very difficult to implement in practice, and that many countries have failed to 
implement it effectively in the past years, leading to cases of arbitrage and 
                                                 
76 The “ladder of investment” model was developed by Martin Cave and significantly inspires 
the implementation of the 2002 framework by NRAs. It aims at reconciling short-term 
service-based competition with long-term infrastructure-based competition, by ensuring 
access of new entrants without requiring significant investment in infrastructure, and later 
providing incentives for them to gradually build their own infrastructure. In order to make 
the ladder operational, NRAs are called to follow a precise sequence of actions: (i) define 
replicability; (ii)  identify easily replicable assets, non-replicable assets and assets in an 
intermediate position to sort out rungs that warrant access regulation; (iii) rank non-
replicable components in the value chain; (iv) identify where on the ladder market players 
are located; (v) choose the most appropriate rung on which intervention should be focused; 
(vi) estimate the amount of investment needed to move from a rung to another up the ladder 
and the correct timing of such move; (vii) identify the most appropriate remedy, which in the 
case of the investment ladder normally implies granting access to the incumbent’s 
infrastructure through cost-oriented charges; and (viii) monitor market structure. See, e.g., 
Cave (2005), Making the Ladder of Investment Operational, at 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Document.2916.pdf.  
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players moving up and down on the ladder. For such reason, the NRA should 
very carefully set prices for different access points, and refrain from 
micromanaging the market over too long a timeframe.  
In light of the above, we consider the available regulatory options to be the 
following: (i) no policy change; (ii) under the assumption that general 
authorizations are in place, favour short-term service-based competition to 
encourage longer-term infrastructure-based competition (“investment ladder”); 
(iii) grant regulatory holidays for new investment in all-IP networks; and (iv) 
consider functional separation of the incumbent’s infrastructure. Below, we 
analyse and discuss these options.  
 
Option 1.7.0. – No policy change 
STRENGTHS 
• None 
WEAKNESSES 
• Hamper sustainable competition and entry in the 
fixed-line and broadband sectors 
• Almost impossible to effectively compete with the 
incumbent due to difficulties in securing a license for 
local calls 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• None 
THREATS 
• Turkey’s fixed-line broadband exhibits declining 
penetration, rather high prices and low speed. With 
increased competition, consumer may profit from 
lower prices (up to 35% reduction) and better speed.  
  
Option 1.7.1. – “investment ladder” 
STRENGTHS 
• Favours short-term entry and 
service-based competition 
• May lead to infrastructure-based 
competition in the long run 
WEAKNESSES 
• Very difficult to implement in practice (only a few 
countries effectively managed to implement it 
without creating room for arbitrage or market micro-
management) 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• With increased competition, 
consumer may profit from lower 
prices (up to 35% reduction) and 
better speed. 
THREATS 
• May end up stifling incentives to invest for both the 
incumbent and the new entrant 
• Evidence that LLU hampers investment in 
alternative infrastructure 
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Option 1.7.2. – “regulatory holidays” 
STRENGTHS 
• Encourages investment by 
incumbent player(s) 
 
WEAKNESSES 
• Hardly adaptable to Turkey’s market environment, 
due to absence of alternative platforms and delays in 
mobile broadband (Turkey is a “0.x” country) 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Consumers may profit from a 
single high-speed infrastructure 
THREATS 
• Prices are likely to remain high to lack of facilities-
based competition 
• Inefficient incentives for the incumbent and new 
entrant over the longer term 
 
Option 1.7.3. – “Functional separation” 
STRENGTHS 
• Ensure equivalence of access for 
new entrants and a level-playing 
field in the provision of 
broadband access 
 
WEAKNESSES 
• Very costly and difficult to administer 
• Creates a long-lasting monopoly in the infrastructure 
• Hampers investment in alternative infrastructure 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Provide regulatory certainty for 
investment 
THREATS 
• May end up stifling incentives to invest in new 
platforms and infrastructure 
 
Accordingly, given Turkey’s current situation in the fixed-line a broadband 
market, we consider that option 1.7.1., if correctly implemented and coupled 
with the simplification of licensing and the strengthening of NRA enforcement 
powers, can represent the most desirable option. At a later stage, once a 
significant number of competitors have entered the market with multiple-play 
offer, the transition to all-IP networks could be approached either with option 
1.7.2, 1.7.3 or any hybrid option.  
3.1.7.1 Focus: promoting competition in the ISP market 
While looking at Turkey’s fixed-line sector, perhaps the most striking feature is 
the very low degree of liberalization of the broadband market, where TTNet 
still holds a quasi-monopoly in local access. An effective liberalization of the ISP 
market should then be targeted by the NRA as a key priority for the 
development of Turkey’s information society. In particular, the implementation 
of the “investment ladder” should follow the main steps highlighted by its 
main author, Martin Cave77, and elaborated in Renda (2006): 
                                                 
77 See Cave (2005), Making the Ladder of Investment Operational, at 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Document.2916.pdf. And Renda (2006), Last Call for 
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• Define replicability. The guiding principle available for NRAs is found in the 
first of the three criteria provided by the Commission in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets, i.e. the existence of “high and non-
transitory” barriers to entry. Of course, while some assets will always be 
defined as inherently non-replicable in the short-term – the prominent 
example being the local loop – the inclusion of other assets would depend 
on how broad is the interpretation of replicability.  
• Identify easily replicable assets, non-replicable assets and assets in an intermediate 
position to sort out rungs that warrant access regulation. This includes a 
thorough and forward-looking assessment of replication possibilities and/or 
potential facilities-based competition in the long run. As a result, NRAs will 
have to pursue actual replication of observed components both when this is 
already feasible, and when it is likely to become feasible in the near future. 
• Rank non-replicable components in the value chain. In other words, NRAs must 
build the ladder and identify all rungs. This step is crucial and challenging, 
as rungs must not be too distant in terms of incremental investment needed, 
and accurate timing needs to be set in order for the transition to facilities-
based competition to be as rapid as possible, without distorting competition 
and/or creating possibilities for arbitrage by new entrants.  
• Identify where on the ladder market players are located. This is another delicate 
task, in that it aims at preventing the ladder to proceed too slowly or even 
backwards, with players falling down the ladder. Without this mapping 
exercise, arbitrage becomes almost inevitable: the ladder cannot be 
successfully implemented if the regulator does not know which players are 
on which rung.  
• Choose the most appropriate rung on which intervention should be focused. As 
specified by Martin Cave, this decision must be based “on an analysis of the 
scale and prospects of the operators at various points, with a bias in favour 
of what might be described as ‘leading competitors’, defined as those more 
advanced in their infrastructure building and satisfying a minimum market 
share criterion”78.  
• Estimate the amount of investment needed to move from a rung to another up the 
ladder and the correct timing of such move. This depends on how distant are the 
chosen rungs, but also on market conditions such as the time needed for a 
new entrant to achieve sufficient economies of scale and installed customer 
base to be able to climb the ladder.  
• Identify the most appropriate remedy, which in the case of the investment 
ladder normally implies granting access to the incumbent’s infrastructure 
through cost-oriented charges. Given the high investments at stake and the 
                                                                                                                                               
Lisbon? Suggestions for the Future Regulation of E-Communications in Europe, Report of a CEPS 
Task Force, CEPS, June 2006. 
78  Id.  
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degree of uncertainty inevitably brought by the ladder on the possibility to 
recover sunk investments, access pricing might not be limited to LRIC 
pricing or other forms of cost-based pricing, and might include some 
remuneration of investment risk (e.g. “real option pricing”)79. 
• Monitor market structure. In the ladder model, NRAs have a fairly heavy 
responsibility: they have to provide efficient entry incentives with the right 
timing. This implies that the NRA mandates access at rather low prices at 
the chosen rung, while keeping high access charges at other rungs. After the 
new entrants have achieved enough scale, the NRA will raise the price for 
access to that rung and mandate access to the upper rung at more appealing 
prices, so that players will have an incentive to move up the ladder80. The 
pro-active role played by the NRA in implementing the ladder model 
should not, if possible, lead to micromanagement of the market.  
In Turkey, these steps have not been followed to date, and most of the 1,000 
exchanges held by TTNet have not been opened up to competition, despite the 
first attempts to launch bitstream access and the few local loops that have been 
unbundled81. This, in turn, means that most players are still located on the “first 
rung of the ladder”, and that the path towards infrastructure-based competition 
is still very long. In addition, there are limited prospects for the development of 
alternative infrastructures, such as cable, fibre and satellite networks, especially 
since the available infrastructures are also under the control of the partly state-
owned incumbent. 
In short, a careful strategic review of broadband competition in Turkey would 
be highly advisable. Absent this important development (possibly coupled with 
the removal of public ownership and the full separation of cable from xDSL 
infrastructure owners), the Turkish market may end up stagnating in a situation 
in which the fixed-line incumbent is de facto the only provider of local access, 
and accordingly a real dominator of the ISP market.  
3.1.8 Communications taxes 
Needless to say, the most evident feature of the Turkish telecoms market is the 
enormously high level of taxation on communications services. In particular, 
mobile operators are subject to an impressive conundrum of taxes, which 
include a Special Communication Tax, the Treasury Share Premium, the Stamp 
Duty, the TGM Handset License Fee and TGM Handset Usage Fee. As a result, 
                                                 
79  Id. 
80 This would be best achieved if new entrants could climb the ladder simultaneously: 
otherwise, later entrants might find it unfeasible to undertake very high investments to enter 
at a deep level of the ladder, and might also experience problems in entering the market at 
lower rungs, if NRAs are currently discouraging existing players from remaining on those 
rungs through high access charges. 
81 TTNet had approximately 5 million subscribers as of July 2008 and the alternative operators 
have approximately 250,000 subscribers which have been acquired by resale method. 
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Turkey exhibits the highest tax rate worldwide, as shown in Figure 21 below. 
Such a high tax rate inevitably exerts a restrictive effect on penetration. With 
lower rates, a much higher market penetration could have been achieved 
instead of the current 90%, which hardly compares to 112% in the EU.  
A similar concern for high tax rates was expressed by the World Bank in its 
March 2004 “Turkey Knowledge Economy Assessment Study”, in which a key 
recommendation was to “reduce the tax and regulatory burden on ICT”. GSMA 
(2005) published a study on the impact of taxation on mobile market growth, 
highlighting that “the degree to which taxation acts as a barrier for users, 
preventing potentially hundreds of millions people from affording mobile 
communications and holding back economic growth and social development in 
many countries”, and showing the magnitude of the Turkish ‘anomaly’.  
Similar conclusions were reported by Deloitte’s Global Mobile Tax Review 
2006-2007, and are reported below in Figure 22. Mobile value added services 
(VAS) such as purchasing musical contents over mobile handsets are still 
struggling due to high tax burden, through a reduction of the special 
communications tax from 15% to 5% (for internet services only) was announced 
in November 2008. Importantly, the tax burden has the worst effect on low-user 
group, since fixed taxes have higher weight on the overall usage.  
 
Figure 21 – Impact of taxation on mobile users in Turkey 
 
Source: Elaboration (and update) from CEPS Task Force Report (2008) 
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Figure 22 – Tax as a share of total cost of mobile ownership (TCMO) 
 
 
Although to a lesser extent, also fixed-line telecom services are characterized by 
high taxation, with a 15% special communication tax (against the 25% imposed 
on mobile services) and no Treasury share.  
In this respect, the following measures could be envisaged82: 
• fixed taxes should be lifted immediately; 
• the special communications tax should be immediately decreased to the 
same level of fixed telephony (15%), and eventually lifted altogether; 
• Value added services should be exempted from any kind of tax (apart from 
VAT); 
• One type of standard tax should be applied and aligned at the average EU 
level. 
The effect of a tax reduction for mobile services is likely to be remarkable, also 
given the high demand elasticity normally associated with 2G and (even more) 
3G services83.  
 
                                                 
82 See CEPS Task Force report (2008). 
83 See, i.a. Gao et al. (2005), at 
http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/eri/hecer/disc/43/demandfo.pdf. And Hausman, From 
2G to 3G: Wireless competition for internet-related services, available at http://aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpvH.pdf.  
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Option 1.8.0. – No policy change 
STRENGTHS 
• None 
WEAKNESSES 
• 2G and 3G success is hampered by taxes. 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• None 
THREATS 
• Tax burden can heavily affect the development of the 
mobile industry today and in the future. 
 
Option 1.8.1. – Elimination of Treasure Share and SCT 
STRENGTHS 
• Unleashes the demand for 2G 
and 3G services 
WEAKNESSES 
• Lower tax income for Turkey in the short term. 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Greater penetration of mobile 
phones, easier transition to 
mobile broadband, better 
business case for 3G and WiMAX 
THREATS 
• None. 
 
3.2 Area 2 – Alignment with the acquis in audiovisual services 
The area in Chapter 10 where the most significant concerns have expressed by 
the European Commission over the years is certainly that of audiovisual 
services. As recalled above, in Section 2.2.2.2, the current acquis in Turkey still 
significantly differs from the EU Audiovisual Content Without Frontiers 
(ACWF) framework which replaced the previous TV Without Frontier (TVWF) 
Directive.  
The main areas of concern are the following: 
• Freedom of expression. The 2006 report and the following two reports 
emphasise that the Turkish legal framework still does not guarantee 
freedom of expression, in particular since defamation is still a criminal 
offence carrying prison sentences. With the advent of the Internet age, non-
linear services face similar risk to content previously broadcasted, as 
testified by several instances of website blocking (e.g. of Youtube). The act 
amending the Broadcasting Act (RTÜK Act) in 2002, provides for the 
possibility of broadcasting programmes in different languages and dialects 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. The 
implementation is far from being perfect. Apart from this, the broadcasting 
act includes a wide range of provisions on sanctions, the Internet and the 
composition of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK). The act 
also lays down basic principles that any broadcasting activity must comply 
with, including a ban on broadcasts that threaten the existence and 
independence of the Turkish Republic, the territorial and national integrity 
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of the State, or the reforms and principles of Atatürk, or which encourage 
violence, terror or ethnic discrimination. In many cases, this provision is 
interpreted in a very strict way. Part of the concerns raised in these area 
overlap with concerns in the field of human rights and protection of 
minorities, and will not form part of the present impact assessment exercise. 
• Competitive environment. The main problem here relates to:  
o The need to introduce a general authorisation regime as opposed to the 
current individual licensing regime (see above, Section 2.3.1.2). 
o Licensing and frequency planning issues. With the amendment of the 
Broadcasting Law in 2002, the task of frequency planning for radio and 
television was transferred from the RTÜK to the Telecommunications 
Authority. However, regulatory competences remain split.  
o Spectrum. Besides issuing telecommunications licences, the 
Telecommunications Authority is also responsible for regulating the 
electromagnetic spectrum, but the RTÜK retains the authority to award 
broadcast licences, and since then has not reallocated frequencies nor 
reviewed temporary licences84. Due to the frequency allocation deadlock 
(see below) currently, all terrestrial radio and television broadcasts are 
carried out without any licence or official allocation of frequencies. 
Overall spectrum policy needs a careful reassessment, also in light of the 
digital switchover plans. 
o The need to complete the analysis of former market 18 to introduce 
competitive safeguard measures against SMP operators.  
• Independence and administrative capacity of the regulator. A number of 
sanctions imposed by RTÜK, on private media raise question marks over its 
independence. In terms of administrative capacity, the composition of the 
Radio and Television Supreme Council makes it vulnerable to political 
pressures. The HYK is a board consisting of the Minister of Internal Affairs, 
the Minister of Transport, the Under-Secretary of the National Intelligence 
Organisation and the Head of Electronic Communications of the General 
Staff, meeting under the presidency of the Prime Minister (or a State 
Minister authorised by the Prime Minister).  
• Promotion of European and independent works and restrictions on the 
share of foreign capital in television enterprises. The new regulation on 
licensing and authorisation of cabled transmissions obliges cable operators 
not to transmit programmes of foreign origin, if these are deemed 
inappropriate by RTÜK. This obligation is clearly not compatible with the 
Television Without Frontiers Directive. In addition, the 2002 Amendment to 
the Broadcasting Law set a 25% ceiling on foreign ownership of private 
                                                 
84 The frequency plan produced by the Telecommunications Authority must be approved by the 
Communications High Council (HYK).  
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radio or television channels. This ceiling is expected to be increased to 50% 
in 2009, and completely relaxed two years before accession to the EU, to 
comply with the EU Treaty principle of free movement of capital across the 
Union.  
3.2.1 Available regulatory options 
Alignment with the acquis in the audiovisual sector will not come without costs 
and shortcomings in Turkey, although most of these costs are hard to express in 
economic terms. Government control over content has clear advantages in 
terms of political stability, and the current protection and funding of Turkish 
content over foreign content has succeeded in protecting the national content 
industry as opposed to global formats and international content. Against this 
background, the Television Without Frontiers Directive was conceived exactly 
for the purpose of lifting barriers to the circulation of content and capital 
throughout the Union, and as such contains provisions that favour European 
content as a whole, not national content. As a matter of fact, many countries 
had rules that hindered the (re-)transmission of programmes originating in 
other countries before the TVWF Directive was enacted in 198985.  
Needless to say, the application of provisions on European programmes and 
the elimination of restriction on the circulation of content would dramatically 
change the landscape of Turkish television as it stands today. Negative impacts 
may occur to local television producers, especially if the current ban on 
ownership of local TV and radio stations will be lifted. But on the other hand, 
citizens will have access to more diverse and (likely) higher-quality content, 
and will be benefited by access to major events, more pluralism in information 
received, and overall positive externalities due to higher demand for 
audiovisual services, including speedier broadband rollout86. This, in turn, will 
favour the development of new content-delivery technologies over broadband 
platforms, such as IPTV or Mobile TV (once 3G and later 4G services are in 
place).  
In other words, a modern regulatory framework for audiovisual services is the 
necessary complement to the telecoms framework to bring Turkey fully in the 
digital era. The direct and indirect benefits of aligning with the EU acquis are 
                                                 
85 Under the TVWF Directive, notwithstanding the application of the country of origin principle, 
Member States may still take measures that restrict the freedom of movement of television 
broadcasting, but only under certain conditions listed in Article 2a of this Directive and 
following the procedure laid down in this Directive. However, the European Court of Justice 
has consistently held that any restriction of the freedom to provide services, such as any 
derogation from a fundamental principle of the Treaty, must be interpreted restrictively. 
(Case C-355/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221, paragraph 28; Case C-348/96 
Calfa [1999] ECR I-0011, paragraph 23). 
86 See, e.g., Marsden et al.(2006), Assessing Indirect Impacts of the EC Proposals for Video Regulation, 
a study for Ofcom, RAND Europe. 
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very significant, and include benefits to users, to advertisers, to content 
producers, and also to equipment manufacturers in all media87. 
In all this, a careful reorganisation of the governance of the audiovisual services 
sector appears essential in Turkey, especially as regards spectrum policy. 
Digital switchover plans will deliver outstanding benefits to Turkish citizens 
only if UHF frequencies are allocated to new services and uses. For this reason, 
our analysis of digital dividend options in Section 2.3.1.3 above holds valid for 
this specific sector. 
Against this background, the main regulatory options available to Turkey are 
represented by different degrees of alignment with the EU acquis: (i) status quo 
option (i.e., continuation of existing reform plans); (ii) full alignment with 
AVMS Directive; (iii) alignment with AVMS Directive and with spectrum policy 
plans at EU level; and (iv) alignment with AVMS Directive, spectrum policy 
plans and reform of sector governance (clearer distinction of roles between 
RTUK and BTK, narrower scope of HYK scrutiny).  
 
Option 2.1.0. – Status quo option 
STRENGTHS 
• Protection of national culture and 
local content producers 
• Existing plans already improve 
the situation as regards foreign 
ownership restrictions 
WEAKNESSES 
• Spectrum policy to be reorganised 
• Unclear division of competences between regulators 
(RTUK and BTK) 
• Need to constrain the role of the HYK in control over 
content 
• Limited access to foreign content  
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Current plans already promise to 
improve the competitiveness of 
the sector in the medium term 
THREATS 
• Current framework hampers the transition towards 
digital (non-linear) content provision  
• Premium content can boost demand for broadband 
and consequently infrastructure rollout 
• Inefficient spectrum policy can lead to insufficient 
spectrum availability for new technologies (e.g. DTT) 
and services (e.g. IPTV, Mobile TV) 
 
                                                 
87 For example, as reported by AIG (2005) the private TV-Broadcaster RTL Television 
Deutschland has calculated that if the Country of Origin principle had not been implemented 
through the Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF), the costs for legal research 
(concerning spill-over-effects of broadcasted programs) would rise to about 20 million more 
every year. Furthermore, advertising revenues would suffer losses of more than 300 million 
each year, due to having to observe different national provisions (e.g. on advertising for 
certain products, sponsorship or other special forms of advertising). 
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Option 2.1.1. – Alignment with the EU AVMS Directive 
STRENGTHS 
• Unleashes the potential for free  
movement of content  
• Lifts restrictions to free  
movement of capital 
• Protects European programmes 
and independent works 
WEAKNESSES 
• Non-linear content provision could be partially 
constrained by AVMS rules (but not as much as in 
status quo) 
• Potential negative effects on national content 
industry due to increased access to European works 
and more foreign ownership of TV and radio 
stations 
• Spectrum policy to be reorganised 
• Unclear division of competences between regulators 
(RTUK and BTK) 
• Need to constrain the role of the HYK in control over 
content 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can boost competitiveness for 
advertising, equipment 
manufacturing, content 
production 
• Increases access to (premium) 
content for Turkish citizens 
THREATS 
• Still insufficient to ensure full transition to 
convergent media provision on new platforms, due 
to inefficient and chaotic spectrum allocation 
• Does not solve the problem of institutional 
governance and regulator independence  
 
Option 2.1.2. – Alignment with the AVMS Directive + spectrum reform 
STRENGTHS 
• Unleashes the potential for free  
movement of content  
• Lifts restrictions to free  
movement of capital 
• Protects European programmes 
and independent works 
• Improves Turkey’s readiness for 
digital convergence  
WEAKNESSES 
• Non-linear content provision could be partially 
constrained by AVMS rules (but not as much as in 
status quo) 
• Potential negative effects on national content 
industry due to increased access to European works 
and more foreign ownership of TV and radio 
stations 
• Unclear division of competences between regulators 
(RTUK and BTK) 
• Need to constrain the role of the HYK in control over 
content 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can boost competitiveness for 
advertising, equipment 
manufacturing, content 
production (even more than 
option 2.1.2) 
• Increases access to (premium) 
content for Turkish citizens (even 
more than option 2.1.2) 
THREATS 
• Does not solve the problem of institutional 
governance and regulator independence 
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Option 2.1.3. – Alignment with AVMS Directive + spectrum + improved governance 
STRENGTHS 
• Unleashes the potential for free  
movement of content  
• Lifts restrictions to free  
movement of capital 
• Protects European programmes 
and independent works 
• Improves Turkey’s readiness for 
digital convergence  
• Increases regulatory certainty 
and effectiveness of regulation 
WEAKNESSES 
• Non-linear content provision could be partially 
constrained by AVMS rules (but not as much as in 
previous options) 
• Potential negative effects on national content 
industry due to increased access to European works 
and more foreign ownership of TV and radio 
stations 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Can boost competitiveness for 
advertising, equipment 
manufacturing, content 
production (even more than 
previous options) 
• Increases access to (premium) 
content for Turkish citizens (even 
more than previous options) 
THREATS 
• None 
 
As a result, we recommend that option 2.1.3 is undertaken. Without a 
significant reorganisation of sector governance and spectrum policy, the 
alignment with the AVMS Directive would prove ineffective.  
3.3 Area 3 – Strengthening the administrative capacity and 
independence of the regulator 
In the previous sections, we have analysed the pending issues in the alignment 
of the Turkish regulatory framework with the EU acquis. As we have seen, there 
are some areas in which significant effort would be needed in order to realise 
full alignment. However, in many other areas, even if legislation is broadly in 
line with the EU framework, the implementation and enforcement of legal and 
regulatory provisions is weak. This problem mostly relates to secondary 
legslation and the actual implementation and enforcement of remedies 
identified by the NRA after finding SMP in the analysed markets, as well as the 
availability of licenses for fixed-line telecommunications services. In a nutshell, 
without effective enforcement, Turkey will never fully align (in practice) with 
the EU framework. 
Effective enforcement requires an independent, powerful, accountable and 
transparent NRA. The importance of independence for NRAs has always been 
stressed at EU level, and is even more under the spotlight in the current debate 
on the review of the 2002 regulatory framework. The Commission recalled in 
the 14th Implementation Report on the regulatory framework for e-
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communications that “[e]ffective and independent national regulatory 
authorities are a prerequisite for ensuring fair and effective regulation of the 
electronic communications markets. NRAs should be independent from any 
organisation providing electronic communications networks and services. 
Moreover, NRAs should be able to exercise their powers impartially and 
transparently”88. Countries like Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Poland 
and others have been constantly pushed by the Commission over the past 
months to strenghten the independence of their NRAs. For example, The 
Commission pointed at the lack of sufficient powers of the Hungarian NRA as 
regards spectrum policy, and called for more NRA powers in enforcing 
competition law in Malta and Ireland.  
In addition, of particular concern in many member states is the “delineation of 
responsibilities and competences in the broadcasting sector”. The Commission 
recently pointed, i.a., at the lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities 
between the NRA and the national broadcasting authority in Malta, Belgium 
and Bulgaria, especially for what concerns the allocation of frequencies for 
analogue services and the assignment of licences for broadcasters. 
The effectiveness of the NRA is important not only for the alignment with the 
EU acquis, but for the performance of the sectoral regulation overall. In previous 
studies, Ros (2003) found that the presence of an independent regulator has a 
positive impact on fixed-line penetration; Wallsten (2001) found that the 
privatization of the incumbent operator is beneficial only in the presence of an 
independent regulator; and Wallsten (2003) concluded that establishing a 
regulatory authority before privatizing the telecommunications incumbent is 
correlated with increased fixed-line penetration, telecom investments and 
subscriptions to mobile telephony.  
Based on Wu (2004) and Grzybowski (2006), we can assess the independence of 
the Turkish Telecommunications Authority along the following dimensions:  
1. Stability of NRA leadership – This concerns the nature in which the 
leadership of the regulatory agency is selected and removed. 
2. Scope of NRA authority – What are the functions of the regulator and to 
what extent are they exclusively the purview of the regulator. 
3. Financial independence – refers to how the regulator is funded. 
4. Ownership of incumbent – refers to the level of privatization of the 
incumbent operator and the level of the state’s financial interest in it. 
5. Movement of staff from industry to regulator – staff may be less 
influenced by external interests if there is discouragement of a “revolving 
door” between the regulator and private industry. 
                                                 
88 See Staff Working Paper, Vol. 1, at  
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6. Representation of consumer concerns – the degree to which the regulator 
can and does represent the interests of consumers 
7. Ethical guidelines – what kind guidelines exist internally that deal with 
ethical issues that arise in the course of normal operations. 
8. Level of expertise and human resources available to the regulator, 
particularly important in a fast-moving technologically dependent industry. 
9. Transparency in decision-making is also critical including how open the 
internal decision-making process is and the level of consultations that are 
part of this process.  
10. Legitimacy and acceptance of the authority of the regulator. Here 
independence is predicated on the regulator having sufficient credibility 
and clout in the eyes of the industry, consumers and other government 
institutions. If the regulator lacks legitimacy then there is potential for 
constant appeals, lack of support from government, and ultimately an 
ineffective sector89. 
The Turkish Telecommunications Authority performs rather well in some of 
these dimensions. For example, it appears as having a rather stable leadership, 
reasonable financial independence and sufficient human resources (as far as the 
number is concerned, totalling 594 staff members in 2008). However, the 
following concerns can be expressed: 
• The delineation of responsibilities and competences is not clear in a 
number of areas, most notably in spectrum policy and generally for 
broadcasting services. 
• There seems to be poor cooperation between the NRA and the NCA in 
Turkey. In principle, the two authorities should seek each other’s opinion 
for matters related to the e-communications sector (after Law No. 2813) and 
should be further stressed in a regulation to be adopted now that the new 
Electronic Communications Law enters into force90. Recently the 
Competition Board was active in ex post scrutiny of allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct, as recently issued a decision against Türk 
Telekomünikasyon A.Ş. and TTNet A.Ş. in the “Summer storm” case, for 
price squeeze in the wholesale broadband internet access market and retail 
broadband internet access market91. 
                                                 
89 See ITU (2002), Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2002: Effective Regulation. Geneva: 
International Telecommunication Union. 
90  See http://www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/10/sorular%20ve%20cevaplar_files/ 
SC10_Cevaplar.pdf.  
91 Subsequent to the evaluation of the each cost item, the Board came to the conclusion that (i) 
each package of the Summer Storm campaign was being sold under cost price (ii) through 
the “Summer Storm” campaign, Türk Telekom structured its wholesale and retail prices in 
such a way that the margin between them did not allow competitors to compete on the 
market without making losses (iii) through this so-called "margin squeeze", Türk Telekom 
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• The independence of the NRA is jeopardised by the role of the 
Communications High Council or Haberlesme Yuksek Kurulu (HYK), 
especially as regards the approval of the national frequency allocation table. 
The HYK was established in 1983 as a body of approval for communications 
policies. It is a board consisting of Transport and Internal Affairs Ministers 
and other government officials, convenes meeting twice a year to approve or 
alter radio and television frequency plan and decides when, and how many 
frequencies may be auctioned. In addition, important regulatory actions 
such as the implementation of universal service require government 
intervention. 
• The skills and expertise available to the NRA can be improved: as reported 
by Burnham (2006), board members are chosen from career civil servants 
who may have little background in current technology and market issues; 
and the recruitment of qualified staff is “hampered by civil service salary 
caps”92. 
• In terms of ownership of incumbents, the Turkish Treasury performs the 
ownership function of the States remaining shareholding in Türk Telekom, 
while the Ministry of Transportation is responsible for Türk Telekom’s 
operational activities (“golden share” function). The Turkish government 
has an interest of 24.3% in Avea Telecommunications, a mobile operator that 
is 81% owned by Türk Telekom. In addition, Turksat Satellite 
Communication and Cable TV Operation AS (Turksat) is wholly owned by 
the government93. 
• As regards the transparency of decision-making, with the new Law no. 
5809 the NRA has a formal obligation to publish all decisions. Draft 
legislation prepared by the NRA usually involves the participation of 
operators through joint committees. A consultation mechanism is 
established and documents on issues that have an effect on the sector are 
published on the NRA’s web site and also sent to the relevant operators, 
industry NGOs, etc. The responses are published and taken into 
consideration by the NRA. Draft legislation is also published on the BTK 
web site. 
                                                                                                                                               
might insulate itself from the rigors of competition by making it impossible for alternative 
broadband suppliers to enter the market on a commercially-viable basis and (iv) continuance 
of such campaigns might cause serious and irreparable damages on the competitors in the 
retail broadband internet access market. An administrative monetary fine amounting to TRY 
12,394,781.16 (almost 6 million Euros) based on their total turnover generated in the relevant 
product market by the end of the fiscal year 2007 was imposed on Türk Telekom and TTNet 
(jointly and severally). 
92 Burnham, cit., at 205. 
93 Board members of Turk Telekom and Avea include the Undersecretary of Ministry of 
Transport, the Undersecratary of the Prime Ministry, the General Manager of Turkish Radio 
and Television channel (TRT). Such situation hurts transparency and independency of the 
NRA in the decision making process. 
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• Finally, increased legitimacy and transparency could be achieved by 
recurrent use of regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) on primary and 
secondary legislation. This is still not done by the Turkish NRA. Use of RIAs 
could strengthen the credibility and the accountability of the regulator in the 
industry.  
Overall, there seems to be room for improving the independence, transparency, 
accountability and effectiveness of the Turkish regulator. As regards Chapter 10 
negotiations, the highest priority should be given to provisions on universal 
service obligations, the delineation of competences in broadcasting, spectrum 
policy and licensing; whereas other issues – such as the drafting of a 
cooperation agreement between the NRA and NCA, increased transparency, 
broader use of better regulation principles and the reduction of state ownership 
of incumbents and other industry players can probably be implemented at a 
later stage.  
3.3.1 Regulatory options 
In line with what discussed in the previous section, we can identify three main 
regulatory options: (i) no policy change; (ii) better delieation of competences in 
broadcasting, spectrum policy and licensing; (iii) cooperation agreement with 
the NCA, increased transparency, broader use of better regulation principles 
and reduction of state ownership of incumbents. 
 
Option 3.1.0. – No policy change 
STRENGTHS 
• The NRA is already well staffed 
and has sufficient budget 
WEAKNESSES 
• Delineation of responsibilities and competences is 
not clear in a number of areas, most notably in 
spectrum policy and generally for broadcasting 
services. 
• Poor cooperation between the NRA and the NCA. 
• The independence of the NRA is jeopardised by the 
role of the Communications High Council or 
Haberlesme Yuksek Kurulu (HYK), especially as 
regards the approval of the national frequency 
allocation table.  
• Universal service regulation still requires 
government intervention. 
• Skills and expertise available to the NRA can be 
improved 
• State ownership of incumbents can undermine the 
NRA independence and effectiveness 
• NRA does not have a formal obligation to publish all 
decisions, but decides on a case-by-case basis.  
• No use of regulatory impact assessments (RIAs)  
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OPPORTUNITIES 
• None 
THREATS 
• A partly ineffective NRA can hamper the 
competitiveness of the sector and the liberalization 
process, as recalled in the economic literature 
 
Option 3.1.1. – Better delineation of competences in broadcasting, spectrum, licensing 
STRENGTHS 
• The NRA is already well staffed 
and has sufficient budget 
• Better delineation of 
responsibilities and competences, 
in spectrum policy and generally 
for broadcasting services. 
• More accountability of the NRA 
to the regulated stakeholders 
• No influence by the HYK on the 
approval of the national 
frequency allocation table.  
• No government intervention for 
implementation of USO  
WEAKNESSES 
• Skills and expertise available to the NRA can be 
improved 
• State ownership of incumbents can undermine the 
NRA independence and effectiveness 
• NRA does not have a formal obligation to publish all 
decisions, but decides on a case-by-case basis.  
• No use of regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Probably sufficient for accession 
to the EU 
• Would streamline the regulatory 
and business environment 
• Would increase regulatory 
certainty 
THREATS 
• Still does not guarantee efficient regulation (lack of 
RIA and more skilled staff) 
• State ownership of incumbents may still hamper 
attempts to fully liberalize some sectors 
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Option 3.1.2. – Cooperation with NCA, reduction of state ownership, transparency, RIA 
STRENGTHS 
• The NRA is already well staffed 
and has sufficient budget 
• Better delineation of 
responsibilities and competences, 
in spectrum policy and generally 
for broadcasting services. 
• More accountability of the NRA 
to the regulated stakeholders 
• No influence by the HYK on the 
approval of the national 
frequency allocation table.  
• No government intervention for 
implementation of USO  
• NRA independence is not 
threatened by state ownership of 
incumbents 
• NRA publishes all decisions 
accompanied by a RIA 
WEAKNESSES 
• Skills and expertise available to the NRA can be 
improved 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Would streamline the regulatory 
and business environment 
• Would increase regulatory 
certainty 
• Likely to increase effectiveness 
and efficiency of regulation 
THREATS 
• Still does not guarantee efficient regulation (lack of 
RIA and more skilled staff), but cooperation with 
NCA can improve the situation 
 
Accordingly, we suggest that the Turkish government adopts the measures 
included in option 3.2.1.2 in the short term, and establishes a more long-term 
plan towards concluding a cooperation agreement with the NCA, increasing 
transparency, adopt RIA and reduces state ownership of incumbents )option 
3.2.1.3). 
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4. “BUNDLES OF OPTIONS” 
In the previous section, we have separately analysed a number of issues that are 
likely to be under the spotlight in the negotiation of Chapter 10 in the months to 
come. Many of these issues, if not all, exhibit however significant interrelations 
and synergies, so that assessing the impact of an option “in isolation” is 
unlikely to approximate real results. In this section we take stock on our 
analysis of individual options. Section 3.1 then builds a number of different 
scenarios to be compared in terms of expected costs and benefits. Section 3.2 
then analyses more in-depth the expected impact of the preferred policy 
scenario.  
In Section 2, we have analysed several issues and options. Table 11 below 
shows the overall assessment of the individual options and indicates the 
options that we indicated as preferable to alternatives for each of the eight 
issues analysed. Costs are expressed in terms of, i.a. opportunity costs, 
inefficiencies in policy formulation and implementation, low-quality business 
environment, administrative costs. Benefits are expressed in terms of reduced 
price, increased competition, innovation and growth, availability of products 
and services and choice for consumers, regulatory certainty, more efficient 
governance, etc.  
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Table 11 – Summary of issues and options assessed 
Option  Description Costs Benefits 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
1.1.0 No policy change ☻ ☻ 
1.1.1. More transparency in the allocation of the USF ☻☻ ☻☻ 
1.1.2. More transparency and transfer of USF to the Telecom authority ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.1.3. Alignment with the acquis through a new USO regulation ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
LICENSING AND AUTHORIZATIONS 
1.2.0. Maintain the wording of Law No. 5809 ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.2.1. Full alignment with the EU acquis ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
1.2.2. General authorisations for all services  ☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
1.2.3. A hybrid system ☻☻☻ ☻ 
SPECTRUM POLICY 
1.3.0. No policy change ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
1.3.1 Introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific bands ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.3.2. Clustering of digital dividend in line with COM(2007)700 ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
NUMBER PORTABILITY 
1.4.0 Implementing current plans ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
1.4.1. Reduction of switching time to less than 5 days ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
TERMINATION RATES 
1.5.0. No policy change ☻☻☻ ☻ 
1.5.1. “Glide path”  ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.5.2. “Glide path” towards “single efficient MTR” ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.5.3. “Glide path” + no internal non-discrimination obligation ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
MVNOS 
1.6.0. No action on MVNOs ☻ ☻ 
1.6.1. Authorisation of MVNOs ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
1.6.2 Mandated entry of MVNOs ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
PROMOTING COMPETITION IN THE FIXED-LINE AND BROADBAND SECTOR 
1.7.0 No policy change ☻☻☻☻  
1.7.1 Investment ladder ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
1.7.2 Regulatory holidays ☻☻ ☻ 
1.7.3 Functional separation ☻☻☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
TAXATION 
1.8.0. No policy change ☻☻☻☻  
1.8.1. Elimination of Treasure Share and SCT ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
AUDIOVISUAL POLICY 
2.1.0. No policy change ☻☻  
2.1.1. Alignment with the EU AVMS Directive ☻☻ ☻☻ 
2.1.2. Alignment with the AVMS Directive + spectrum reform ☻☻☻ ☻☻ 
2.1.3. Alignment with AVMS Directive + spectrum + improved governance ☻☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
NRA INDEPENDENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY 
3.1.0. No policy change ☻☻ ☻ 
3.1.1. Better delineation of competences in broadcasting, spectrum, licensing ☻☻ ☻☻☻ 
3.1.2. Cooperation with NCA, reduced state ownership, transparency, RIA ☻☻ ☻☻☻☻ 
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4.1 Policy scenarios 
Based on the summary Table above, on the observation of the timing and 
political constraints currently existing on both sides of the negotiation table, 
and on the current uncertainty caused by the ongoing review of the EU 2002 e-
communications framework, we can structure our next step of analysis by 
identifying a number of different policy scenarios, which correspond to 
different combinations of the options analysed above. The purpose of this 
exercise is twofold: (i) identifying the combination of options that is likely to 
bring the highest net benefits for Turkish citizens; and (ii) discuss timing and 
feasibility issues by developing a “roadmap” towards accession.  
We identified the following scenarios for analysis: 
• Scenario 1 – no policy change. This corresponds to the combination of all 
“no policy change” options in Section 2. The “no policy change” scenario 
differs from the status quo scenario as it does not incorporate the measures 
proposed by the Turkish government in the 2008 NPAA. This distinction 
allows us to assess the expected additional impact of implementing the 
NPAA.  
• Scenario 2 – Implementation of the 2008 NPAA. The most important 
measures announced in the NPAA (as illustrated in Section 2.2 above) are 
related to:  
(i)  Implementation of the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) and 
access to emergency services (the so-called 112 emergence number) 
within 2 years (option 1.1.3);  
(ii)  adoption and implementation of the Authorization directive in line 
with Law No. 5809 (option 1.2.0);  
(iii)  opening up the market to MVNOs in 2009 through general 
authorisations (option 1.6.1);  
(iv)  amending Law no. 3984 within 2 years to align it with the AVMS 
Directive as regards broadcasting principles, legal framework for digital 
broadcasting and its licensing, the transmission/re-transmission rights 
and the frequency allotment – i.e. licensing, authorization and bidding – 
procedures94 (option 2.1.2); and  
(v)  improving the administrative capacity of the NRA (option 3.1.1., 
though the details of this policy measure are not specified yet). 
                                                 
94 The NPAA includes the creation of a Radio and Television Public Advisory Forum to 
complement the work of RTÜK. With participation of radio and television broadcasters, the 
forum will act as a consultative body for the regulatory process and the decisions of RTÜK. 
According to the details provided in the NPAA, the forum will be created in 2009, (Table 
10.2.2). A number of entities for tracking the alignment with EU acquis, protection of minors, 
etc. are also put forth as structural enhancements. 
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• Scenario 3 – “Full” alignment with the EU acquis. This scenario includes 
currently proposed rules and policies at EU level and would require, 
compared to scenario 2, the following measures: 
viii)  New rules are introduced to clarify the assignment of rights of way; 
ix)  Full alignment with the EU acquis on authorisation and licensing, 
through the removal of ambiguous provisions contained at Article 9 of 
Law No 5809 (option 1.2.1); 
x)  Introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific spectrum 
bands (option 1.3.1); 
xi)  Reduction of the porting time to one working day (option 1.4.1); 
xii)  Glide path to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile termination rates and 
gradual convergence towards the “Single efficient MTR” (option 1.5.3); 
xiii)  Licensing of new operators for local calls and implementation of 
“investment ladder” model (option 1.7.1); 
xiv)  The independence and effectiveness of the NRA are strengthened in 
order to ensure the effective implementation of already available 
remedies, especially in wholesale fixed-line and broadband access 
(option 3.1.1). 
• Scenario 4 – “Full” alignment plus pro-competitive policy measures. Under 
this scenario, in addition to scenario 3, Turkey would: 
(i)  adopt a Spectrum plan based on the clustering of the UHF band 
proposed in the recent communication on the digital dividend (option 
1.3.2);  
(ii)  implement current plans on mobile portability (option 1.4.0); 
(iii)  adopt a glide path to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile termination 
rates and refrain from adopting the internal non-discrimination 
obligation on one SMP player proposed in the analysis of market 16 
(option 1.5.3);  
(iv)  adopt the AVMS Directive, align with EU spectrum reform objectives 
and improve governance of spectrum by reorganising competences 
(option 2.1.4.); and  
(v)  strengthen NRA-NCA cooperation, plan a reduction of state ownership 
of incumbents, increase transparency and adopt RIA (option 3.1.2.). 
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Table 12 – Summary of scenarios 
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4.2 Impact assessment of alternative scenarios 
4.2.1 Scenario 1 – no policy change 
Under scenario 1, Turkey would not introduce additional policy measures 
compared to laws and regulations that are currently being adopted (such as the 
licensing of 3G). In this situation, alignment with the acquis will of course 
remain insufficient, and one of the most important consequences for Turkey 
would be that negotiations on Chapter 10 would fail.  
Overall, there are very little benefits that would accrue to Turkish citizens from 
preserving the current situation in the e-communications and media sectors. 
Without new legislation, Turkey would virtually remain out of the EU; in 
addition, absent the streamlining of licensing and authorizations, very little 
competition would emerge in the fixed-line and broadband sector, due to 
difficulties in entering the local calls market. Moreover, rather rigid spectrum 
policy and the absence of a pro-competitive spectrum plan for the digital 
dividend will leave Turkish citizens with a rather limited possibility of 
entering the digital age from the front door. This situation would be worsened 
by the rigidities in the current audiovisual policy framework and consequently 
by the limited access to (foreign) premium content featured by the current 
framework. Recent changes in legislation to enable wholesale broadband access 
(for example, by mandating the publication of RIOs and a RUO) would not be 
sufficiently enforced due to limited capacity and independence of the NRA, 
both in the e-communications and (most notably) in the media sector) 
Against this background, the major cost of scenario 1 would be the foregone 
benefit of failing to enter the digital age and realizing the information society 
for all in Turkey. We can call this Turkey’s “cost of non-Europe”, or simply the 
cost of non-accession. In quantitative terms, this cost has been quantified as at 
least 0.428% of GDP, but also of foregone fixed-line price reductions of 33.5% 
and significant increases in broadband availability, speed and choice for end 
users95. 
The table below summarises the main costs and benefits of scenario 1 and 
provides a scorecard analysis, which attaches scores from 1 (minimum) to 5 
(maximum)  to different categories of costs..  
 
 
                                                 
95 Akdemir et al. (2007) estimate that the potential contribution from Turkey’s alignment with 
the EU acquis and implementation of a UK-like or Finland-like telecoms policy could be an 
increase in Turkish GDP of 0.428% yearly. Their result for fixed-line prices follows the model 
originally developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001). 
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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF SCENARIO 1 
Scenario 1 – no policy change 
BENEFITS  
Investment (foreign and 
domestic)  
2 
• Turkey is a large e-com market, which will attract investment regardless of the regulatory framework. Current rules hamper inward FDI 
due to limited regulatory certainty and uncertain business environment, imperfect law enforcement, state ownership of incumbents, etc. 
• In the audiovisual sector, persisting limits to foreign ownership hamper investment 
Competition 1 
• Entry of new competitor can be stimulated only if new regulations on wholesale fixed-line access and MVNOs are implemented strictly.  
• Difficulties in issuing licenses and limited access to the local calls sector hamper effective competition 
• In the audiovisual sector, persisting limits to foreign (EU) content hamper competition between players and entry of new players 
Benefits to end users 1 
• Broadband prices likely to remain high if liberalization of fixed-line is not full. 
• End users in Turkey already benefit from some innovation, especially in mobile. But the current framework prevents them from fully 
entering the digital age. 
• Broadband penetration likely to remain low and decreasing in fixed (DSL, Cable); and to a lower extent also in wireless (3G unlikely to 
be deployed in all areas; WiMAX currently in a rather expensive frequency band). 
• Failure to open up the audiovisual services sector means limited access to premium content and to new applications and services that 
drive the demand for broadband (e.g., Web 2.0 website).  
Harmonisation with EU 
acquis 
2 
• Current policy in the e-communications sector has only been partly aligned with the EU acquis (also after Law No 5809). 
• The NRA should be strengthened and competencies more clearly organised.  
• Need to speed up alignment of audiovisual policy framework, even compared to current plans (e.g. foreign ownership restrictions).  
Macroeconomic benefits 1 
• Currently the Turkish ICT sector is an important component of GDP 
• Very limited improvements if Turkey does not change gear on broadband plans. 
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COSTS  
Costs to industry players 3 
• Opportunity costs of deploying BWA technologies in sub-optimal bands 
• Opportunity costs of limited access to licenses and fixed-line markets 
Costs to end users 5 
• Price levels could be reduced up to 33.5% with more pro-competitive reforms 
• Limited prospects for access to innovative technologies and premium content via digital platforms 
• Opportunity cost of insufficient broadband penetration 
Switching/harmonisation 
costs 
1 
• Very limited harmonisation with the acquis in the areas analysed 
Employment costs 4 
• Little prospects of short-term fixed broadband deployment also mean significant employment opportunities lost  
• Current audiovisual services framework limits the expansion of nomadic services and e-Government 
Administrative burdens 3 
• The licensing regime is considerably more burdensome than a general authorisation regime 
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4.2.2 Scenario 2 – Implementing the 2008 NPAA 
The main difference between scenario 2 and scenario 1 above are the following:  
• The implementation of the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) 
within 2 years will bring additional benefits to end users and industry 
players, as it will add transparency and accountability on the way in which 
the universal service fund is managed and used; at the same time, it will 
bring a more levelled-playing field in the fixed-line telephony sector.  
• The adoption and implementation of the Authorization directive by 2009 is 
a crucial step on the way to a more modern regulatory framework for e-
communications in Turkey. This has partly been achieved with Law No 
5809, but both primary and (most notably) secondary legislation are still 
exhibiting some deficiencies. Most of the other policy measures that could 
be implemented by Turkey on the way to accession strongly depend on this 
preliminary measure, which sets the stage for easier entry by fixed-line 
telecoms service providers, MVNOs, etc. Although benefits and costs are 
very difficult to quantify, they are likely to be substantial. 
• Opening up the market to MVNOs in 2009 through the issuing of general 
authorisations may lead to both costs and benefits. On the one hand, 
depending on the business model that will be adopted by MVNOs that will 
enter the market, as well as on the type of regulation that will be adopted, 
the presence of MVNOs may erode the profitability of the MNOs, depriving 
them of resources they will need to upgrade their networks to 3G and 
beyond. At the same time, MVNOs can exert a disciplining effect on MNOs, 
leading to lower prices and more choice for end users, at least in the short 
term. Overall, the balance between costs and benefits is very difficult to 
predict, and heavily depends on what will happen in practice in both legal 
and business terms. But certainly, the impact on long-term facilities-based 
competition will be mixed, and not necessarily positive.  
• The amendment of Law no. 3984 within 2 years to align it with the AVMS 
Directive as regards broadcasting principles, legal framework for digital 
broadcasting and its licensing, the transmission/re-transmission rights and 
the frequency allotment (i.e. licensing, authorization and bidding) 
procedures is another crucial step for Turkey, as the European Commission 
has always stated that the major discrepancies between the EU acquis and 
the Turkish framework in Chapter 10 are located in the audiovisual services 
field. Benefits from this legal change would accrue mostly to Turkish 
citizens (through enhanced access to foreign linear and non-linear content), 
to foreign content producers and to local telcos, which may be able to offer 
more enticing application/content packages on their broadband networks. 
Costs will be faced by Turkish content producers, who will not benefit 
anymore from rules aimed at protecting national content over other (EU) 
content.  
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• Finally, long-term measures aimed at improving the administrative 
capacity of RTÜK are important, but should be accompanied by measured 
aimed at strengthening the independence and regulatory capacity of ITCA, 
the national regulatory authority for e-communications. Also, a better 
delineation of competences between the ITCA, the RTÜK and the HYK 
would be essential to increase regulatory certainty and improve the 
business environment.   
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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF SCENARIO 2 
Scenario 2 – Implementation of the 2008 NPAA 
BENEFITS  
Investment (foreign and 
domestic)  
2 
• More investment would be expected due to easier entry and the possibility of entering as MVNO in a vibrant mobile market such as the 
Turkish one, with high churn rate. But regulatory uncertainty remains high due to weakness of the NRA 
• In the audiovisual sector, (gradual) removal of limits to foreign ownership might stimulate investment 
Competition 2 
• In this scenario, more competition can be expected in the already competitive mobile sector, but less in the quasi-monopolised fixed-line 
sector, also since the NRA capacity and independence are not strengthened. Absence of a forward-looking spectrum policy may 
undermine fixed-mobile competition in broadband.  
• No changes in the governance of the audiovisual sector (with the HYK retaining competence on frequency assignment) may limit the 
possibility of entry of new competitors. Competition in the provision of content is also jeopardised by the absence of refarming plans in 
the UHF band 
Benefits to end users 2 
• Broadband prices likely to remain high absent a proactive policy to open up the market to competition 
• Entry of MVNOs can increase choice for end users and/or lower prices 
• Better access to audiovisual content, both linear and non-linear, though a lot depends on spectrum policy  
Harmonisation with EU 
acquis 
3 
• Still partial, especially as regards termination rates, spectrum policy, policies to stimulate competition in wholesale access, and NRA 
independence  
Macroeconomic benefits 2 
• Limited improvement due to (slightly) more competitive markets and relaxation of inward FDI restrictions in audiovisual services.  
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COSTS  
Costs to industry players 3 
• Opportunity costs of having to deploy BWA technologies in sub-optimal bands 
• Potential costs to MNOs of mandatory MVNO entry (if any), in terms of reduced profitability (also due to persisting asymmetry in 
MTRs) 
• Costs for Turkish content producers of alignment with the AVMS Directive 
Costs to end users 3 
• Expected price reductions and increase in consumer choice compared to scenario 1 
• Still limited prospects for access to innovative technologies via digital platforms 
Switching/harmonisation 
costs 
3 
• Need to change the administration of the USF 
• Need to migrate to the general authorisation regime 
• Need to change the rules in the audiovisual services sector 
Employment costs 2 
• Opportunity cost of a more proactive policy to encourage entry and investment in the fixed-line sector 
Administrative burdens 1 
• The general authorisation regime is way less burdensome than the status quo 
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4.2.3 Scenario 3 – “full alignment” with the acquis 
In scenario 3, the existing NPAA is complemented by a number of other policy 
measures, which in principle would bring additional benefits to Turkey. In 
particular: 
•  Full alignment with the EU acquis on authorisation and licensing, 
through the removal of ambiguous provisions contained at Article 9 of 
Law No 5809 (option 1.2.1); 
•  Introduction of service and technology neutrality in specific 
spectrum bands (option 1.3.1); 
•  Reduction of the porting time to one working day (option 1.4.1); 
•  Glide path to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile termination rates 
and gradual convergence towards the “Single efficient MTR” (option 
1.5.3); 
• A fuller alignment with the EU acquis on authorisation and licensing, 
through the removal of ambiguous provisions contained at Article 9 of Law 
No 5809, would bring regulatory certainty by narrowing the discretion 
attributed to the NRA in deciding upon authorisations. 
• The implementation of service and technology neutrality in some spectrum 
bands would leave it to the market to decide which services are more 
appropriate, and in which bands. This is often considered as a welfare-
enhancing change in the economic literature since Coase (1959). 
• The reduction of the porting time may be premature in Turkey, as 
legislation is very recent, and more advanced than the common practice in 
many EU member states. This option is considered unlikely to improve upon 
the status quo.  
• A “glide path” to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile termination rates is 
consider to bring benefits in terms of a more sustainable competitive 
environment and a level-playing field for MNOs. Of course, this comes at a 
cost for those SMP players that have profited from higher MTRs to date. This 
cost is even more evident if the convergence towards a “single efficient 
MTR” is sought, as this process – still heavily criticised in Europe – would 
probably stifle investment incentives for MNOs, which need resources to face 
the challenge of 3G and later 4G deployment in Turkey. 
• The implementation of an “investment ladder” model, if carefully 
undertaken, can unleash the potential competition in the fixed-line 
broadband sector, leading to service-based competition (and thus lower 
prices) in the short term, and potentially infrastructure-based competition 
over a longer timeframe. At the same time, such a regulatory model can also 
hamper incentives to invest in alternative infrastructure, as already found in 
empirical studies by Waverman et al. (2007) and Wallsten (2007).  
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• Long-term measures aimed at improving the administrative capacity of the 
NRA will be essential in light of the new general authorisation system. Even 
with a general authorisation regime in place, difficulties may emerge if the 
NRA is not in the position to imposing regulatory measures on existing 
players. This measure is thus complementary to the transition towards a 
general authorisation regime, and as such represents a preliminary reform of 
the Turkish framework, which is essential for the effectiveness of all other 
measures analysed in this report. 
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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF SCENARIO 3 
Scenario 3 – “Full alignment” with the acquis 
BENEFITS  
Investment (foreign and 
domestic)  
3 
• More investment expected due to easier entry, stronger regulatory certainty (stronger NRA) and the possibility of entering as MVNO 
in a vibrant mobile market such as the Turkish one, with high churn rate.  
• Investment in the mobile sector may be hampered by too strict rules on termination and portability; 
• In the audiovisual sector, (gradual) removal of limits to foreign ownership would stimulate investment 
Competition 3 
• In this scenario, more competition can be expected in both the mobile and fixed-line sector, also due to stronger NRA capacity and 
independence. Absence of a forward-looking spectrum policy may undermine fixed-mobile competition in broadband.  
• No changes in the governance of the audiovisual sector (with the HYK retaining competence on frequency assignment) may limit the 
possibility of entry of new competitors. Competition in the provision of content is also jeopardised by the absence of refarming plans in 
the UHF band 
Benefits to end users 3 
• Broadband prices likely to fall due to service-based competition induced by the investment ladder model and stronger administrative 
capacity of the NRA (approx. 0.31% reduction in retail prices for each 1% drop in interconnection prices) 
• Entry of MVNOs can increase choice for end users and/or lower prices 
• Quick number portability can enable dynamic consumer choice. 
• Better access to audiovisual content, both linear and non-linear, though a lot depends on spectrum policy  
Harmonisation with EU 
acquis 
5 
• Almost full (depending on actual implementation of rules) 
Macroeconomic benefits 3 
• Positive effects on GDP, productivity, innovation, etc. But termination and portability rules may stifle incentives to invest. 
• Improvement due to more competitive markets and relaxation of inward FDI restrictions in audiovisual services.  
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COSTS  
Costs to industry players 4 
• Opportunity costs of having to deploy BWA technologies in sub-optimal bands 
• Costs for MNOs due to very low MTRs 
• Very high cost of strict portability regulations 
• Potential costs to MNOs of mandatory MVNO entry (if any), in terms of reduced profitability  
• Costs for Turkish content producers of alignment with the AVMS Directive 
Costs to end users 2 
• Expected price reductions and increase in consumer choice compared to scenarios 1 and 2.  
• Limited investment in the mobile sector due to portability and termination regulations.  
Switching/harmonisation 
costs 
4 
• Need to change the administration of the USF 
• Need to migrate to the general authorisation regime 
• Need to change the rules in the audiovisual services sector 
• Costs due to strict portability requirements 
Employment costs 1 
• None 
Administrative burdens 1 
• The general authorisation regime is way less burdensome than the status quo 
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4.2.4 Scenario 4 – “Alignment” plus proactive policy measures 
Scenario 4 depicts a situation in which Turkey, besides aligning its regulatory 
framework to the EU acquis, also implements a number of additional policy 
measures with the specific aim to create a more competitive environment for 
industry players and better choice and quality for end users, at lower prices. 
The expected impact of the additional measures can be described as follows. 
• The clustering of the UHF band would be highly desirable in Turkey, 
especially if technology and service neutrality are ensured within the sub-
bands to be established. In Turkey, this would be easier than elsewhere due 
to the relatively short duration of the licenses awarded to broadcasters. As 
shown below, in table 13, the additional value of devoting part of the UHF 
bad to mobile services, in particular two-way networks, is remarkable. 
Table 13 – Economic impacts of spectrum use in the EU economy 
 
 
The same rationale applies to Turkey, even more since 3G and WiMAX 
applications are currently suffering from delays (3G) and a questionable 
selection of the band to be used (WiMAX). Using the upper UHF band for 
BWA services would boost Turkey’s economy in terms of direct benefits to 
operators, OEMs, economic output per MHz; indirect benefits due to 
mobile productivity, user and producer surplus; and more and better jobs.  
• Refraining from adopting a regulation that imposes the convergence 
towards a “single efficient MTR” is desirable for Turkey in the short term, 
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due to the need to “close the gap” with the EU27 in terms of advanced 
mobile services, and most notably 3G.   
• The adoption of the AVMS Directive, coupled with spectrum reform 
objectives and improved governance of spectrum through a 
reorganisation of competences between the RTUK, the HYK and the BTK, is 
likely to bring substantial benefits to Turkey. In addition to Scenario 3, the 
spectrum objectives are key to Turkey’s future competitiveness in this field, 
as well as for the alignment with current plans being formulated in several 
EU member states.  
• Implementing current plans on number portability is the best solution for 
Turkey as of now, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.4 above. Expected 
benefits would accrue mostly to end users in terms of more aggressive 
competition, whereas MNOs would bear the costs of ensuring portability, 
which are not negligible and may lead to a counterbalancing effect on 
prices.  
• Besides adopting a glide path to eliminate the asymmetry in mobile 
termination rates – the impact of which was discussed under Scenario 3 
above – in scenario 4 also the internal non-discrimination obligation 
imposed on one SMP player in market 16 (Turkcell) would be withdrawn. 
As recalled in section 3.1.5 above, the Commission has challenged this 
provision in several occasions, especially when it overlaps with regulated 
MTRs. Its removal is likely to produce direct benefits to MNOs, in terms of 
a more levelled-playing field; and to end users, in terms of a more efficient 
development of the mobile market overtime. 
• Finally, although the actual impact is very hard to quantify, strengthening 
NRA-NCA cooperation, planning a reduction of state ownership of 
incumbents, increasing transparency and adopting RIA would all be very 
important steps for Turkey. The NCA can assist the NRA in an increasingly 
complex competitive environment, where defining the relevant market, 
understanding modern business strategies and even calculating market 
shares can become particularly tough. Reduced state ownership, coupled 
with increased NRA independence, was found to be positively correlated 
with a reduction in interconnection rates and retail prices. For example, 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) examine the effects of public ownership 
and regulatory agency independence on interconnection charges in the EU, 
and find that public ownership of the incumbent affects interconnection 
rates positively. They estimate that a 1% decrease in single transit 
interconnection charges on the incumbent network have led to a 0.31% 
decrease in incumbent national prices at peak times, as calculated for the 
average prices in the EU in 2002. 
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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF SCENARIO 4 
Scenario 3 – “Full alignment” with the acquis 
BENEFITS  
Investment (foreign and 
domestic)  
5 
• Easier entry; stronger regulatory certainty; opportunities to invest in new technologies to be used in the UHF and other valuable 
spectrum bands; opportunity to enter as fixed-line operator (through the investment ladder” model, MVNO or both; possibility to 
deliver content in any language. 
Competition 5 
• In this scenario, competition would be boosted, also due to stronger NRA capacity and independence, pro-active policy and availability of 
spectrum.  
• Changes in the governance of the audiovisual sector will create new entry opportunities.  
Benefits to end users 4 
• Broadband prices likely to fall due to the combination of reduced public ownership and stronger NRA independence (approx. 0.31% 
reduction in retail prices for each 1% drop in interconnection prices). 
• Entry of MVNOs can increase choice for end users and/or lower prices. 
• Better access to audiovisual content, both linear and non-linear, though a lot depends on spectrum policy  
Harmonisation with EU 
acquis 
4 
• Full (depending on actual implementation of rules) 
Macroeconomic benefits 5 
• Proactive policy, if carefully implemented, can boost GDP, productivity, innovation, etc. 
• Spectrum availability in the upper UHF band can boost growth and jobs in Turkey 
• Improvement due to more competitive markets and relaxation of inward FDI restrictions in audiovisual services.  
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COSTS  
Costs to industry players 2 
• Costs for MNOs that currently profit from higher MTRs 
• Potential costs to MNOs of mandatory MVNO entry (if any), in terms of reduced profitability (also due to persisting asymmetry in 
MTRs) 
• Costs for Turkish content producers of alignment with the AVMS Directive 
Costs to end users 1 
• Lower prices, more choice 
Switching/harmonisation 
costs 
5 
• Need to change the administration of the USF 
• Need to migrate to the general authorisation regime 
• Need to change the rules in the audiovisual services sector 
• Need to reduce state ownership 
• Need to re-auction spectrum licenses in several bands 
Employment costs 1 
• None 
Administrative burdens 4 
• The general authorisation regime is way less burdensome than the status quo 
• Costs of reforming spectrum policy (auctions, licensing issues, etc.) 
• Tendering procedure for reducing public ownership of industry operators 
• Costs of revising procedures in the delineation of competences of BTK, RTUK and HYK. 
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4.3 The preferred scenario 
Table 14 below shows the results of our scorecard analysis of the four scenarios 
assessed in the previous sections. We also show, merely for ease of reading, the 
average score in the benefits and cost categories considered. This must not be 
taken as a quantification exercise, but only as a way to improve the readability 
of the table and the comparison between the options, as we do not attempt, in 
general, to put weights on the specific benefit and cost categories.  
As shown in the Table, even if Scenario 4 is on average considered more costly 
than Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 – mostly due to switching and harmonisation costs –, 
it is preferable to all other alternatives due to the significant benefits that would 
accrue to Turkish citizens and stakeholders.  
Table 14 – Comparison of scenarios assessed 
 
4.3.1 The preferred scenario: timing issues 
As shown above, the preferred scenario for Turkey is Scenario 4, in which the 
current debate on future EU rules (including rules on termination and 
portability) is not fully mirrored by the Turkish framework, and more time is 
left for operators to close the gap with the EU27 in sectors that have been 
affected by delays (e.g. in 3G services). In this section, we explore the potential 
timing and sequencing issues that can lead Turkey towards the implementation 
of a welfare-enhancing policy strategy in the e-communications and media 
sectors. In particular, we recommend the following steps: 
• Step 1 – setting the stage: in this phase, Turkey should ensure that the basic 
preconditions for improving the regulatory framework and liberalising the 
e-communications and media sectors are present. These include the 
following: 
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o Moving to a general authorisation system (expected in May 2009); 
o Alignment with the Universal Service Directive, elimination of cross-
subsidies and transparency in the use of the USF; 
o Strengthening NRA independence and regulatory capacity; 
o Adopting a clear and modern spectrum policy; 
o Adopting a glide path on termination rates and avoiding the internal 
non-discrimination principle; 
o Reduction of the Special Communications Tax for mobile to 15%; 
o Issuing a policy statement on the regulatory model that will be adopted 
to encourage competitive entry in the broadband sector (possibly, a joint 
paper by the NRA and NCA, which includes a cooperation agreement). 
• Step 2 – completing the alignment with the EU acquis: in this phase, 
Turkey should complete its alignment with the EU regulatory framework, 
by adopting policy measures in the following areas 
o Alignment with the AVMS Directive; 
o Careful implementation of the “investment ladder” model; 
o Authorisation of MVNOs; 
o Elimination of the Special Communications Tax and Treasury Share; 
• Step 3 – shaping Turkey’s future policy: this step includes the following 
activities: 
o Clustering of UHF spectrum bands in line with the Commission 
communication on the digital dividend; 
o Use of upper UHF band to bridge the digital divide; 
o Reduction of the time needed for mobile number portability to less than 
5 days; 
o Reduction of state ownership of incumbents; 
o Adoption of mandatory Regulatory Impact Assessment for all NRA 
decisions. 
The timing of the three steps is of essence. As shown in the Figure below, we 
recommend that Turkey completes the first step by the end of 2009 and the 
second step by mid-2010. Step 3 should be completed at the latest by the end of 
2011.  
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Figure 23 – proposed timing of steps 
Jan 09 Jun 09 Jan 2010 Jun 2010 Jan 2011 Jun 2011 Jan 2012
• General authorisation
• Alignment of USO 
regulation
• NRA independence
• Spectrum policy
• Glide path + elimination 
of internal non‐
discrimination obligation;
• Reduction of SCT to 15%;
• Policy statement on the 
regulatory model
• Alignment with the AVMS 
Dicrective
• Implementation of 
“investment ladder”
• Authorisation of MVNOs;
• Elimination of SCT and 
and Treasury Share
• Clustering and use of UHF 
to bridge the digi. Divide
• Reduction of state 
ownership of incumbent 
players
• Adoption of mandatory 
RIA for all decisions
Step 1
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Step 3
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the past few years, also in view of its accession negotiations with the EU, 
Turkey has launched very important and ambitious reforms in the information 
society and media sector. Even more substantial changes are expected in 2009, 
after the new e-communications law has been approved at the end of 2008. 
Apart from the 49 expected pieces of secondary legislation foreseen to 
implement the new Law No 5809, Turkey has also planned important steps in 
the domain of spectrum policy, with licenses for WiMAX soon to be awarded.  
In this report, we have analysed the current state of advancement of Turkey’s 
regulatory reform in this sector, and formulated suggestions for reform on the 
basis of a complex and articulated impact assessment exercise. Our final 
conclusion is that Turkey may profit significantly from a set of targeted 
reforms, aimed at solving existing problems that have been highlighted, i.a., by 
the European Commission and also by the recent ECTA Scorecard 2008. These 
include, very briefly:  
• The streamlining of primary legislation – possibly through a consolidated 
text, which clarifies the currently confusing framework created by the 
enactment of a law (No 5809) that overlaps and co-exists with previous 
laws and by-laws.  
• A more proactive approach towards the liberalization of the fixed-line and 
broadband sectors, possibly by implementing the investment ladder model 
(due to lack of alternative infrastructure) and, in the medium-term, by 
addressing the problems of limited access to the local loops, 
concentration of all infrastructures in the hands of the same player, 
spectrum liberalization and the optimal choice of the band to be used for 
WiMAX.  
• Efforts to bring the regulatory framework in line with the EU framework, 
especially in the areas of Universal Service, spectrum policy and mobile 
termination rates. 
• A clear and reliable plan to drastically reduce taxation in the area of mobile and 
internet services, thus boosting usage (also in terms of MoU) and 
penetration. 
• Striving for “better regulation”, by prioritizing the clear delineation of roles 
and responsibilities between the various authorities active in the field, 
from ITCA to RTÜK, the Competition Authority, the Ministry of 
Transport, etc.; and also by providing for systematic use of impact 
assessment and public consultation.   
For each of the goals identified, it is very important that the Turkish 
government specifies the indicators it plans to use to monitor the effectiveness 
of its regulatory and legislative measures, with what frequency it plans to 
review such indicators, and what would happen in case indicators are clearly 
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not met. In short, the use of a “review clause”, coupled with constant and 
measurable monitoring of market development, would facilitate the dialogue 
between the regulator and stakeholders, as well as with the European 
Commission within accession negotiations.  
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